

# Web Security: Cookies and Authentication

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# Reading Assignment

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- ◆ Read Kaufman, Chapter 25
- ◆ Read “Dos and Don’ts of Client Authentication on the Web”



# HTTP: HyperText Transfer Protocol

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- ◆ Used to request and return data
  - Methods: GET, POST, HEAD, ...
- ◆ **Stateless** request/response protocol
  - Each request is independent of previous requests
  - Statelessness has a significant impact on design and implementation of applications
- ◆ Evolution
  - HTTP 1.0: simple
  - HTTP 1.1: more complex

# HTTP Request


**Method**                      **File**                      **HTTP version**                      **Headers**

```
GET /default.asp HTTP/1.0
Accept: image/gif, image/x-bitmap, image/jpeg, */*
Accept-Language: en
User-Agent: Mozilla/1.22 (compatible; MSIE 2.0; Windows 95)
Connection: Keep-Alive
If-Modified-Since: Sunday, 17-Apr-96 04:32:58 GMT
```

**Blank line**

**Data – none for GET**

# HTTP Response



# HTTP Digest Authentication

client

server



Request URL with  
GET or POST method


- HTTP 401 Unauthorised
- Authentication "realm"  
(description of system being accessed)
- Fresh, random nonce

$H1 = \text{hash}(\text{username},$   
 $\text{realm}, \text{password})$   
 $H2 = \text{hash}(\text{method}, \text{URL})$

$H3 = \text{hash}(H1, \text{server nonce},$   
 $H2)$

Recompute  $H3$   
and verify

# Primitive Browser Session



Store session information in URL; easily read on network

# FatBrain.com circa 1999

[Fu et al.]

- ◆ User logs into website with his password, authenticator is generated, user is given special URL containing the authenticator

<https://www.fatbrain.com/HelpAccount.asp?t=0&p1=me@me.com&p2=540555758>

- With special URL, user doesn't need to re-authenticate
  - Reasoning: user could not have not known the special URL without authenticating first. That's true, BUT...

- ◆ Authenticators are global sequence numbers

- It's easy to guess sequence number for another user

<https://www.fatbrain.com/HelpAccount.asp?t=0&p1=SomeoneElse&p2=540555752>

- Fix: use random authenticators

# Examples of Weak Authenticators

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## ◆ Verizon Wireless: counter

- User logs in, gets counter, can view sessions of other users

## ◆ Apache Tomcat: generateSessionID()

- MD5(PRNG) ... but weak PRNG
  - PRNG = pseudo-random number generator
- Result: predictable SessionID's

# Bad Idea: Encoding State in URL


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- ◆ Unstable, frequently changing URLs
- ◆ Vulnerable to eavesdropping
- ◆ There is no guarantee that URL is private
  - Early versions of Opera used to send entire browsing history, including all visited URLs, to Google



# Storing Info Across Sessions

- ◆ A **cookie** is a file created by a website to store information in your browser



HTTP is a stateless protocol; cookies add state

# What Are Cookies Used For?

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## ◆ Authentication

- Use the fact that the user authenticated correctly in the past to make future authentication quicker

## ◆ Personalization

- Recognize the user from a previous visit

## ◆ Tracking

- Follow the user from site to site; learn his/her browsing behavior, preferences, and so on

# Cookie Management

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## ◆ Cookie ownership

- Once a cookie is saved on your computer, only the website that created the cookie can read it
  - If cookie is “secure”, browser will only send it over HTTPS
  - ... but anyone can write a secure cookie!

