

Adaptive Mechanism Design: A Metalearning Approach

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
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Auction Example

- Consider a book seller using an auction service
- Seller must choose **parameters** defining auction
- Goal is to maximize revenue
- Optimal parameters depend on **bidder population**




Analytical Approach

- Traditional approach
 - (e.g. Myerson 81, Milgrom and Weber 82)
- **Assumptions** are made about
 - bidder motivations (valuations, risk aversion, etc.)
 - information available to bidders
 - bidder rationality
- Derive equilibrium strategies
- What if assumptions are incorrect?
 - **revise assumptions**
 - requires time and human input
 - problem if limited time between auctions


Empirical Approach

- Possible if historical data on similar auctions
- Do **data mining** to identify optimal parameters (e.g. Shmueli 05)
 - a number of businesses provide this service



For “The Cat in the Hat”, you should run a 3-day auction starting on Thursday with a starting bid of \$5.

Empirical Approach



- What if the item is new and no data exists?
- What if there is a sudden change in demand?




Overview

- Motivation
- Adaptive auction mechanisms
- Bidding scenario
- Adaptive mechanism implementation and results
- Incorporating predictions through metalearning
- Additional experiments

Adaptive Auction Mechanisms

- For use in situations with recurring auctions
 - repeated eBay auctions, Google keyword auctions, etc.
- Bidder behavior consistent for some period
 - possible to learn about behavior through experience
- Adapt mechanism parameters in response to auction outcomes in order to maximize some objective function (such as seller revenue)



- Seller adjusts parameters using an **adaptive algorithm**
 - characterizes function from parameters to results
 - essentially an active, online regression learner

Adaptive Auction Mechanisms

- Related work (e.g. Blum et al. 03)
 - apply online learning methods
 - few or no assumptions about bidders
 - worst case bounds
- What about the intermediate case?
 - between complete knowledge and no knowledge
 - can make some predictions about bidders
 - choose adaptive algorithm using this information


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Loss Averse Bidders

- Loss aversion: utility of gain = X ,
utility of loss = $-X$
- Loss averse bidders “lose” if outbid after they were the high bidder
- 2 bidder equilibrium: (Dodonova 2005)
- Reserve price important


Loss Averse Bidders




Auction Scenario

- Our seller has 1000 books to sell in auctions
 - series of English auctions with choice of reserve price
- The seller interacts with a **population of bidders**:
 - bidders characterized by valuation v , loss aversion
 - the **population is characterized by distributions** over v ,
 - $0 < v < 1$; $1 < < 2.5$
- Assume Gaussian distributions
 - mean of v chosen from $[0, 1]$; mean of from $[1, 2.5]$
 - variances are 10^x , where x chosen from $[-2, 1]$
- **2 bidders** per auction, following equilibrium

Individual populations:



Average:







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Adaptive Algorithm (Bandit)

- Discretize choices of reserve price (k choices)
- Results in a k -armed bandit problem
- Tradeoff between exploration and exploitation
- Sample averaging + softmax action selection:
 - Record avg_i and $count_i$ for each choice
 - Choose i with probability $(e^{avg_i/\tau})/(\sum_{j=1}^k e^{avg_j/\tau})$
 - controls exploration vs exploitation, often decreases

Adaptive Algorithm (Bandit)







Adaptive Algorithm Parameters

- k (number of discrete choices)
- $start, end$ (decrease linearly over time)
- How to initialize values of avg_i and $count_i$?
 - optimistic initialization
- We choose these **by hand**:
 - $k = 13$
 - $start = 0.1, end = 0.01$
 - $avg_i = 0.6, count_i = 1$

Adaptive Algorithm (Regression)

- Bandit - restricts choices, assumes independence
- Solve by using regression:
 - **Locally Weighted Quadratic Regression** (instance based)
 - can estimate revenue at any point
 - considers all experience, uses a Gaussian weighting kernel
- Continue to discretize choices, but at high resolution
- Parameters nearly the same
 - need to choose kernel width (0.1)


Adaptive Algorithm (Regression)



Results

- Average results over 10,000 generated bidder populations
- Significant with 99% confidence (paired t-tests)

Adaptive algorithm	Avg. revenue
best fixed reserve price (0.54)	0.367
bandit	0.374
regression	0.385




Overview




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Taking Advantage of Predictions

- Adaptive mechanism requires no assumptions
- But what if reasonable **predictions** are possible?
- Example: selling a brand new book
 - could make guesses about bidder valuations, strategies
 - could consider books with similar author or subject



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
Taking Advantage of Predictions

- Seller can predict plausible bidder populations
- Adaptive mechanism should work well if correct

Metalearning

- Suppose seller can simulate bidder populations
- Choose an **adaptive algorithm that is parameterized**
- Search for optimal parameters in simulation
- An instance of **metalearning**

Metalearning



Simulation of Bidders by the Seller

- Suppose seller can predict possible populations (distributions of v and)
- Essentially a **distribution over bidder populations**
- Choose adaptive algorithm that performs best *with respect to this distribution*

Adaptive Parameters

- Now chosen through metalearning
- *start*, *end*
- Kernel width
- avg_i and $count_i$
 - optimistic initialization becomes **initial experience**

Parameter Search

- A **stochastic optimization task**
- Use Simultaneous Perturbation Stochastic Approximation (SPSA):
 - generate two estimates for slightly different parameters
 - move in direction of gradient
- Start with previously hand chosen parameters
- Time consuming, but **done offline**

Search Results

Bandit approach

$$start = .0423$$



$$end = .0077$$

Regression approach

$$start = .0081$$

$$end = .0013$$


kernel width = .138



Results

- Average results over 10,000 populations drawn from predicted distribution
- Significant with 99% confidence (paired t-tests)

Adaptive algorithm	Avg. revenue
best fixed reserve price (0.54)	0.367
bandit, initial parameters	0.374
bandit, learned parameters	0.394
regression, initial parameters	0.385
regression, learned parameters	0.405



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Questions

- Why not learn a model of the population?
- What if the population behaves unexpectedly? (different from simulated)
- What if the population changes over time?

Modeling the Population

- Bayesian approach
 - maintain probability distribution over possible populations (distributions of v and)
 - update after each new observation (auction result)
 - softmax action selection using expected revenues

Adaptive method	Avg. revenue
Bayesian approach	0.407
regression, initial parameters	0.385
regression, learned parameters	0.405

Unexpected Behavior

- Generate populations differently
 - before: mean of v in $[0, 1]$; mean of θ in $[1, 2.5]$
 - now: mean of v in $[\cdot 3, \cdot 7]$; mean of θ in $[1.5, 2]$

Adaptive method	Avg. revenue
Bayesian approach	0.414
regression, initial parameters	0.575
regression, learned parameters	0.593

Related Work

- Evolve ZIP traders and CDA together (Cliff 01)
- Evolve buyer and seller strategies and auction mechanism with genetic programming (Phelps et al. 02)
- Identify optimal price parameter of sealed bid auction for various bidder populations (Byde 03)

Future Work

- Encountered populations with unexpected behavior
- Non-stationary populations
- Learning populations
- Multiple mechanism parameters
- More sophisticated adaptive algorithms
- Evaluate on actual auction data

Conclusion

- Described design of adaptive auction mechanisms
- Experimented with a specific bidder scenario
- Adaptive mechanism outperforms fixed one
- Introduced metalearning approach
- Improve performance when predictions available

