Foundations of Computer Security
Lecture 24: The Clark-Wilson Model

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Lipner’s Integrity Matrix Model showed that BLP and Biba’s Strict Integrity can be adapted to yield a workable commercial policy. But it’s not necessarily a good fit.

David Clark and David Wilson (1987) argued that commercial security has its own unique concerns and merits a model crafted for that domain.

The overriding concern is consistency among the various components of the system state.

**Example:** In a bank, the funds at the beginning of the day plus the funds deposited minus the funds withdrawn should equal funds on hand at the end of the day.
Clark and Wilson claimed that the following are four fundamental concerns of any reasonable commercial integrity model:

1. **Authentication**: identity of all users must be properly authenticated.

2. **Audit**: modifications should be logged to record every program executed and by whom, in a way that cannot be subverted.

3. **Well-formed transactions**: users manipulate data only in constrained ways. Only legitimate accesses are allowed.

4. **Separation of duty**: the system associates with each user a valid set of programs they can run and prevents unauthorized modifications, thus preserving integrity and consistency with the real world.
The policy is constructed in terms of the following categories:

- **Constrained Data Items**: CDIs are the objects whose integrity is protected

- **Unconstrained Data Items**: UDIs are objects not covered by the integrity policy

- **Transformation Procedures**: TPs are the only procedures allowed to modify CDIs, or take arbitrary user input and create new CDIs. Designed to take the system from one valid state to another.

- **Integrity Verification Procedures**: IVPs are procedures meant to verify maintainance of integrity of CDIs.
There are two kinds of rules: Certification and Enforcement.

C1: All IVPs must ensure that CDIs are in a valid state when the IVP is run.

C2: All TPs must be certified as integrity-preserving.

C3: Assignment of TPs to users must satisfy separation of duty.

C4: The operation of TPs must be logged.

C5: TPs executing on UDIs must result in valid CDIs.

E1: Only certified TPs can manipulate CDIs.

E2: Users must only access CDIs by means of TPs for which they are authorized.

E3: The identify of each user attempting to execute a TP must be authenticated.
Permissions are encoded as a set of triples of the form:

$$(\text{user}, \text{TP}, \{\text{CDI set}\})$$

where \text{user} is authorized to perform a \textit{transaction procedure} TP, on the given set of \textit{constrained data items} (CDIs).

Each triple in the policy must comply with all applicable certification and enforcement rules.
Clark and Wilson identified a set of integrity concerns claimed to be of particular relevance within commercial environments: consistency, authentication, audit, etc.

They proposed a set of mechanisms explicitly designed to address those specific concerns.

Their policy is quite abstract and must be instantiated with specific data sets (constrained and unconstrained), transformation procedures, verification procedures, etc.

Next lecture: Chinese Wall Policy