We investigate the relationship between two epistemic nonmonotonic formalisms: autoepistemic logic and introspective circumscription. Finitely axiomatized autoepistemic theories are shown to be equivalent to the propositional case of introspective circumscription. This theorem is applied to the problem of relating the usual "minimizing" circumscription to autoepistemic logic.

PS

In Theoretical Aspects of Reasoning about Knowledge: Proceedings Fifth Conf., Fagin, Ronald (Eds.), pp. 197-207 1994.

@INPROCEEDINGS{gel94, title={Autoepistemic Logic and Introspective Circumscription}, author={Michael Gelfond and Vladimir Lifschitz and Halina Przymusinska and Grigori Schwarz}, booktitle={Theoretical Aspects of Reasoning about Knowledge: Proceedings Fifth Conf.}, editor={Fagin, Ronald}, pages={197-207}, url="http://www.cs.utexas.edu/users/ai-lab?gel94", year={1994} }