@COMMENT This file was generated by bib2html.pl version 0.90
@COMMENT written by Patrick Riley
@COMMENT This file came from Peter Stone's publication pages at
@COMMENT http://www.cs.utexas.edu/~pstone/papers
@article(DSS04,
author="Michael L.~Littman and Peter Stone",
title="A Polynomial-time {N}ash Equilibrium Algorithm for Repeated Games",
journal="Decision Support Systems",
year="2005",
volume="39",
pages="55--66 ",
abstract={
With the increasing reliance on game theory as a
foundation for auctions and electronic commerce,
efficient algorithms for computing equilibria in
multiplayer general-sum games are of great
theoretical and practical interest. The
computational complexity of finding a Nash
equilibrium for a one-shot bimatrix game is a well
known open problem. This paper treats a related but
distinct problem, that of finding a Nash equilibrium
for an average-payoff repeated bimatrix game,
and presents a polynomial-time algorithm. Our
approach draws on the well known ``folk theorem''
from game theory and shows how finite-state
equilibrium strategies can be found efficiently and
expressed succinctly.
},
wwwnote={An earlier version appeared in the proceedings of the fourth annual ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce

Official version from Decision Support Systems},
)