# CS 329E Midterm
# Sample Questions
# Instructor: Dr. Bill Young

Name: _____

*Read all questions carefully.* Answer all questions in the space provided. You may use scratch paper to do your work but only answers recorded on the test paper will be graded. Be as concise as possible. *Note: this gives you an idea of the types of questions that could be asked, but this is quite a bit longer than an hour test.*

1. (10 points) Suppose you have a secure system with three subjects and three objects, with levels as listed below.

| **Type** | **Name** | **Level** |
|---|---|---|
| Object | Obj1 | $(H, \{A, B\})$ |
| Object | Obj2 | $(L, \{B\})$ |
| Object | Obj3 | $(L, \{A, B\})$ |
| Subject | Subj1 | $(L, \{A, B\})$ |
| Subject | Subj2 | $(H, \emptyset)$ |
| Subject | Subj3 | $(L, \{A, B, C\})$ |

Here $H$ dominates $L$. You wish to implement a Bell and LaPadula model of security for this system. Fill in the access rights (**R** and/or **W**) permitted by the model for each subject/object pair in the access matrix below:

| | **Obj1** | **Obj2** | **Obj3** |
|---|---|---|---|
| **Subj1** | | | |
| **Subj2** | | | |
| **Subj3** | | | |

**Also answer this question for Biba Strict Integrity Policy, instead of Bell and Lapadula.**

| | **Obj1** | **Obj2** | **Obj3** |
|---|---|---|---|
| **Subj1** | | | |
| **Subj2** | | | |
| **Subj3** | | | |

2. (10 points) Imagine a Bell and LaPadula-like secure system with the following five operations.

   **(READ s o):** if the subject and object exist and $L(s) \geq L(o)$, the subject obtains the current value of the object; otherwise, do nothing.

   **(WRITE s o v):** if the subject and object exist and $L(s) \leq L(o)$, the object gets value $v$; otherwise, do nothing.

   **(CREATE s o):** add a new object with the given name, a level equal to the subject's level, and an initial value of 0. If an object of that name exists, do nothing.

   **(DESTROY s o):** eliminate the designated object from the state, assuming that the object exists and the subject has WRITE access to it. Otherwise, do nothing.

   Describe a covert channel in this system. That is, show a series of instructions that will send a 0 from high to low, and another that will send a 1 from high to low.

   *You might also be asked to display the row in the shared resource matrix appropriate for this system that reflects the channel.*

3. (Short answer – 2 points each) Fill in the word or phrase that *best* matches the description provided. In most cases, what is needed is a general term, not a specific instance of the concept.

   (a) _____ Security concern involving whether resources are on hand when needed.

   (b) _____ Describes an information transmission medium over which a message is transmitted without distortion or loss of information.

   (c) _____ An encryption algorithm that replaces each symbol uniformly by another symbol.

   (d) _____ The common name for the partial order among security levels in a hierarchical access control system such as Bell and LaPadula.

   (e) _____ An information transmission medium that utilizes system resouces that were not designed to transmit information.

   (f) _____ The aspect of security concerning who can alter or modify stored information.

   (g) _____ Security policy that says that an agent cannot access information for a client if he has previously served a client in the same "conflict" class.

   (h) _____ The property that says that the levels of subjects and/or objects can vary, but only in ways that don't violate the system security properties.

   (i) _____ Describes any cryptographic system that uses the same key for encryption and decryption.

4. (10 points) Declassification (lowering the security level of an object) effectively violates the *-property of Bell and LaPadula because the information in that object flows from high to low.

   (a) Would *raising* the level violate either of the BLP properties? Why or why not?

   (b) Would raising the integrity level of an object violate any principles of Biba's Strict Integrity model? Explain your answer.

5. (5 points) Suppose you work for a company with a Chinese Wall security policy with clients in the following conflict classes:

   - { Cadbury, Nestle }
   - { Ford, Chrysler, GM }
   - { Citicorp, Credit Lyonnais, Deutsche Bank }
   - { Microsoft }

   You have previously worked on cases for Nestle and Citicorp, and you are ready for a new assignment.

   List any of your company's clients for whom you *are not* able to work as your next assignment. Assume you *can* work for a client for whom you have previously worked.

6. (10 points) Steve Lipner uses the access control rules of Bell and LaPadula and of Biba's Strict Integrity policy to model a commercial security environment. The following is a simplified version of Lipner's model.

   Confidentiality labels are generated in terms of the hierarchical levels (from high to low): **AM** and **SL**. In addition there are five need-to-know categories: **D**, **PC**, **PD**, **SD**, **T**.

   Integrity labels are defined in terms of the hierarchical levels (from high to low): **ISP**, **IO**, **ISL**. There are two integrity need-to-know categories: **ID**, **IP**.

   Finally, users/objects are given labels according to their role/type:

| **User Role** | **Confidentiality** | **Integrity** |
|---|---|---|
| Ordinary users | $(SL, \{PC, PD\})$ | $(ISL, \{IP\})$ |
| System programmers | $(SL, \{SD, T\})$ | $(ISL, \{ID\})$ |
| System controllers | $(SL, \{D, PC, PD, SD, T\})$ | $(ISL, \{IP, ID\})$ |

| **Object type** | **Confidentiality** | **Integrity** |
|---|---|---|
| Production code | $(SL, \{PC\})$ | $(IO, \{IP\})$ |
| Software tools | $(SL, \{T\})$ | $(IO, \{ID\})$ |
| System programs | $(SL, \emptyset)$ | $(ISP, \{IP, ID\})$ |

   Assuming the following users/objects have the associated roles/types, fill in the table below with the R and/or W permissions that the system would allow.

| **Name** | **Role or Type** |
|---|---|
| User1 | Ordinary user |
| User2 | System programmer |
| User3 | System controller |
| Obj1 | Production code |
| Obj2 | Software tool |
| Obj3 | System program |

| | **Obj1** | **Obj2** | **Obj3** |
|---|---|---|---|
| **User1** | | | |
| **User2** | | | |
| **User3** | | | |

7. (5 points) Discuss the following question: If **Unclassified** is the lowest hierarchical security level in a Bell and LaPadula system, is it meaningful to have need-to-know compartments at this level? For example, would it make sense to have a confidentiality label of **(Unclassified, { Crypto })**? Why or why not?

8. (5 points) Labels in the Bell and Lapadula model are of the form $(L, C)$. You could map this onto a set of labels just containing categories where dominates becomes set membership, though you might have to add some new categories. First, illustrate how this would work in a system that has hierarchical levels $\{l, h\}$ and categories $\{A, B\}$ by showing how to map a label in the old system to a label in the new system that accomplishes "the same thing." Then explain *in general* how you could take an arbitrary BLP policy and implement the same policy replacing $(L, C)$ by $C'$. I.e., $dom\,(x, y)$ in the old system iff $dom\,(x', y')$ in the new system. *Think about this one, but I won't ask anything that requires this much creativity on the exam.*