CS378
Autonomous Multiagent Systems
Spring 2005

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Department of Computer Sciences
The University of Texas at Austin

Week 10a: Tuesday, March 29th

Good Afternoon, Colleagues

Are there any questions?

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- Can GT apply to the real world?

- Are there other GT programming contests?

- What if you don't know outcomes ahead of time?

Logistics

- No more slack in the discussion schedule

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- Two talks by Rob Holte

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T-test vs. Paired T-test

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- Who's better at pacman? Chinmay or Neil?

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- Who's better at video games in general?

More Programming Competitions

- Repeat of IPD: multiple collaborative agents win

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- RoShamBo: statistics vs. direct history

Game Theory

- Multiagent systems

- Economics

- Social science, law, etc.

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- Propose a payoff matrix

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Bach/Stravinsky

		Wife	
		S	B
Me	S	2,1	0,0
	B	0,0	1,2

Matching Pennies

- We each put a penny down covered

- If they match, I win, if they don't, you win

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```
                          Player 2
                  H                   T


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  Player 1

         T      -1,1                 1,-1
```

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Nash equilibrium?

Mixed strategy equilibrium

		Player 2	
		Action 1	Action 2
Player 1	Action 1	4,8	2,0
	Action 2	6,2	0,8

Mixed strategy equilibrium

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Do actual numbers matter?