Decision-Theoretic Bidding Based on Learned Density Models in Simultaneous, Interacting Auctions (2003)
Peter Stone, Robert E. Schapire, Michael L. Littman, J'anos A. Csirik, and David McAllester
Auctions are becoming an increasingly popular method for transacting business, especially over the Internet. This article presents a general approach to building autonomous bidding agents to bid in multiple simultaneous auctions for interacting goods. A core component of our approach learns a model of the empirical price dynamics based on past data and uses the model to analytically calculate, to the greatest extent possible, optimal bids. We introduce a new and general boosting-based algorithm for conditional density estimation problems of this kind, i.e., supervised learning problems in which the goal is to estimate the entire conditional distribution of the real-valued label. This approach is fully implemented as ATTac, a top-scoring agent in the second Trading Agent Competition (TAC-01). We present experiments demonstrating the effectiveness of our boosting-based price predictor relative to several reasonable alternatives.
View:
PDF, PS, HTML
Citation:
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research, Vol. 19 (2003), pp. 209-242.
Bibtex:

Peter Stone Faculty pstone [at] cs utexas edu