CS378
Autonomous Multiagent Systems
Spring 2004

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The University of Texas at Austin

Week 12a: Tuesday, April 13th

Good Afternoon, Colleagues

Are there any questions?

Department of Computer Sciences

The University of Texas at Austin

UTCS

Logistics

- Final tournament times

  – M-F 10:30am, 12:30, 2:30pm?

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- Next week's readings

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- Questions required on Thursday!

Distributed Rational Decision Making

Self-interested, rational agent

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Distributed Rational Decision Making

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The protocol is key

Evaluation Criteria

- Social welfare

- Pareto efficiency

- Stability

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- Efficiency (computational, communication)

Voting vs. auctions

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    – result affects all

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- Voting: maximize social good

  – result affects all

- Auctions: maximize profit

  – result affects buyer and seller

Class Discussion

Irvin Hwang on auctions (and candy bars)

Auctions

- Valuations:

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  - private value

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  – second-price sealed-bid (Vickrey)

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    Revenue equivalence: private-value, risk-neutral

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- What if it's an antique?

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