Peter Stone's Selected Publications

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Auction-based autonomous intersection management

Dustin Carlino, Stephen D. Boyles, and Peter Stone. Auction-based autonomous intersection management. In Proceedings of the 16th IEEE Intelligent Transportation Systems Conference (ITSC), October 2013.

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Abstract

Autonomous vehicles present new opportunities for addressing traffic congestion through flexible traffic control schemes. This paper explores the possibility that auctions could be run at each intersection to determine the order in which drivers perform conflicting movements. While such a scheme would be infeasible for human drivers, autonomous vehicles are capable of quickly and seamlessly bidding on behalf of human passengers. Specifically, this paper investigates applying autonomous vehicle auctions at traditional intersections using stop signs and traffic signals, as well as to autonomous reservation protocols. This paper also addresses the issue of fairness by having a benevolent system agent bid to maintain a reasonable travel time for drivers with low budgets. An implementation of the mechanism in a microscopic simulator is presented, and experiments on city-scale maps are performed.

BibTeX Entry

@InProceedings{ITSC13-dcarlino,
  author = {Dustin Carlino and Stephen D. Boyles and Peter Stone},
  title = {Auction-based autonomous intersection management},
  booktitle = {Proceedings of the 16th IEEE Intelligent Transportation Systems Conference (ITSC)},
  location = {The Hague, Netherlands},
  month = {October},
  year = {2013},
  abstract = {
  Autonomous vehicles present new opportunities for addressing traffic
  congestion through flexible traffic control schemes. This paper explores the
  possibility that auctions could be run at each intersection to determine the
  order in which drivers perform conflicting movements. While such a scheme
  would be infeasible for human drivers, autonomous vehicles are capable of
  quickly and seamlessly bidding on behalf of human passengers.  Specifically,
  this paper investigates applying autonomous vehicle auctions at traditional
  intersections using stop signs and traffic signals, as well as to autonomous
  reservation protocols. This paper also addresses the issue of fairness by
  having a benevolent system agent bid to maintain a reasonable travel time for
  drivers with low budgets. An implementation of the mechanism in a microscopic
  simulator is presented, and experiments on city-scale maps are performed.
  },
}

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