Small Byzantine Quorum Systems

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Abstract

In this paper we present two protocols for asynchronous Byzantine Quorum Systems (BQS) built on top of reliable channels—one for self-verifying data and the other for any data. Our protocols tolerate f Byzantine failures with f fewer servers than existing solutions by eliminating nonessential work in the write protocol and by using read and write quorums of different sizes. In practice, however, engineering asynchronous reliable channels is difficult in many environments. To address this concern, we modify the original asynchronous BQS protocol of Malkhi and Reiter to work on unreliable channels and discuss how our two new asynchronous protocols can be used to derive an efficient protocol for synchronous Byzantine systems.

1. Introduction

Quorum systems are valuable tools for implementing highly available distributed shared memory. The principle behind their use is that if a shared variable is stored at a set of servers, then read and write operations need only be performed at some set of servers (a *quorum*). The intersection property of quorums ensures that each read has access to the most recently written value of the variable. Any practical use of quorum systems must account for the possibility that some of the servers may be faulty; hence, quorum systems must enforce the intersection property even in the presence of failures. Mahlki and Reiter introduce quorum systems, called *masking quorum systems*, that guarantee data availability in the presence of arbitrary (*Byzantine*) failures [24]. They also introduce a special class of quorum systems, *dissemination quorum systems*, which can be used by services that support *self-verifying data*, i.e. data that cannot be undetectably altered by a faulty server, such as data that have been digitally signed. To tolerate f Byzantine failures, masking quorum systems must include at least $4f + 1$ servers, while dissemination quorum systems need only $3f + 1$ servers to provide the same guarantee.

In this paper, we present two new quorum systems, one for generic data and the other for self-verifying data, that need only $3f + 1$ servers and $2f + 1$ servers, respectively, to tolerate f Byzantine failures. These results apply in the same system model used by Mahlki and Reiter, i.e. one in which communication is authenticated and reliable, but asynchronous.

Our quorums thus use fewer servers to tolerate a given number of failures than previously possible. Reducing the required number of servers is particularly important where Byzantine protocols protect against

security breaches of servers [8, 9, 25, 39]. Note that using Byzantine protocols to tolerate security breaches is sound only if server failures are independent, i.e. if breaking into one server does not increase the probability of successfully breaking into others. Achieving such failure independence may require developing and maintaining multiple independent implementations of the server and underlying operating system [33]. Because implementing these multiple variations is expensive, the number of different implementations is, in practice, limited. It is therefore essential to minimize the number of servers needed to tolerate a given number of failures.

We call our new quorum systems *a-masking* and *a-dissemination*, where the leading "a" indicates the distinguishing characteristic of these quorums, namely, that they are asymmetric with respect to the operations they support: reads and writes use quorum of different sizes.

The key insight that allows us to exploit asymmetric quorums is the recognition that assuming reliable communication has different implications for read and write operations. Although reads need a response from a *read quorum* of servers in order to return a reliable value, writes do not need to be explicitly acknowledged by a corresponding *write quorum*: a reliable communication abstraction already guarantees that every value written by a correct client will eventually be stored by every correct server in the write quorum, and the writer itself has no use for the knowledge that the write completed. We call read and write protocols that exploit this insight Small Byzantine Quorum (*SBQ*) protocols.

Reliable asynchronous communication is a common model for Byzantine quorum algorithms [24, 25], and our protocol aggressively exploits that model's properties to improve efficiency. In an asynchronous system, unfortunately, if the underlying network is unreliable then the presence of even crash failures can pose significant challenges to engineering a reliable messaging layer because a message sender cannot distinguish a crashed receiver from a slow one. For example, if an asynchronous reliable messaging layer requires senders to buffer and retransmit unacknowledged messages, a failed receiver can force the system to consume unbounded amounts of buffer memory.

To understand such practical concerns, we explore the trade-offs for building Byzantine quorum systems (BQS) as we vary the properties of the underlying communication infrastructure. In this analysis, we consider not just the SBQ protocols but also existing protocols [5, 24].

We begin by strengthening the reliable and asynchronous communication model to consider systems that implement *reliable and synchronous* communication. Under these assumptions, read and write protocols that tolerate f Byzantine failures require just $2f + 1$ servers for generic data ($f + 1$ for self-verifying data) [5]. However, these protocols are vulnerable to *slow reads*: even a single faulty server can delay each read until a timeout occurs. Unfortunately, for some systems of practical interest, the natural timeout at which network transmission should be abandoned is long compared to the desired performance of read operations. Unexpectedly, our analysis suggests that some systems that assume a reliable and synchronous networks may still choose to use an *asynchronous* BQS protocol such as the original SBQ. Such systems may use timeouts in the networking layer to bound network retransmission buffers, but they may choose an

asynchronous BQS protocol to allow reads to proceed at a rate governed by the speed of the fastest quorum of servers rather than at a rate governed by communication timeouts to failed servers. To address these trade-offs more generally, we develop a new class of synchronous SBQ protocols, which we call S-SBQ. S-SBQ protocols can be tuned with respect to two parameters: f, the maximum number of faulty servers for which the protocol is safe and live, and t ($t \leq f$), the maximum number of faulty servers for which the protocol is free from slow reads. When $t = 0$, S-SBQ uses the same number of servers as the synchronous protocol described in [5], and when $t = f$, S-SBQ is identical to the asynchronous SBQ protocol.

We then explore the implications of weakening the assumption of asynchronous reliable communication. We consider *authenticated unreliable asynchronous networks*, in which protocols must explicitly manage both server faults and network faults, and show that the quorum systems and protocols introduced by Mahlki and Reiter for reliable asynchronous networks can be easily extended to operate in this weaker model.

In summary, our analysis results in a series of Byzantine quorum systems and protocols over a range of system models, with increasing numbers of servers required to tolerate progressively weaker system models. For generic data, $2f + 1$ servers are needed for synchronous reliable network systems where timeouts are short, $2f + 1$ to $3f + 1$ for synchronous reliable network systems where timeouts are long, $3f + 1$ for asynchronous reliable network systems, and $4f + 1$ for asynchronous unreliable network systems. Self-verifying-data allows systems to be built for each of these scenarios using f fewer servers.

The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2. presents the system model. Section 3. presents the new a-masking and a-dissemination quorum systems. Section 4. discusses the design space of BQS protocols under different system models. Section 5. puts our results in perspective with related work and Section 6. summarizes our conclusions.

2. System Model

We assume the system model commonly adopted by previous works [3, 5, 24, 25, 26] that have applied quorum systems in the Byzantine failure model. In particular, our system consists of an arbitrary number of clients and a set U of data servers such that the number $n = |U|$ of servers is fixed. A *quorum system* $\mathcal{Q} \subseteq 2^U$ is a non empty set of subsets of U, each of which is called a *quorum*. We denote with $\mathcal{Q}_r$ the set of quorums used by read operations (*read quorums*) and with $\mathcal{Q}_w$ and the set of quorums used by write operations(*write quorums*). Any pair of read and write quorums intersect, and $\mathcal{Q} = \mathcal{Q}_r \cup \mathcal{Q}_w$.

Servers can be either *correct* or *faulty*. A correct server follows its specification; a faulty server can arbitrarily deviate from its specification. Following [24], we define a *fail-prone system* $\mathcal{B} \subseteq 2^U$ as a nonempty set of subsets of U, none of which is contained in another, such that some $B \in \mathcal{B}$ contains all faulty servers. Fail-prone systems can be used to express the common *f-threshold* assumption that up to a threshold f of servers fail (in which case, $\mathcal{B}$ contains all sets of f servers) but they can also describe more general situations, as when some computers are known to be more likely to fail than others.

The set of clients of the service is disjoint from U. We restrict our attention in this work to server failures; clients are assumed to be correct. Clients communicate with servers over point-to-point channels. In this paper, we consider Byzantine quorum systems for the following models of communication:

Reliable Synchronous A correct process q receives a message from another correct process p if and only if p sent it; furthermore, q can determine that p was the sender of the message. Also, there exists a bound on message delivery time that can be used to timeout failed processes that do not respond to requests [5].

