| |
|
| Date |
Topic |
Assignment |
| T 1/17 |
Game-Theoretic Concepts |
|
| Th 1/19 |
Voting: Social Welfare Functions |
|
| T 1/24 |
Voting: Social Choice Functions |
|
| Th 1/26 |
Voting: Single-Peaked Preferences |
|
| T 1/31 |
Stable Marriage: Introduction |
|
| Th 2/2 |
Stable Marriage: Core Characterization |
1 out |
| T 2/7 |
Stable Marriage: Strategic Considerations |
|
| Th 2/9 |
Stable Marriage: Generalizations |
|
| T 2/14 |
House Allocation: Introduction |
|
| Th 2/16 |
House Allocation: Core Characterization |
|
| T 2/21 |
Matching with Complex Preferences: A Labor Market Model |
1 in, 2 out |
| Th 2/23 |
Matching with Complex Preferences: Gross Substitutability |
|
| T 2/28 |
The Assignment Game: Introduction |
|
| Th 3/1 |
The Assignment Game: Core Characterization |
|
| T 3/6 |
A Multiobject Auction Mechanism: Introduction |
|
| Th 3/8 |
A Multiobject Auction Mechanism: Incentive-Compatibility |
2 in, 3 out |
| T 3/13 |
SPRING BREAK |
|
| Th 3/15 |
SPRING BREAK |
|
| T 3/20 |
The Hungarian Algorithm |
|
| Th 3/22 |
The Vickrey Auction |
|
| T 3/27 |
The Vickrey-Clarke-Groves Mechanism: Introduction |
|
| Th 3/29 |
The Vickrey-Clarke-Groves Mechanism: Applications |
3 in, 4 out |
| T 4/3 |
Riley and Samuelson's Auctions |
|
| Th 4/5 |
The Myerson Mechanism |
|
| T 4/10 |
Combinatorial Auctions |
|
| Th 4/12 |
Combinatorial Auctions |
|
| T 4/17 |
Cost Sharing: Shapley Value |
4 in, 5 out |
| Th 4/19 |
Cost Sharing: Applications |
|
| T 4/24 |
Market Equilibria: Fisher's Linear Case |
|
| Th 4/26 |
Market Equilibria: Algorithms |
|
| T 5/1 |
Sponsored Search |
|
| Th 5/3 |
Sponsored Search |
5 in |