

CS378

Autonomous Multiagent Systems

Spring 2005

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Week 9b: Thursday, March 23rd

Good Afternoon, Colleagues

Are there any questions?

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- minimax vs. maximin
- why so much about PD?
- how do you find NEQ?
- what if there are multiple NEQ?

Game Theory

- Multiagent systems
- Economics
- Social science, law, etc.

Class Discussion

Vishal Marocha on Commitment

Vishal's Game 1

		P2	
		D	C
P1	D	2, 2	4, 1
	C	1, 3	3, 4

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- P1 commits C : $(C,D) = (3,4)$
- P2 commits D : $(D,D) = (2,2)$

Vishal's Game 1

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		D	C
P1	D	2, 2	4, 1
	C	1, 3	3, 4

- No commitment: $(D,D) = (2,2)$
- P1 commits D : $(D,D) = (2,2)$
- P1 commits C : $(C,D) = (3,4)$
- P2 commits D : $(D,D) = (2,2)$
- P2 commits C : $(D,C) = (4,1)$

Vishal's Game 2

		P2		
		A	B	C
P1	A	5, 5	4, 3	1, 4
	B	4, 4	7, 8	10, 10
	C	3, 19	6, 21	20, 20