## ◆ Variations

- Temporary cookies: stored until you quit your browser
- Persistent cookies: remain until deleted or expire
- Third-party cookies: originate on or sent to another website

# Privacy Issues with Cookies

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- ◆ Cookie may include any information about you known by the website that created it
  - Browsing activity, account information, etc.
- ◆ Sites can share this information
  - Advertising networks
  - 2o7.net tracking cookie
- ◆ Browser attacks could invade your “privacy”

November 8, 2001:

Users of Microsoft's browser and e-mail programs could be vulnerable to having their browser cookies stolen or modified due to a new security bug in Internet Explorer (IE), the company warned today

# Austin American-Statesman

The screenshot shows the website statesman.com in a Windows Internet Explorer browser. The address bar displays http://www.statesman.com/. The website header includes navigation tabs for NEWS and ENTERTAINMENT, the statesman.com logo, and a subscription link. A secondary navigation bar lists categories like NEWS, BUSINESS, SPORTS, LIFE, OPINION, WEATHER, BLOGS, MULTIMEDIA, CUSTOMER SERVICE, and ADVERTISE. A left sidebar contains links for CLASSIFIEDS, CARS, HOMES, JOBS, and SHOPPING. The main content area features a headline for a 3M HALF MARATHON and a real estate article titled 'Exclusive for some'.

A blue 'Privacy Alert' dialog box is overlaid on the page, containing the following text: 'The website "adinterax.com" has requested to save a file on your computer called a "cookie." This file may be used to track usage information. Do you want to allow this?' Below the text is an unchecked checkbox labeled 'Apply my decision to all cookies from this website' and four buttons: 'Allow Cookie', 'Block Cookie', 'More Info', and 'Help'. The dialog box is circled in red.

The website "adinterax.com" has requested to save a file on your computer called a "cookie." This file may be used to track usage information...


# The Weather Channel

The screenshot shows the Weather Channel website in a Windows Internet Explorer browser. The address bar displays `http://www.weather.com/`. The website header includes the logo, a search bar for local weather, and navigation links. A blue "Privacy Alert" dialog box is overlaid on the page, containing the following text: "The website 'twci.coremetrics.com' has requested to save a file on your computer called a 'cookie.' This file may be used to track usage information. Do you want to allow this?" Below the text are buttons for "Allow Cookie", "Block Cookie", "More Info", and "Help", along with a checkbox for "Apply my decision to all cookies from this website".

The website "twci.coremetrics.com" has requested to save a file on your computer called a "cookie." This file may be used to track usage information...

# MySpace

The website "insightexpressai.com" has requested to save a file on your computer called a "cookie"...



# Let's Take a Closer Look...

**Privacy Alert**

The website "insightexpressai.com" has requested to save a file on your computer called a "cookie." This file may be used to track usage information. Do you want to allow this?

Apply my decision to all cookies from this website

[Allow Cookie](#) [Block Cookie](#) [More Info](#) [Help](#)

**Cookie Information**

Name	[X]AICampaignCounter558		
Domain	insightexpressai.com		
Path	/		
Expires	Thursday, December 31, 2020 5:00:00	Secure	No
Data	1		
3rd Party	Yes	Session	No
Compact Policy	CP="OTI DSP COR CUR ADMi DEVI TAI PSA PSD IVD CONi TELi OUR BUS STA"		

with Afro Samurai: The Soundtrack feat. Talib

# Storing State in Browser

## ◆ Dansie Shopping Cart (2006)

- “A premium, comprehensive, Perl shopping cart. Increase your web sales by making it easier for your web store customers to order.”

```
<FORM METHOD=POST
```

```
ACTION="http://www.dansie.net/cgi-bin/scripts/cart.pl">
```

```
Black Leather purse with leather straps< Change this to 2.00
```

```
<INPUT TYPE=HIDDEN NAME=name VALUE="Black leather purse">
```

```
<INPUT TYPE=HIDDEN NAME=price VALUE="20.00">
```

```
<INPUT TYPE=HIDDEN NAME=sh VALUE="1">
```

```
<INPUT TYPE=HIDDEN NAME=img VALUE="f
```

```
<INPUT TYPE=HIDDEN NAME=custom1 VALUE="E Bargain shopping!
```

```
with leather straps">
```

```
<INPUT TYPE=SUBMIT NAME="add" VALUE="Put in Shopping Cart">
```

```
</FORM>
```

# Shopping Cart Form Tampering

<http://xforce.iss.net/xforce/xfdb/4621>

- ◆ Many Web-based shopping cart applications use hidden fields in HTML forms to hold parameters for items in an online store. These parameters can include the item's name, weight, quantity, product ID, and price. Any application that bases price on a hidden field in an HTML form is vulnerable to price changing by a remote user. **A remote user can change the price of a particular item they intend to buy, by changing the value for the hidden HTML tag that specifies the price, to purchase products at any price they choose.**