Reliable Asynchronous A correct process q receives a message from another correct process p if and only if p sent it; furthermore, q can determine that p was the sender of the message. However, no bound is assumed on message transmission times [24].

Authenticated Unreliable Asynchronous If a correct process p sends a message infinitely often to another correct process q, then q will eventually receive the message and know that it came from p; a correct process q receives a message only if a correct process p sent the message; and no bound is assumed on message transmission times.

We will explicitly state which model is assumed at each point of our discussion.

3. Small Byzantine Quorums

Figures 1 and 2 show our Small Byzantine Quorum (SBQ) protocols for generic and self-verifying data, respectively, under the assumption of reliable asynchronous communication. To write data Δ to a variable v in either protocol, a client first queries a read quorum of servers to choose a timestamp that is larger than the timestamp for any completed write (steps 1-4) and then sends the data and the new timestamp to a write quorum of servers (step 5). To read data, a client queries a read quorum of servers for their most recent values (steps 1-2) and then chooses and returns the valid answer with highest timestamp (step 3-4). Each correct server updates its local variable and timestamp to the values $\langle ts, \Delta \rangle$ received by a client only if ts is larger than the timestamp currently associated with Δ.

A noteworthy aspect of the protocol is that unlike operations on read quorums, an operation on a write quorum does not wait for replies from the servers it contacts. For reliable asynchronous communication, the eventual delivery of all messages sent by a correct client to correct servers is assured, and the write operation can complete without gathering information from the servers to which the write messages have been sent. Note, however, that this means that a client's local write operation may *return* before the global write *completes*. In order to define an order among reads and writes, we say that a global write operation completes when all correct servers in some write quorum have finished processing the STORE messages sent in step 5 of the write() operation defined in Figures 1 and 2. Furthermore, we say that a write operation w_1

happens before a write operation w_2 if w_1 ends (according to the above definition) before w_2 starts. A disadvantage of this definition of write completion is that a client issuing a write may not know when the write completes. This is not a problem from a theoretical standpoint, since this knowledge is required by neither safe semantics (provided by the SBQ protocol for generic data) nor regular semantics (provided by the SBQ protocol for self-verifying data) [21]. Furthermore, completion of write operations is both well defined from the point of view of an observer external to the system, and *timely*, in the sense that completion cannot be delayed by faulty servers because it only depends on actions taken by correct processes. Nonetheless, SBQ protocols do carry a price: they do not support the implicit synchronization that can be obtained through write operations that block until the write completes. Fortunately, there are several interesting applications that do not require this implicit synchronization, either because they don't need any synchronization (e.g., in networked sensors [18], nodes producing data often do not need to receive acknowledgments, implicit or explicit, from consumers) or because they only require end-to-end explicit acknowledgments in which clients synchronize by reading values written to various memory locations by other clients. For instance, two clients can communicate using an SBQ protocol in the same way as two pen-pals communicate through regular mail: in both cases, the writer relies on the fact that its message will be eventually received, even if it does not know when. Its counterpart can assure the writer of the receipt of his message by acknowledging it in his next message.

The rest of this section explains this protocol in more detail. We first describe how quorums are constructed and why the SBQ protocols' quorums are small, needing only $3f + 1$ servers in the threshold *f*-threshold case for generic data and $2f + 1$ for self-verifying data. We then compare our protocol to existing protocols to identify the differences and explain why these differences allow quorums based on SBQ protocols to be smaller than those of existing protocols for reliable asynchronous communications systems. Finally, we step through the details of the SBQ protocol and provide a proof of its correctness.

3.1. Quorum definition

The key advantage of SBQ protocols over existing Byzantine quorum systems protocols is their reduction in the number of servers required by the system. This reduction stems from the different constraints SBQ places on read and write quorums. Because the protocol places asymmetric constraints on read and write quorums, it can use asymmetric masking quorums (*a-masking quorums*) for generic data and asymmetric dissemination quorums (*a-dissemination quorums*) for self-verifying data in place of the traditional (symmetric) masking and dissemination quorums [24].

To understand how the protocol's constraints on quorum construction influence the minimum number of services required by a system, consider the simple case of *f*-threshold quorums for self-verifying data under the SBQ protocol and let $|Q_r|$ and $|Q_w|$ denote, respectively, the size of read and write quorums. In order to guarantee safety and liveness for this protocol, there are effectively three constraints that must be met:

Write(Δ)

1. send (GET-TS) to all servers.
2. **wait until** received timestamp ts_i from each server s_i in a read quorum.
3. let *last_ts* be the largest received timestamp.
4. choose a new timestamp new_ts that is larger than both *last_ts* and any timestamp previously chosen by this server.
5. send (STORE,Δ, new_ts) to a write quorum of servers.

Δ =**Read()**

1. send (GET) to all servers.
2. **wait until** received pairs $\langle \Delta_i, ts_i \rangle$ from each server s_i in a read quorum Q_r.
3. { *Build a set A' containing all pairs returned by a voucher set of servers* }
   compute $A' = \{\langle \Delta, ts \rangle \mid (\exists B^+ \subseteq Q_r :: (\forall B \in \mathcal{B} : B^+ \not\subseteq B : (\forall s_u \in B^+ :: \Delta_u = \Delta \wedge ts_u = ts)))\}$
4. **if** $A' \neq \emptyset$ **then**
   select the pair $\langle \Delta, ts \rangle$ with the highest timestamp *ts*
   return Δ
   else
   return $\perp$

Figure 1: *SBQ protocol for generic (non-self-verifying) data*

Write(Δ)

1. send (GET-TS) to all servers.
2. **wait until** received timestamp ts_i from each server s_i in a read quorum.
3. let *last_ts* be the largest received timestamp.
4. choose a new timestamp new_ts that is larger than both *last_ts* and any timestamp previously chosen by this server.
5. send (STORE, Δ, new_ts) to a write quorum of servers.

Δ =**Read()**

1. send (GET) to all servers.
2. **wait until** received pairs $\langle \Delta_i, ts_i \rangle$ from each server s_i in a read quorum Q_r.
3. discard all pairs that are not verifiable.
4. select among the remaining pairs the pair $\langle \Delta, ts \rangle$ with the highest timestamp
   return Δ

Figure 2: *SBQ protocol for self-verifying data*

SBQ1. $|Q_r| \leq n - f$ (*Availability*)

This constraint is required for step 2 of Read() and step 2 of Write() to be live.

SBQ2. $|Q_r| + |Q_w| - n \geq f + 1$ (*Consistency*)

This constraint is required for the intersection of reads (in step 2 of Read() and step 2 of Write()) and writes (in step 5 of Write()) to be large enough to ensure that each read intersects with each completed write in at least one correct server. This constraint is essential for the safety of the protocol.

SBQ3. $|Q_w| \leq n$ (*Realism*)

The following values meet these constraints: $|Q_w| = \lceil \frac{n+1}{2} \rceil + f$ and $|Q_r| = \lceil \frac{n+1}{2} \rceil$. Substituting this value for $|Q_r|$ into SBQ1 gives $n \geq 2f + 1$.

Similar reasoning applies for non-self-verifying data, where the consistency constraint requires that read and write quorums intersect in a majority of correct processes. SBQ2 then becomes:

SBQ2′. $|Q_r| + |Q_w| - n \geq 2f + 1$ (*Consistency*)

The corresponding bound for n is $n \geq 3f + 1$.

The above arguments capture the intuition behind a-masking and a-dissemination quorums. We now define them formally.

3.1.1 Asymmetric quorum systems

We say that a set V of servers is a *voucher set*, if, under all possible failure scenarios, it is guaranteed to contain at least one correct server, i.e. $\forall B \in \mathcal{B} : V \not\subseteq B$.

We define asymmetric quorum system for generic (non-self-verifying) data and self verifying data as follows.

Definition 1 *A quorum system is an* a-masking quorum system *if the sets of read and write quorums $\mathcal{Q}_r$ and $\mathcal{Q}_w$ have the following properties.*

AM-Consistency The intersection of any pair of read and write quorums always contains a voucher set consisting entirely of correct servers.

