UTCS Cryptography and Network Security Seminar: Amit Sahai/UCLA: "A New Paradigm for Secure Protocols" ACES 2.402, Friday, May 8, 2009 11:00 a.m.
Type of Talk: UTCS Cryptography and Network Security
Speaker/Affiliation: Amit Sahai/UCLA
Friday, May 8, 2009 11:00 a.m.
Location: ACES 2.402
ost: Brent Waters
Talk Title: "A New Paradigm for Secure
One of the most fundamental go
als in cryptography is to design protocols that remain secure when adversar
ial participants can engage in arbitrary malicious behavior. In 1986
, Goldreich, Micali, and Wigderson presented a powerful paradigm for des
igning such protocols: their approach reduced the task of designing secure
protocols to designing protocols that only guarantee security against "
;honest-but-curious" participants. By making use of zero-knowledge p
roofs, the GMW paradigm enforces honest behavior without compromising secr
ecy. Over the past two decades, this approach has been the dominant
paradigm for cryptographic protocol design.
In this talk, we p
resent a new general paradigm for secure protocol design. Our approach also
reduces the task of designing secure protocols to designing protocols that
only guarantee security against honest-but-curious participants. Ho
wever, our approach avoids the use of zero-knowledge proofs, and instead
makes use of multi-party protocols in a much simpler setting - where the ma
jority of participants are completely honest (such multi-party protocols ca
n exist without requiring any computational assumptions). Our paradi
gm yields protocols that rely on Oblivious Transfer (OT) as a building bloc
k. This offers a number of advantages in generality and
In contrast to the GMW paradigm, by avoiding the use of ze
ro-knowledge proofs, our paradigm is able to treat all of its building blo
cks as "black boxes". This allows us to improve over previous r
esults in the area of secure computation. In particular, we obtain:
br />* Conceptually simpler and more efficient ways for basing unconditiona
lly secure cryptography on OT.
* More efficient protocols for ge
nerating a large number of OTs using a small number of OTs.
cure and efficient protocols which only make a black-box use of cryptograph
ic primitives or underlying algebraic structures in settings where no such
protocols were known before.
This talk is based on joint works w
ith Yuvali Ishai (Technion and UCLA) and Manoj Prabhakaran (UIUC).
Professor Amit Sahai received his Ph.D. in Computer Scien
ce from MIT in 2000. From 2000 to 2004, he was a professor at Princeton Un
iversity; in 2004 he joined UCLA as an Associate Professor of Computer Sci
ence, and as Associate Director of the Center for Information and Computat
ion Security. His research interests are in security and cryptography, and
theoretical computer science more broadly. He has published more than 60 o
riginal technical research papers at venues such as the ACM Symposium on Th
eory of Computing (STOC), CRYPTO, and the Journal of the ACM. He has give
n a number of invited talks at institutions such as MIT, Stanford, and Be
rkeley, including the 2004 Distinguished Cryptographer Lecture Series at N
TT Labs, Japan. Professor Sahai is the recipient of numerous honors; he w
as named an Alfred P. Sloan Foundation Research Fellow in 2002, and receiv
ed an Okawa Research Award in 2007. His research has been covered by severa
l news agencies including the BBC World Service.
*Special Note: This
talk will be part of the Cryptography and Network Security Seminar. The sem
inar was recently created to bring together ideas in cryptography and syste
ms security. We are happy to have Amit Sahai as our inaugural and distingui
shed speaker of our seminar.
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