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Michael L. Littman and
Peter Stone
With the increasing reliance on game theory as a foundation for auctions and electronic commerce, efficient algorithms for computing equilibria in multiplayer general-sum games are of great theoretical and practical interest. The computational complexity of finding a Nash equilibrium for a one-shot bimatrix game is a well known open problem. This paper treats a related but distinct problem, that of finding a Nash equilibrium for an average-payoff repeated bimatrix game, and presents a polynomial-time algorithm. Our approach draws on the well known ``folk theorem'' from game theory and shows how finite-state equilibrium strategies can be found efficiently and expressed succinctly.
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Citation:
Decision Support Systems
, Vol. 39 (2005), pp. 55-66.
Bibtex:
@article{DSS04, title={A Polynomial-time Nash Equilibrium Algorithm for Repeated Games}, author={Michael L. Littman and Peter Stone}, volume={39}, journal={Decision Support Systems}, pages={55-66}, url="http://www.cs.utexas.edu/users/ai-lab/pub-view.php?PubID=126569", year={2005} }
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Peter Stone
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pstone [at] cs utexas edu
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Game Theory
Multiagent Systems
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