$\forall Q_r \in \mathcal{Q}_r \forall Q_w \in \mathcal{Q}_w \forall B_1, B_2 \in \mathcal{B} : Q_r \cap Q_w \setminus B_1 \not\subseteq B_2$

AM-Availability One read quorum is always available.

$\forall B \in \mathcal{B}\ \exists Q_r \in \mathcal{Q}_r : B \cap Q_r = \emptyset$

Definition 2 *A quorum system is an* a-dissemination quorum system *if the sets of read and write quorums $\mathcal{Q}_r$ and $\mathcal{Q}_r$ have the following properties.*

AD-Consistency The intersection of any pair of read of read and write quorums is a voucher set.

$\forall Q_r \in \mathcal{Q}_r \forall Q_w \in \mathcal{Q}_w \forall B \in \mathcal{B} : Q_r \cap Q_w \not\subseteq B$

AD-Availability One read quorum is always available.

$\forall B \in \mathcal{B}\ \exists Q_r \in \mathcal{Q}_r : B \cap Q_r = \emptyset$

Note that the consistency requirement is easier to discharge when the data is self-verifying. As a result, in the *f*-threshold case, a-masking quorums require $n \geq 3f + 1$, $|Q_r| = \lceil \frac{n+f+1}{2} \rceil$, and $|Q_w| = \lceil \frac{n+f+1}{2} \rceil + f$, while a-dissemination quorum systems only need $n \geq 2f + 1$, $|Q_r| = \lceil \frac{n+1}{2} \rceil$, and $|Q_w| = \lceil \frac{n+1}{2} \rceil + f$.

3.2. Comparison with existing protocols

The SBQ protocols for generic and self-verifying data are similar to the protocols introduced by Mahlki and Reiter for masking and dissemination quorum systems [24]. There are two differences between these protocols and SBQ protocols. First, in the Write(Δ) operation, in place of the SBQ protocol's step 5, which just sends data to a write quorum, earlier protocols for masking and dissemination quorum systems first send the data and then wait for acknowledgments from a quorum of servers. In essence, these protocols send writes to a quorum of *responsive* servers while SBQ sends writes to a quorum of servers that may or may not be responsive. Second, earlier protocols use same-sized quorums for both reads and writes, while the SBQ protocols allow asymmetric read and write quorums.

To illustrate these differences, consider the *f*-threshold case. In addition to the constraints SBQ1, SBQ2, and SBQ3 listed above, Mahlki and Reiter protocols (MR protocols for short) add two more constraints.

First, MR protocols require that writes wait for a write quorum of acknowledgments.

MR1. $|Q|_w \leq n - f$ (*Availability*)

Second, MR protocols use symmetric quorums.

MR2. $|Q|_r = |Q|_w = |Q|$ (*Symmetry*)

Note that because MR1 and SBQ1 impose symmetric constraints on read and write quorums the use of symmetric quorums is a natural design decision for MR protocols. Note also that either of MR1 and MR2, when combined with constraints SBQ1 to SBQ3, is sufficient in the *f*-threshold case to increase by f the number of servers required to tolerate f failures: generic data now requires $n \geq 4f + 1$ servers, with minimum quorum size $|Q| = \frac{n+2f+1}{2}$ ($n \geq 3f + 1$ and $|Q| = \frac{n+f+1}{2}$ for self-verifying data). The following table compares the quorum sizes in the *f*-threshold case for the MR protocols and the SBQ protocols.

For generic data (minimum values):

	MR	SBQ
Server count	$4f + 1$	$3f + 1$
Write quorum	$\lceil \frac{n+2f+1}{2} \rceil$	$\lceil \frac{n+f+1}{2} \rceil + f$
Read quorum	$\lceil \frac{n+2f+1}{2} \rceil$	$\lceil \frac{n+f+1}{2} \rceil$

For self-verifying data (minimum values):

	MR	SBQ
Server count	$3f + 1$	$2f + 1$
Write quorum	$\lceil \frac{n+f+1}{2} \rceil$	$\lceil \frac{n+1}{2} \rceil + f$
Read quorum	$\lceil \frac{n+f+1}{2} \rceil$	$\lceil \frac{n+1}{2} \rceil$

Because SBQ quorums are formed under strictly weaker constraints than the dissemination and masking quorums used in the MR protocols, the SBQ quorums never need to be larger than the MR quorums. For a given number of failures, even though SBQ's write quorum is a larger fraction of all servers than MR's write quorum, the absolute number of servers to which writes must be sent is no larger because the total number of servers is correspondingly smaller. In particular, for minimal n both SBQ and MR have write quorums of size $2f + 1$ in the self-verifying-data case, and as n increases, both protocols' write quorums grow at the same rate.

Conversely, for a given number of servers, the SBQ protocols can tolerate more failures than the MR protocols. For example in the case of self-verifying data and with 13 servers, MR can tolerate 4 failures and SBQ can tolerate 6. The quorum sizes are 9 for MR and 13/7 for SBQ (for the write/read quorum, respectively).

Finally, we note that SBQ protocols use the same reliable asynchronous messaging system model as MR protocols, and, as we show in the next section, they provide the same consistency guarantees: regular semantics in the case of self-verifying data and safe semantics otherwise.

Although SBQ protocols can reach the same level of fault-tolerance with fewer servers, they sacrifice something in order to get these improvements: a writer that uses SBQ can not determine when a write operation ends. A mitigating factor is that all write operations are guaranteed to end eventually.

Section 4. shows that as a result, our protocol cannot be adapted to unreliable networks. Instead, we adapt the original protocols of Mahlki and Reiter to this more general model.

3.3. Correctness

The SBQ protocols given in Figures 1 and 2 implement, respectively, safe semantics for a-masking quorum systems and regular semantics for a-dissemination quorum systems. The proofs of these claims, not surprisingly, resemble the proofs of the same claims given by Mahlki and Reiter for their masking and dissemination quorum systems. In the interest of space, we only give the results for a-masking quorum systems, and state, without proof, the results for a-dissemination quorum systems.

3.3.1 Safe semantics in a-masking quorum systems Safe semantics [21] guarantees that a read operation concurrent with no write operation returns the most recently written value. If there is a write concurrent with a read, then safe semantics allow the read to return an arbitrary value—in which case, any live protocol trivially guarantees safe semantics. The following lemmas prove that the SBQ protocol for non-self-verifying data given in Figure 1 implement a multi-reader multi-writer *safe* variable.

Lemma 1 *The SBQ read and write protocols for both a-masking and a-dissemination quorum systems are live.*

PROOF. The only time in which a client is blocked, for both the read and the write protocol, is in step 2. In both cases, the client is waiting for responses from a read quorum of servers. By AM-Availability (respectively AD-Availability), a responsive read quorum always exists. □

Lemma 2 *Let w_1 and w_2 be two SBQ write operations in an a-masking or a-dissemination quorum system, and let ts_1 and ts_2 be their corresponding timestamps. If w_1 happens before w_2, then $ts_1 < ts_2$.*

PROOF. If w_1 happens before w_2, then, by definition, w_1 has completed before w_2 starts. By our definition of completion, all correct servers in a write quorum Q_{w_1} have stored ts_1. By Lemma 1, w_2 can collect a set of timestamps from a read quorum Q_r. Because of AM-Consistency (respectively AD-Availability), Q_r and Q_w intersect in at least one correct server s. Because timestamps kept by a correct server are monotonically increasing, s will return a timestamp $ts_s \geq ts_1$. Since by the write protocol the timestamp of w_2 is larger than any of the collected timestamps, it follows that $ts_1 < ts_2$. □

Lemma 3 *In a-masking quorum systems, a read operation not concurrent with any write operation returns the most recently written value.*

PROOF. Let W be the set of write operations that preceded the read, and let $w^* \in W$ be the write operation with the highest timestamp. By Lemma 2, w^* did not precede any operation in W and therefore there exists a serialization of the operations in W in which w^* is the most recently written value. By Lemma 1, a read quorum will respond to the read with a set of value/timestamp pairs, and by AM-Consistency, that read quorum includes a voucher set of correct servers that received w^*. Since the timestamp of correct servers is monotonically increasing, and w^* is the write with the highest timestamp, each of the servers in this voucher set returns w^*'s value. Furthermore, by definition, any value returned by a voucher set of servers has been previously written. Because the read protocol decides on the value returned by a voucher set that has the highest timestamp, the read operation returns w^*, the most recently written value. □

3.3.2 Regular semantics in a-dissemination quorum systems The following lemmas, that we give without proof, establish that the SBQ protocol for a-dissemination quorum systems given in Figure 2 implements a *regular* variable. The proofs are very similar to those given above for a-masking quorum systems and safe variables and can be found in [27].