## ◆ Platforms Affected:

- 3D3.COM Pty Ltd: ShopFactory 5.8 and earlier
- Adgrafix: Check It Out Any version
- ComCity Corporation: SalesCart Any version
- Dansie.net: Dansie Shopping Cart Any version
- Make-a-Store: Make-a-Store OrderPage Any version
- McMurtrey/Whitaker & Associates: Cart32 3.0
- Rich Media Technologies: JustAddCommerce 5.0
- Web Express: Shoptron 1.2
- @Retail Corporation: @Retail Any version
- Baron Consulting Group: WebSite Tool Any version
- Crested Butte Software: EasyCart Any version
- Intelligent Vending Systems: Intellivend Any version
- McMurtrey/Whitaker & Associates: Cart32 2.6
- pknutsen@nethut.no: CartMan 1.04
- SmartCart: SmartCart Any version

# Other Risks of Hidden Forms

[From "The Art of Intrusion"]

- ◆ Estonian bank's web server
- ◆ HTML source reveals a hidden variable that points to a file name
- ◆ Change file name to password file
- ◆ Webserver displays contents of password file
  - Bank was not using shadow password files!
- ◆ Standard cracking program took 15 minutes to crack root password

# Storing State in Browser Cookies

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
- ◆ Set-cookie: price=299.99
- ◆ User edits the cookie... cookie: price=29.99
- ◆ What's the solution?
- ◆ Add a MAC to every cookie, computed with the server's secret key
  - Price=299.99; HMAC(ServerKey, 299.99)
- ◆ But what if the website changes the price?

# Web Authentication via Cookies

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- ◆ Need authentication system that works over HTTP and does not require servers to store session data
  - Why is it a bad idea to store session state on server?
- ◆ Servers can use cookies to store state on client
  - After client successfully authenticates, server computes an authenticator and gives it to browser in a cookie
    - Client cannot forge authenticator on his own
    - Example: `hash(server's secret key, session id)`
  - With each request, browser presents the cookie
  - Server recomputes and verifies the authenticator
    - Server does not need to remember the authenticator

# Typical Session with Cookies



Authenticators must be **unforgeable** and **tamper-proof**

(malicious client shouldn't be able to compute his own or modify an existing authenticator)

# WSJ.com circa 1999

[Fu et al.]

- ◆ Idea: use  $\text{user, hash}(\text{user, key})$  as authenticator
  - Key is secret and known only to the server. Without the key, clients can't forge authenticators.
- ◆ Implementation:  $\text{user, crypt}(\text{user, key})$ 
  - `crypt()` is UNIX hash function for passwords
  - `crypt()` truncates its input at 8 characters
  - Usernames matching first 8 characters end up with the same authenticator
  - No expiration or revocation
- ◆ It gets worse... This scheme can be exploited to extract the server's secret key

# Attack

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<u>username</u>	<u>crypt(username,key,"00")</u>	<u>authenticator cookie</u>
VitalySh1	008H8LRfzUXvk	VitalySh1008H8LRfzUXvk
VitalySh2	008H8LRfzUXvk	VitalySh2008H8LRfzUXvk

Create an account with a 7-letter user name...


VitalySA	0073UYEre5rBQ	Try logging in: access refused
VitalySB	00bkHcfOXBKno	Access refused
VitalySC	00ofSJV6An1QE	Login successful! 1 <sup>st</sup> key symbol is C

Now a 6-letter user name...

VitalyCA	001mBnBErXRuc	Access refused
VitalyCB	00T3JLLfuspdo	Access refused... and so on

- Only need 128 x 8 queries instead of intended 128<sup>8</sup>
- 17 minutes with a simple Perl script vs. 2 billion years

# Better Cookie Authenticator



- ◆ Main lesson: **don't roll your own!**
  - Homebrewed authentication schemes are often flawed
- ◆ There are standard cookie-based schemes