Peter Stone's Selected Publications

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Leading a Best-Response Teammate in an Ad Hoc Team

Peter Stone, Gal A. Kaminka, and Jeffrey S. Rosenschein. Leading a Best-Response Teammate in an Ad Hoc Team. In Esther David, Enrico Gerding, David Sarne, and Onn Shehory, editors, Agent-Mediated Electronic Commerce: Designing Trading Strategies and Mechanisms for Electronic Markets, pp. 132–146, Springer Verlag, November 2010.
Official version from publisher's webpage

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Abstract

Teams of agents may not always be developed in a planned, coordinated fashion. Rather, as deployed agents become more common in e-commerce and other settings, there are increasing opportunities for previously unacquainted agents to cooperate in ad hoc team settings. In such scenarios, it is useful for individual agents to be able to collaborate with a wide variety of possible teammates under the philosophy that not all agents are fully rational. This paper considers an agent that is to interact repeatedly with a teammate that will adapt to this interaction in a particular suboptimal, but natural way. We formalize this setting in game-theoretic terms, provide and analyze a fully-implemented algorithm for finding optimal action sequences, prove some theoretical results pertaining to the lengths of these action sequences, and provide empirical results pertaining to the prevalence of our problem of interest in random interaction settings.

BibTeX Entry

@Incollection(AMEC09,
	author="Peter Stone and Gal A.\ Kaminka and Jeffrey S.\ Rosenschein",
	title="Leading a Best-Response Teammate in an Ad Hoc Team",
	booktitle="Agent-Mediated Electronic Commerce: Designing Trading Strategies and Mechanisms for Electronic Markets",
	editor="Esther David and Enrico Gerding and David Sarne and Onn Shehory",
	month="November",
	year="2010",
	pages="132--146",
	publisher="Springer Verlag",
	abstract={Teams of agents may not always be developed in a
		  planned, coordinated fashion.  Rather, as deployed
		  agents become more common in e-commerce and other
		  settings, there are increasing opportunities for
		  previously unacquainted agents to cooperate in ad
		  hoc team settings.  In such scenarios, it is useful
		  for individual agents to be able to collaborate with
		  a wide variety of possible teammates under the
		  philosophy that not all agents are fully rational.
		  This paper considers an agent that is to interact
		  repeatedly with a teammate that will adapt to this
		  interaction in a particular suboptimal, but natural
		  way.  We formalize this setting in game-theoretic
		  terms, provide and analyze a fully-implemented
		  algorithm for finding optimal action sequences,
		  prove some theoretical results pertaining to the
		  lengths of these action sequences, and provide
		  empirical results pertaining to the prevalence of
		  our problem of interest in random interaction
		  settings.},
	wwwnote={Official version from <a href="http://www.springer.com/business+%26+management/business+information+systems/book/978-3-642-15116-3">publisher's webpage</a>},
)

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