CS378
Autonomous Multiagent Systems
Spring 2005

Prof: Peter Stone
TA: Nate Kohl

Department of Computer Sciences
The University of Texas at Austin

Week 13b: Thursday, April 20th

Good Afternoon, Colleagues

Are there any questions?

Class Discussion

Mickey Ristroph on human modeling

Reinforcement Learning

- Slides from Tom Mitchell's ML book

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Peter Stone

Stackelburg Game

		Player 2	
		Action 1	Action 2
Player 1	Action 1	1,0	3,2
	Action 2	2,1	4,0

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Threats slides

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  - Learning in an environment with other, unknown, independent agents who may also be learning

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  - common payoff = search for pareto optimum
  - General sum is the interesting case:
  - Learning in an environment with other, unknown, independent agents who may also be learning
  - Need to do well against some set of agents, never too poorly, and well against yourself.