Exploiting Design-for-Debug for Flexible SoC Security Architecture

A. Basak, S. Bhunia, and S. Ray

In C. Alpert, M. McNamara, X. S. Hu, N. Chang, and V. Bertacco editors, 53rd International ACM/EDAC/IEEE Design Automation Conference (DAC 2016), Austin, TX, USA, June 2016, pages 167:1-167:6. ACM.

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Abstract

Systematic implementation of System-on-Chip (SoC) security policies typically involves smart wrappers extracting local security critical events of interest from Intellectual Property (IP) blocks, together with a control engine that communicates with the wrappers to analyze the events for policy adherence. However, developing customized wrappers at each IP for security requirements may incur significant overhead in area and hardware resources. In this paper, we address this problem by exploiting the extensive design-for-debug (DfD) instrumentation already available on-chip. In addition to reduction in the overall hardware overhead, the approach also adds flexibility to the security architecture itself, e.g., permitting use of on-field DfD instrumentation, survivability and control hooks to patch security policy implementation in response to bugs and attacks found at post-silicon or changing security requirements on-field. We show how to design scalable interface between security and debug architectures that provides the benefits of flexibility to security policy implementation without interfering with existing debug and survivability use cases and at minimal additional cost in energy and design complexity.

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