Lemma 4 *A read operation that is not concurrent with any write operation returns the result of the most recently written value.*

Lemma 5 *A read operation that is concurrent with one or more write operations returns either the most recently written value, or one of the values being written by the concurrent write operations.*

4. Network models

Both the MR and the SBQ protocols assume a *reliable asynchronous network*: for any pair of correct machines A and B, if A sends a message, then B is guaranteed to eventually receive it. In some systems, the network subsystem is such that assuming reliable communication is natural. In many other cases, however, the underlying network hardware provides weaker guarantees such as *unreliable asynchronous communication*, in which each message sent has a non-zero probability of arriving at its destination but there are no bounds on message delivery time. In that case, communicating machines commonly attempt to construct a network layer that provides a reliable network abstraction over unreliable network hardware.

Unfortunately, Byzantine machine failures can make it difficult to engineer a reliable messaging abstraction over an unreliable network substrate. In particular, we are concerned about bounding memory consumption of message buffers. Commonly, a system achieves reliable message delivery by requiring a sender to buffer and occasionally retransmit each message it sends until it receives an acknowledgment from the receiver [1, 16, 29]. In an asynchronous system, such an approach can consume unbounded buffer memory even if failures are restricted to crash failures [31]. This danger arises because a correct but slow machine cannot be distinguished from a faulty (crashed) machine. Therefore, a sender can never safely delete an unacknowledged message from its buffer.

For a fail-stop system model, this problem may not be a large concern because there exist reasonable engineering approaches to avoid the need for infinite memory while providing a reasonable approximation of reliable asynchronous messaging. For example, several reliable messaging systems [1, 2, 20] store unacknowledged messages on in an on-disk log. It may be safe in practice to assume that it is extremely unlikely that the log will overflow by assuming (1) a large log, (2) a reasonable bound on crash or partition durations, and (3) that a machine will acknowledge received messages after the repair of a crash or partition. Although such an approach may be theoretically unsatisfying (it implicitly assumes a bound on the duration of failures and therefore is no longer, strictly speaking, an asynchronous system), this approach seems common in practice.

Unfortunately, when we design a system to tolerate Byzantine failures, such assumptions may no longer hold. In particular, we would like to be able to construct protocols that behave well even if faulty machines remain faulty for arbitrary periods of time or never return to a state when they acknowledge receipt of messages or both. In those circumstances, a faulty server can easily force clients to consume infinite memory by never acknowledging messages.

The subsections below address the interaction of network models and Byzantine quorum systems. We focus on the problem of engineering practical systems that, for example, do not allow a misbehaving receiver to force the system to run slow or to consume unbounded network buffer space. We discuss three strategies:

1. Engineer the network to provide (a good approximation of) the *reliable asynchronous messaging* abstraction without requiring infinite memory.

This approach is an extension of the approach discussed above for fail-stop systems, and it is a natural match with existing protocols [24] as well as the SBQ protocols discussed above. We qualitatively discuss the new issues that arise in Byzantine systems, and we provide example scenarios where such an approach may be appropriate and effective.

2. Strengthen the system abstraction to provide *reliable synchronous messaging* and take advantage of the stronger semantics.

   Byzantine quorum protocols exist for synchronous systems [5], but as we describe below, when failures occur these protocols may be vulnerable to *slow reads* that include timeouts on the critical path. For systems where the natural network timeouts exceed the desired read performance, we propose two options that still can make use of network timeouts to bound buffer memory consumption but that are less vulnerable to slow reads than existing protocols. First, we argue that even in systems with a synchronous network layer that makes use of timeouts, *asynchronous* Byzantine quorum protocols—such as our original SBQ protocol—may be an attractive option because they are "self-timing" and their performance is not limited by failed servers or timeouts. Second, to address these trade-offs more generally, we develop the S-SBQ protocol, a synchronous version of our SBQ protocol that allows a system to use a tunable number of additional servers to reduce its vulnerability to slow reads.

3. Weaken the system abstraction to assume *authenticated unreliable asynchronous messaging* and strengthen the Byzantine quorum protocol to handle not just server failures but also to handle message loss and to bound buffer consumption.

   Below, we show new U-masking and U-dissemination protocols that adapt the masking and dissemination protocols from Malkhi and Reiter to explicitly manage retransmission and network buffers. Once a quorum of machines has completed an operation, a client may safely delete unacknowledged messages from its send buffer; thus the fact that Malkhi an Reiter's protocols acknowledge all operations, including writes, makes it easy to adapt them to unreliable networks. We show that these protocols work even though they may delete messages destined to both correct and faulty servers.

Table 1 summarizes the key results discussed in this section. Our analysis results in a series of Byzantine quorum systems and protocols over a range of system models, with increasing numbers of servers required to tolerate progressively weaker system models. For generic data, $2f+1$ servers are needed for synchronous reliable network systems where timeouts are short, $2f+1$ to $3f+1$ for synchronous reliable network systems where timeouts are long, $3f+1$ for asynchronous reliable network systems, and $4f+1$ for asynchronous unreliable network systems. Self-verifying-data allows systems to be built for each of these scenarios using f fewer servers.

Network Model	Protocol	Minimum servers	
		generic data	self-verifying data
reliable synchronous (fast timeouts)	Bazzi [5]	2f+1	f+1
reliable synchronous (slow timeouts)	S-SBQ SBQ	2f+1 to 3f+1 3f+1	f+1 to 2f+1 2f+1
reliable asynchronous	SBQ	3f+1	2f+1
unreliable asynchronous	U-masking/U-dissemination	4f+1	3f+1

Table 1: *Summary of protocols tolerating f Byzantine failures for different network models.*

4.1. Engineering an asynchronous reliable network

If one can engineer an asynchronous reliable network, Malkhi and Reiter's original protocols or our new SBQ protocols work well. This approach is appealing because it rests on a clean separation of concerns between the network protocol and the Byzantine quorum protocol. Such a separation simplifies theoretical analysis, and it appears to work reasonably well in practice for fail-stop quorum systems.

However, as discussed above, if the network layer is also subject to arbitrary Byzantine failures, a faulty receiver can prevent a sender from ever deleting buffered messages. Nonetheless, one can engineer a reasonable approximation of an asynchronous reliable network abstraction when one can (1) restrict the failures to which the network layer is vulnerable or (2) restrict the workload so that infinite buffering is not a concern. To illustrate when this network model is appropriate, we provide a few examples of both types of restriction below.

Restricting network failures. In some systems, the Byzantine quorum protocol layer is vulnerable to arbitrary Byzantine failures, but the network layer is less vulnerable. For example, some systems have highly reliable physical networks. Examples include "System/Storage Area Networks" (SANs) (such as Myrinet [6] and Fibre Channel [34]), networks for Massively Parallel Processors (MPPs) (such as the Thinking Machines CM5 and Cray T3D), networks with built-in redundancy and automatic fail-over such as Autonet [36], and networks with automatic link-level retransmission [32]. A second, related, approach to bounding memory consumption by assuming a restricted model of network failures is to construct a network protocol without relying on acknowledgments to free network retransmission buffers. For example, consider the case where the primary cause of message loss is bit errors from transient electronic interference, where each packet has a probability p of arriving at its destination. A sender that retransmits a message a constant number of times or with sufficient forward error control redundancy [7, 19] may in this case regard the packet as successfully sent, even if no acknowledgments are received; such a system may still use acknowledgments to reduce the number of retransmissions in the common case of a responsive sender, but it might make the

reasonable engineering approximation that a message sent, say, ten times has been delivered to the receiver with high probability, even if no acknowledgment has been received. A third approach that insulates the network layer from some failures is to rely on protection across software modules. For example, in some systems the network layer may be a protected kernel subsystem and may be considered less vulnerable to Byzantine failures than higher-level protocols.

