
# A Case Study in Using ACL2 for Feature-Oriented Verification

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## Configurations of Features



#### Feature-Oriented Design

Modules encapsulate features, not objects

| F. |            |                    |           |                     |          |
|----|------------|--------------------|-----------|---------------------|----------|
| e  |            | Command            | User Pref | Incoming            | Outgoing |
| a_ |            | loop               | Database  | Messages            | Messages |
| t  | auto-reply | set-msg,<br>enable | response  | check/send<br>reply |          |
| r  | encryption | set-key,           | key       | check               | encrypt  |
| е  |            | enable             |           | encrypted           | message  |

Components

#### Feature-Rich Systems

- Telecommunications industry
- NASA's next-generation software base
- Symbian
- Aspects

Still greatly lacking in verification tools

#### Verification Challenges

- Exponential number of possible products!
  - verify individual features once
  - verify compositions cheaply

- Feature interactions
  - does voice mail always engage after 4 rings?

Features can share data

#### The Case Study

- Model an email system with four features
  - Host/postmaster (report unknown users)
  - Auto-response (aka vacation)
  - Encryption
  - Decryption
- Determine lemmas to modularly
  - prove properties of individual features
  - confirm properties and detect interactions

## A Basic Email System

simulate-network (hostenv, userenv, actions)
↓
do-actions (...) — do-mail

## Modeling Features

|            | Command<br>loop    | User Pref<br>Database | Incoming<br>Messages | Outgoing<br>Messages |
|------------|--------------------|-----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|
| auto-reply | set-msg,<br>enable | response              | check/send<br>reply  |                      |
| encryption | set-key,<br>enable | key                   | check<br>encrypted   | encrypt<br>message   |

#### One function for each extension to the system

- add new actions
- add user info
- add processing on incoming messages
- add processing on outgoing messages

## A Basic Email System

simulate-network (hosteny, usereny, actions) do-actions (...) — do-mail do-send do-deliver do-init do-command email-auto-init email-auto-incoming host-incoming

#### **Customizing Products**

```
(defconst *features-present* '(auto encrypt))
(defund do-init (user)
 (let-seg user
         (fif encrypt (email-encrypt-init user) user)
         (fif decrypt (email-decrypt-init user) user)
         (fif auto (email-auto-init user) user)
         user))
```

#### Verifying Features

If user has auto-response enabled and sender not in prev-recip list, send message

- Needs —init and -incoming functions
- Verify against product containing base system and auto-response feature
  - theorem refers to simulate-network
  - not really modular

#### Lightweight Product Verification

Add host to product with auto-response: prove auto-response property still holds

- build (new) product including host feature
- prove simulate-network theorem again

Lightweight means proof shouldn't require unanticipated lemmas

Ideally warn of likely feature interactions

#### Detecting Feature Interactions

- Sample interaction:
  - Auto-reply message sent to postmaster
- Often violates no properties of features
- Incompleteness makes more difficult
- Capture interaction as theorem, determine lemmas needed to confirm
  - Hope: failure to prove under lemmas indicates likely interaction

#### Supporting Modular Verification

- Lemmas about individual features crucial
  - make product verification lightweight
  - help detect feature interactions
- Four kinds of lemmas helpful
- type/format of inputs and outputs
  - environment info that might/won't change
- conditions characterizing changes
- lifting lemmas through call-graph hierarchy
- Ideally automate lemma creation

## Why Modularity?

Reviewer: modularity irrelevant for ACL2

#### We disagree

- modularity key part of design process
- features provide new form of modularity
- Research goal goes beyond ACL2

#### Reflections on ACL2

- Procedural-style natural match for features
  - features capture functional/behavioral information
- First-order limitation inhibits plug-and-play
  - Implementations use higher-order functions/classes
- Macros crucial
  - generate products and standard lemmas
- Books too restrictive for some feature lemmas
- Hands-off and disable hints simulate modular environment

#### **Questions for Experts**

Better way to achieve plug-and-play?

Way to use books for all feature lemmas?

Results on lemma generation that we should know about?