Restricting the workload. Rather than restricting the network failure model, some systems may approximate reliable asynchronous messaging with finite buffers by assuming a restricted workload. If the request rate is low and the retransmission buffer large (e.g., on disk as in MQS [1] or Bayou [14]), then a system may reasonably buffer all sent messages regardless of whether they have been acknowledged. An example of a system where such an assumption is natural is a system that already maintains a persistent log of all transactions for another purpose such as auditing.

4.2. Synchronous network

Given the challenges to engineering a reliable asynchronous network, it may not be much more difficult to engineer a reliable synchronous network which allows network buffers to be bounded by placing an upper bound on delivery time. In effect, such a system declares that a server has failed if it fails to acknowledge a message within a prescribed time.

An obvious strategy to constructing Byzantine storage in a synchronous system is to use time-outs not only to garbage collect network buffers but also to detect server failures at the BQS-protocol level. This additional information can improve the efficiency of the BQS protocol. In particular, Bazzi [5] describes a synchronous BQS protocol for generic (or self-verifying) data that requires just $2f + 1$ (or $f + 1$) servers to provide storage with safe (or regular) semantics. Bazzi's read protocol for self-verifying data, for example, sends read requests to all $f + 1$ servers, waits for $f + 1$ replies or time-outs, and then returns the correct value with the highest timestamp from the set of replies.

The disadvantage of such an approach is that a single faulty server can force each read request to wait for a timeout. Unfortunately, for many systems the natural network timeout may be long or it may be difficult to estimate precisely. For example, empirical measurements of network failures show a heavy-tailed distribution for the duration of Internet connectivity failures, with significant numbers of failures lasting several minutes and some network failures lasting hours [11]. As another example, TCP's protocol for establishing an initial connection attempts retransmissions at increasing intervals that can exceed one minute if several packet losses occur in a row [4]. Furthermore, selecting a timeout at which retransmission will be abandoned will often be an engineering estimate of a time beyond which successful retransmission is unlikely rather than a true fundamental bound on possible message delays. Therefore, it may often be desirable to conservatively set such timeouts to be as long as possible in order to avoid introducing spurious

server failures. When messages can be buffered on disks, timeouts of minutes, hours, or longer may be desirable.

Unfortunately, if a synchronous BQS protocol is used, such timeouts would result in unacceptable read performance for many applications. In some cases, the impact of long timeouts can be mitigated by having clients track which servers have timed out in the past so that clients can avoid sending messages to or waiting for servers known to have failed. Unfortunately, this solution is not always appropriate. For example, for some applications or environments such an approach can (1) increase the complexity of a client, (2) increase the complexity of server recovery [9], (3) inflict a timeout that is too long (e.g., minutes or hours) to be accepted for even a single operation per client, or (4) remain vulnerable to a server that consistently responds a few moments before a series of timeouts.

An alternative approach is to use an asynchronous Byzantine quorum protocol over a synchronous network. In this approach, a server that fails to acknowledge a message within a timeout is defined to have failed, and the network layer uses timeouts to bound buffer consumption by deleting messages to failed servers. The Byzantine quorum protocol, however, is asynchronous and does not make use of timeouts. This approach has the advantage of being "self-timing" – reads and writes proceed at the rate of the correct servers rather than the rate imposed by failed servers and timeouts. The price for this speed is that the SBQ protocol requires f more servers than Bazzi's synchronous protocol.

This naturally raises the question of how much performance can be achieved using fewer additional servers. In fact, a continuum exists between (a) the option of synchronous protocols such as Bazzi's that use $2f + 1$ servers for generic data but that can suffer slow reads if even one server is faulty and (b) the option of asynchronous protocols that use $3f + 1$ servers for generic data servers but that can keep all failed servers off the critical path of read and write operations. We cover this complete continuum by adapting the SBQ protocol to the reliable synchronous network model. The resulting protocol, S-SBQ, provides two different guarantees: it can still tolerate f failures, and in addition it is guaranteed to complete operations without waiting for time-outs until the number of failures reaches some threshold t ($t \leq f$). We say that S-SBQ is *f-safe, t-fast*. By comparison, the Bazzi protocol is f-safe, 0-fast and the asynchronous BQS protocols are f-safe, f-fast. The quorum construction used by S-SBQ allows it to be f-safe, t-fast using $f + t + 1$ servers ($2f + t + 1$ for non-self-verifying data). Because the choice of the value of t is left to the implementor, S-SBQ can either use as few servers as Bazzi's protocol or always be self-timing like SBQ. More interestingly, its performance can be adjusted to any intermediate scenario.

Due to space constraints, the complete description of S-SBQ as well as the quorum constructions it uses is deferred to Appendix 3.1.. Note that even though the discussion of the previous paragraph was limited to the threshold case, S-SBQ uses a more general failure model that includes not only a fail-prone system but also a new *delay-prone system* to describe the conditions under which the protocol must be fast.

The following theorems describe the key behaviors of the S-SBQ protocol.

Theorem 1 *The S-SBQ protocol for self-verifying data follows regular semantics and the S-SBQ protocol*

for non-self-verifying data follows safe semantics. (Safety)

This theorem expresses the safety of the protocol. Its proof derives from the intersection property of our quorum construction.

Theorem 2 *The S-SBQ protocols are live (i.e. all requests eventually terminate).* (Liveness)

It is easy to show by inspection that all protocol operations terminate at most after a time-out delay. The next theorem expresses the conditions under which the protocol does not need to wait for this delay.

Theorem 3 *The S-SBQ protocols are self-timed as long as the failure set is covered by some delay scenario.* (Performance)

This derives from the availability property of the quorums.
It is also straightforward to adapt Bazzi's protocol to construct an f-safe, t-fast version by adding more servers. However, because Bazzi's protocol includes synchronous acknowledgments of writes, the natural definition of such an "S-Bazzi" protocol retains symmetric read and write quorums and therefore requires $2f + 2t + 1$ servers for generic data ($f + 2t + 1$ servers for self-verifying data).

4.3. Unreliable asynchronous network

In this section we describe a U-masking and U-dissemination Byzantine quorum protocol for *authenticated unreliable networks* as defined in Section 2 in which the protocol deals with network-layer failures, retransmission, and buffering. We also show how variations of this protocol can bound network retransmission buffer consumption. This protocol is a straightforward extension of Malkhi and Reiter's protocol for asynchronous reliable networks [24]. Due to space constraints, we summarize the protocol and its properties in this section. We refer the reader to [27] for a full statement of the protocol as well as proofs for the theorems and lemmas stated in this section.

Although the model used by Malkhi and Reiter's original protocol ensures that all correct servers receive all transmitted messages, the protocol itself only relies on a quorum of servers receiving each message. Thus, once a sender receives responses to a request from a quorum of machines, it may safely stop retransmitting that request. Because the protocol requires explicit responses to all requests, including writes, it is simple to adapt it to manage retransmission buffers. In particular, we modify the protocol to replace each step that waits for a quorum of replies to instead repeatedly resend the message sent in the previous step to all servers that have not responded until a quorum of servers has responded. Note that a sender can space the repeated resends arbitrarily far apart in time as long as it follows an algorithm that ensures an infinite number of retries to a receiver if no response from that receiver is ever received and if the send to that receiver is not cancelled. Also note that these application-level retransmissions provide weaker guarantees than the reliable

asynchronous networking abstraction because some correct servers may not receive messages transmitted to them.

The resulting U-masking (or U-dissemination) protocol provides safe (or regular) semantics for generic (or self-verifying) data. The protocol is live because the availability property guarantees that it must always eventually stop resending messages: under an unreliable asynchronous network as defined here, a message sent repeatedly must eventually reach its destination. Given that, we show that each send/receive/wait step is equivalent to a reliable asynchronous send to a responsive quorum of servers. Then, the proof of safety and liveness follows Malkhi and Reiter's original proof.

The advantage of managing message retransmission in the Byzantine quorum protocol as opposed to abstracting it into the communications layer is that doing so makes it easy to bound buffer consumption even if a server's network protocol software is considered vulnerable to Byzantine failures of the server. In particular, under these protocols, a read or write request may consume client buffer memory proportional to n, the number of servers. If a client issues c concurrent operations, then the client's total memory consumption is O(nc). Unfortunately, in an asynchronous system, each request may take arbitrary time to complete, so c may, in general, be unbounded. Fortunately, this protocol is amenable to several techniques for bounding the number of outstanding requests from each client. For example, if a client application using the BQS system is single-threaded and blocks for reads and writes, then system buffer consumption is naturally bounded to O(n) buffers per client.

A more general solution is for the protocol itself to manage allocation and deallocation from a finite set of buffer and to block incoming requests when insufficient buffers are available to complete a request. In particular, in the Finite Buffer U-masking or U-dissemination protocol, we assume L local buffers and add a step FIRST before and a step LAST after both the read and the write function.

FIRST) Wait for n local buffers to be available then lock n local buffers.

LAST) Unlock the n local buffers claimed in step FIRST.

We provide the complete proofs for the following three theorems in our technical report [27].

Theorem 4 *The Finite Buffer U-masking protocol for generic data follows safe semantics and the Finite Buffer U-dissemination protocol for self-verifying data follows regular semantics.* (Safety)

The safety of the Finite Buffer protocol follows from the fact that each send/wait/repeat step is equivalent to a reliable asynchronous send and the safety properties of Malkhi and Reiter's original protocol.

Theorem 5 *The Finite Buffer U-masking and U-dissemination protocols are live (i.e. all requests eventually terminate).* (Liveness)

This follows from three facts: (1) step FIRST terminates because the rest of the protocol is live, (2) each network send/wait/resend step terminates because it must eventually reach a responsive set of servers, and (3) the original Malkhi and Reiter protocols terminate.

Theorem 6 *The Finite Buffer U-masking and U-dissemination protocol consumes at most L buffers.* (Finite Buffering)

This follows from the locking of step FIRST.

5. Related Work

There is a significant body of work on quorum systems [12, 13, 15, 17, 23, 37] but Byzantine failures were first considered by Malkhi and Reiter [24]. They have extended this work in other directions, for example by distinguishing between crash and Byzantine failures [26]. In the same work, Malkhi and Reiter show how to use smaller quorums (as opposed to smaller quorum *systems*, as examined here), of size $O(\sqrt{n})$. These constructions however require as many total servers as their previous work. Investigating whether our SBQ protocols can be adapted to these smaller quorums remains future work. Malkhi and Reiter's seminal paper on Byzantine quorums [24] also explores the load of the quorum system and present a quorum construction which does not requires the clients to know about the failure scenarios. Exploring these concepts in the context of SBQ is future work as well.

The idea of distinct read and write quorums has been explored before [13] but not in the context of Byzantine failures.

Bazzi [5] explored Byzantine quorums in a synchronous environment, with reliable channels. In this context it is possible to require fewer servers ($f + 1$ for self-verifying data, $2f + 1$ otherwise). He uses symmetric quorums. Our work shows an alternative asynchronous algorithm that can efficiently utilize additional servers to avoid slow reads.

Triantafillou and Taylor [38] have extended work in quorums under a fail-stop assumption by reasoning about the location of the replicas. They present results which provide similar availability to quorum systems but with improved latency. Extending these results to Byzantine environments remains future work.

Phalanx [25] builds shared data abstractions and provides a locking service, both of which can tolerate Byzantine failure of servers or clients. It uses dissemination and masking quorums. Asymmetric quorums would not be appropriate in this case because to implement locks, one must be able to determine when the write operation completes.

Distributed storage can also be implemented using Rampart [30], a toolkit for distributed applications in Byzantine environments. Rampart does not use quorum systems but instead relies on the state machine approach [35] to implement the abstraction of highly available distributed shared memory.

Castro and Liskov [10] also attacked the problem of reliable storage under Byzantine failures. They

implement a Byzantine-fault-tolerant NFS service using a technique different from quorum systems. They use self-verifying data and can tolerate f Byzantine failures using $3f + 1$ servers.

When using non-self-verifying data, faulty servers can force new timestamps to take arbitrarily large values. This is a problem because in practice timestamps can only take values from a finite range and therefore faulty servers can compromise the safety of the protocol. All the quorum protocols discussed in this paper are vulnerable to this problem, but it can be solved by applying known techniques [22].

6. Conclusion

We present two Small Byzantine Quorum (SBQ) protocols for shared variables, one that provides safe semantics for generic data using $3f + 1$ servers and the other that provides regular semantics for self-verifying data using $2f + 1$ servers. This reduces by f the number of servers needed by previous protocols in the reliable asynchronous communication model. Our protocols use novel a-masking and the a-dissemination quorums. They differ from existing quorums for Byzantine systems in that they make a distinction between read and write quorums.

The reliable channels required by our protocols can be difficult to engineer, particularly when Byzantine failures are a concern. We therefore consider Byzantine quorum protocols with different system models.

In the case of reliable synchronous networks, protocols that rely on synchrony can be forced to wait for a time-out if faulty servers do not reply. It can therefore be advantageous to use asynchronous protocols and to use the synchrony assumption only in the network layer. We propose an intermediate protocol for the synchronous model which tolerates f Byzantine failures but also provides the guarantee of self-timed operation as long as the number of actual failures does not exceed a threshold t ($t \leq f$).

For the case of unreliable asynchronous networks we show how to adapt Malkhi and Reiter's protocol to this environment to provide safe semantics using $4f + 1$ servers or, if the data is self-verifying, regular semantics using $3f + 1$ servers.

A limitation of the asymmetric quorums used by the SBQ protocols is that the implicit synchronization provided by blocking writes is lost. We are exploring the benefits and limitations of solutions that combine SBQ protocols with explicit end-to-end acknowledgments of writes that have been successfully read.

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A Malkhi and Reiter's protocols

The SBQ protocols, the a-masking and a-dissemination quorum construction, and their analysis draw on Malkhi and Reiter's original protocol and quorum systems [24]. In this section, we review Malkhi and Reiter's original definitions and restate their protocol in a notation similar to that used to describe our SBQ protocols in Figures 1 and 2.

1.1. Masking Quorum systems

Masking quorum systems provide consistent data replication even if some of the servers in the quorum system are arbitrarily faulty. They are defined as follows [24].

Definition 3 *A quorum system $\mathcal{Q}_\mathcal{M}$ is a* masking quorum system *for a fail-prone system $\mathcal{B}$ if the following properties are satisfied.*

M-Consistency:	$\forall Q_1, Q_2 \in \mathcal{Q}_\mathcal{M}\ \forall B_1, B_2 \in \mathcal{B} :\ (Q_1 \cap Q_2) \setminus B_1 \not\subseteq B_2$
M-Availability:	$\forall B \in \mathcal{B}\ \exists Q_1 \in \mathcal{Q}_\mathcal{M} :\ B \cap Q_1 = \emptyset$

The first property implies that, in the f-threshold case, the intersection of two quorums contains a majority of correct servers (since $|B_1| = |B_2|$). The second property guarantees that there always exists at least one quorum which contains no faulty processes. For an f-masking quorum system, these properties require $n \geq 4f + 1$, and quorums of size $|Q| \geq \lceil \frac{n+2f+1}{2} \rceil$.

Read and Write Protocols for Masking Quorum Systems The protocols for reading and writing data in masking quorum systems implement multiple-writer, multiple-reader *safe* variables [21]. Protocols for partial regular semantics have also been proposed [28]. The protocols assume that each client c has access to a set T_c of timestamps, and that the sets used by different clients are disjoint. Read and write operations are defined as follows [24].

Write. For a client c to write a value v, it queries servers to obtain a set of timestamps $A = \{< t_u >\}_{u \in Q}$ for some quorum Q; chooses timestamp $t \in T_c$ greater than the highest timestamp value in A and greater than any timestamp it has chosen in the past; and sends the update $< v, t >$ to servers until it has received an acknowledgment for this update from every server in some quorum Q'.

Read. For a client to read a variable x, it queries servers to obtain a set of value/timestamp pairs $A = \{< v_u, t_u >\}_{u \in Q}$ for some quorum Q. The client the computes a set A' that contains all pairs returned by at least one correct server. Formally,

$$A' = \{< v, t > :\ \exists B^+ \subseteq Q\ [\forall B \in \mathcal{B}[B^+ \not\subseteq B] \wedge \forall u \in B^+[v_u = v \wedge t_u = t]]\}$$

The client then chooses the pair $< v, t >$ in A' with the highest timestamp, and chooses v as the result of the read operation; if A' is empty, the client returns $\perp$ (a null value, indicating that the read failed).

Write(Δ)

1. send (GET-TS) to all servers.
2. **wait until** received timestamp ts_i from each server s_i in a masking quorum.
3. let *last_ts* be the largest received timestamp.
4. choose a new timestamp new_ts that is larger than both *last_ts* and any timestamp previously chosen by this server.
5. send (STORE,new_ts, Δ) to all servers.
6. **wait until** received an acknowledgment from each server s_i in a masking quorum.

$\langle ts, \Delta \rangle$=**Read()**

1. send (GET) to all servers.
2. **wait until** received pairs $\langle \Delta_i, ts_i \rangle$ from each server s_i in a masking quorum Q.
3. { *Build a set G containing all pairs returned by a voucher set of servers.* }
   Compute $G = \{\langle ts, \Delta \rangle | (\exists B^+ \subseteq Q :: (\forall B \in \mathcal{B} : B^+ \not\subseteq B : (\forall s_u \in B^+ :: \Delta_u = \Delta \wedge ts_u = ts)))\}$
4. **if** $G \neq \emptyset$ **then**
   select the pair $\langle \Delta, ts \rangle$ with the highest timestamp *ts*
   return $\langle \Delta, ts \rangle$
   else
   return $\perp$

Figure 3: MR protocol for generic (non-self-verifying) data

Figure 3 describes this protocol using a notation similar to the one used to describe the SBQ protocol for generic data in Figure 1.

1.2. Dissemination Quorum systems

Dissemination quorum systems guarantee high availability for self-verifying data. They are defined as follows [24].

Definition 4 *A quorum system $\mathcal{Q}_\mathcal{D}$ is a* dissemination quorum system *for a fail-prone system $\mathcal{B}$ if the following properties are satisfied.*

$$\textit{D-Consistency:} \qquad \forall Q_1, Q_2 \in \mathcal{Q}_\mathcal{D}\ \forall B \in \mathcal{B} :\ (Q_1 \cap Q_2) \not\subseteq B$$

$$\textit{D-Availability:} \qquad \forall B \in \mathcal{B}\ \exists Q_1 \in \mathcal{Q}_\mathcal{D} :\ B \cap Q_1 = \emptyset$$

The first property guarantees that the intersection of any two quorums contains at least one non-faulty process. The second property, as in masking quorum systems, guarantees that there exists at least one quorum which contains no faulty process. For an f-threshold quorum system, these properties require $n \geq 3f + 1$, and quorums of size $|Q| \geq \lceil \frac{n+f+1}{2} \rceil$.

Read and Write Protocols for Dissemination Quorum Systems. The self-verifying nature of the data stored by dissemination quorum systems makes it possible to implement shared variables with strong semantics. The following read and write protocols implement a multiple-writer multiple-reader *regular* variable [21] for dissemination quorum systems. Read and write protocols for achieving *atomic* semantics [21] have also been proposed [25].

Write(Δ)

1. send (GET-TS) to all servers.
2. **wait until** received signed timestamp $\{ts_i\}_{client_i}$ from each server s_i in a dissemination quorum.
3. let $last_ts$ be the largest valid timestamp in the answers.
4. choose a new timestamp new_ts that is larger than both *last_ts* and any timestamp previously chosen by this server.
5. send (STORE,$\{new\_ts\}_{client}$,$\{new\_ts, \Delta\}_{client}$) to all servers.

$\langle ts, \Delta \rangle$=**Read()**

1. send (GET) to all servers.
2. **wait until** received signed timestamp $\{ts_i\}_{client_i}$ from each server s_i in a dissemination quorum.
3. discard all pairs that are not verifiable.
4. **if** all pairs were discarded
   return $\perp$
   else
   return the remaining pair $\langle ts, \Delta \rangle$ with the highest timestamp.

Figure 4: MR protocol for self-verifying data

Write. Identical to the write protocol used in masking quorum systems.

Read. For a client to read a variable x, it queries servers to obtain a set of value/timestamp pairs $A = \{< v_u, t_u >\}_{u \in Q}$ from some quorum Q. The client then discards those pairs that are not verifiable (e.g., using an appropriate digital signature verification algorithm) and chooses from the remaining pairs the pair $< v, t >$ with the largest timestamp. v is the result of the read operation.

Figure 4 describes this protocol using a notation similar to the one used to describe the SBQ protocol for generic data in Figure 1.

B Correctness of SBQ

In Section 3. we asserted that the SBQ protocol for generic data implements safe semantics and that the version for self-verifying data implements regular semantics. We proved the correctness of the protocol for generic data in Section 3.3.1. We now treat of case of self-verifying data.

2.1. Regular Semantics in a-dissemination quorum systems

Lemma 6 *A read operation returns either the most recently written value, or the value being written by some concurrent write operation.*

Let W be the set of write operations that preceded the read, and let $w^* \in W$ be the write operation with the highest timestamp. By Lemma 2, w^* did not precede any operation in W and therefore there exists a serialization of the operations in W in which w^* is the most recently written value. By Lemma 1, a read quorum will respond to the read with a set of value/timestamp pairs, and by AD-Consistency, that read quorum will contain an answer from a voucher set that received w^*. Since the timestamp of correct servers is monotonically increasing and w^* is the write in W with the highest timestamp, the correct server in the voucher set will return either w^*'s value or a verifiable value with a higher timestamp. Furthermore, any verifiable value has previously been written. Because the read protocol decides on the verifiable value that has the highest timestamp, the read operation returns either the most recently written value w^* or a value w^+ with higher timestamp. Since w^* is the completed write with the highest timestamp, it follows that the value w^+ is associated with a concurrent write. □

Lemma 7 *A read operation that is not concurrent with any write operation returns the result of the most recently written value.*

This is a corollary of the previous lemma. □

C S-SBQ

3.1. Adapting SBQ to Synchronous Networks

SBQ, as described in Figures 1 and 2, requires a number of servers ($2f+1$ or $3f+1$) that is appropriate for asynchronous networks. In the case of synchronous networks, it is possible to modify the protocol to take advantage of time-outs and therefore require fewer servers. We present S-SBQ, which requires only $f+1$ servers ($2f+1$ for non-self-verifying data).

In this variant of SBQ, we modify step 2 of the write operation for self-verifying data as follows.

2. Wait for a read quorum of answers or time-outs.
   Let A be the set of servers that either replied with (ACK-GET-TS, $\{ts_i\}_{some\_client}$) or whose link timed out.
   Let A grow until $\exists Q_1 \in Q_r : Q_1 \subseteq A$.

Step 2 of the read operation is modified similarly.

2. Wait for a read quorum of answers or time-outs.
   Let A be the set of servers that either replied with (ACK-GET, $\{ts, \Delta\}_{client}$) or whose link timed out.
   Let A grow until $\exists Q_1 \in Q_r : Q_1 \subseteq A$.

Similar changes apply to the case of non-self-verifying data, the only difference being the absence of the signature in the data read.

We now modify the quorum construction to express the fact that the construction of S-SBQ is not only determined by a requirement on fault tolerance but also by a requirement on fast (self-timed) reads.

3.2. f/t-masking quorum system

The quorum systems for asynchronous networks consider a fail-prone system S which contains all possible failure scenarios that the protocol is expected to be able to survive. To this we add the *delay-prone system* S' that contains all possible *delay scenarios*. A delay scenario is a subset of some failure scenario. The requirement is that as long as the failures do not expand beyond any delay scenario, the protocol must not suffer from slow reads. Because this quorum construction has two different bounds, one for performance and one for safety, we call it a *f/t-masking quorum system*.

S-Consistency: $\forall Q_1 \in Q_r \forall Q_2 \in Q_w \forall B_1, B_2 \in S : Q_1 \cap Q_2 \setminus B_1 \not\subseteq B_2$

S-Performance: $\forall B' \in S' \; \exists Q_1 \in Q_r : \; B' \cap Q_1 = \emptyset$

In the threshold case where all delay scenarios have size d the minimum number of required servers is $n = 2f + d + 1$.

Is it always possible to build such a quorum system if sufficiently many servers are available. This derives from the fact that self-verifying (and non-self-verifying) data quorums exist and that delay scenarios are subsets of failure scenarios.

3.3. f/t-dissemination quorum system

This quorum construction is specific to self-verifying data. Its performance constraint is identical to that of the f/t-masking quorum system but the consistency constraint is optimized for self-verifying data, allowing for smaller quorums.

$$\textbf{SV-Consistency:} \quad \forall Q_1 \in Q_r \forall Q_2 \in Q_w \forall B \in S : Q_1 \cap Q_2 \not\subseteq B$$

$$\textbf{SV-Performance:} \quad \forall B' \in S' \; \exists Q_1 \in Q_r : \; B' \cap Q_1 = \emptyset$$

In the threshold case where all delay scenarios have size d the minimum number of required servers is $n = f + d + 1$.

3.4. Correctness

In this section we revisit the key properties of S-SBQ presented initially in Section 4.2. and present a proof for each. For clarity we consider self-verifying and non-self-verifying data separately, even though several of the proofs for self-verifying data apply to the case of non-self-verifying data as well.

3.4.1 Self-Verifying Data

Lemma 8 (timestamp consistency) *So long as at least one failure scenario covers the failure set, if a write operation A completes before a write operation B then the timestamp associated with B is larger than the timestamp associated with A.*

This lemma shows that our choice of timestamp values is appropriate. It allows us to reason about the real-time ordering of writes based on their relative timestamps.

If write operation A has completed then (by our definition of completion), all correct servers in a write quorum have finished processing the write message. The S-Consistency property (or AS-Consistency for self-verifying data) of the f/t-masking (f/t-dissemination, respectively) quorum construction guarantees that A's timestamp ts will be read in phase 2 of the write function. Because that value comes from a correct server it will be valid. Therefore the timestamp chosen for B will be larger than ts. □

Lemma 9 (safety) *So long as at least one failure scenario covers the failure set, the S-SBQ protocol for self-verifying data follows regular semantics.*

Because of the self-verifying nature of the data, faulty servers cannot modify the timestamp in their answer. Any valid answer they provide (i.e. answer that has not been modified) is therefore necessarily correct. Correct servers only send correct answers, therefore all valid answers will also be correct. Because the read protocol decides on a valid answer, we can deduce that the chosen value will also be correct.

The SV-consistency property of the f/t-dissemination quorum construction guarantees that the read quorum will include at least one correct server A which sent timely data. We use Section 3.3.'s definition of timely, i.e. timely data either comes from the completed write with highest timestamp (the *latest completed write*) or data from a write that is concurrent with the read.

The previous lemma guarantees that correct data with a timely timestamp comes from either the last completed write operation or a write operation that has not completed yet.

The read protocol selects the valid answer with the highest timestamp. Because A's timely answer is considered, the chosen answer will necessarily have a timestamp that is greater or equal to that of the latest completed write. It follows that this timestamp is associated either with the latest completed write or with a write that is concurrent with the read. By definition, that answer is timely.

The chosen value will therefore be correct and timely. Because the previous lemma shows that our definition of timely corresponds to the real-time ordering of the write operations, we can conclude that S-SBQ obeys the regular semantics in the case of self-verifying data. □

Lemma 10 (liveness) *The S-SBQ protocols are live (i.e. all requests eventually terminate).*

There are two places in the protocol where waits occur: step 2 of the write operation and step 2 of the read operation. After a time-out duration, the set A will contain all servers (Since the request was sent to all servers). Because all quorums are subsets of the server universe, $\exists Q_1 \in Q_r : Q_1 \subseteq A$ will hold and the wait will stop. Therefore, each of these two waits will stop at most after a time-out delay. This is true for both the self-verifying and the non-self-verifying versions of S-SBQ □

The next theorem expresses the conditions under which the protocol does not need to wait for this delay.

Lemma 11 (performance) *The S-SBQ protocols are self-timed as long as the failure set is covered by some delay scenario.*

We revisit the two locations in the protocol where a wait occurs, but this time show that a shorter wait is possible if sufficiently few failures occured. Since the wait functions are identical, we treat them together.

The wait completes as soon as the set A of answers covers a read quorum. If the failure set is smaller than some delay scenario then the S-Performance property of the f/t-masking quorum system (or the SV-Performance of f/t-dissemination quorums for self-verifying data) guarantees that there exists a read quorum

R consisting only of correct servers. These servers will reply as soon as they see the request and A will grow to contain the read quorum R. The operation will therefore continue in a self-timed manner. □

3.4.2 Non-Self-Verifying Data

Lemma 12 (safety) *So long as at least one failure scenario covers the failure set, the S-SBQ protocol for non-self-verifying data follows safe semantics.*

We first show that the chosen answer will be correct.

Faulty servers can send arbitrary answers to the read query. However because the read protocol decides on a value vouched for by more servers than a failure set can cover, answers that no correct server vouches for are rejected. Therefore, the chosen answer is correct.

We now show that the chosen answer obeys safe semantics, that is if there is no concurrent write then the read will decide on the value of one of the *last writes*, which we define as a write that has completed and that is not followed by any other write.

Consider the last write with the highest timestamp. We will call this the *latest completed write*. Because this write has completed, all correct servers in some write quorum W have finished processing it. The S-Consistency property guarantees that the intersection between the read quorum used in the read operation and the correct servers in W is larger than any failure scenario. Because of its sufficient size, this answer will not be rejected (we say it is valid).

In fact, the latest completed write will be the chosen answer because it has the highest timestamp. We already know that only correct answers are chosen. Because there is no concurrent write, Lemma 8 ensures that the latest completed write has the highest timestamp in the system. This concludes the proof of this lemma since the read operation selects the valid answer with the highest timestamp and we know that the latest completed write is valid. □

The liveness and performance of the S-SBQ protocol for non-self-verifying data is shown in Lemmas 10 and 11. The proof of these lemmas is general enough to apply equally well in the case of non-self-verifying data.

3.5. Conclusion

The two previous subsections have shown that the S-SBQ protocol is regular for self-verifying data and safe for non-self-verifying data. This result should not come as a surprize as it is similar to that of the SBQ protocol itself.

The SBQ protocol is designed for reliable asynchronous networks. The S-SBQ protocol is appropriate for reliable *synchronous* networks. It differentiates itself from existing protocols [5] by providing performance guarantees. S-SBQ does not allow the writer to determine when its write operation has completed. In cases where this information is necessary, the writer can sacrifice performance and wait for a time-out value: the

write is then guaranteed to have completed. If the time-out value is too long then the implementor should consider an asynchronous protocol, for example the MR [24] or MR-U protocol.

D Extending MR to unreliable networks

In this section we extend the MR protocols to *authenticated unreliable asynchronous* channels. A message sent in such a channel is only guaranteed to reach its destination if sent an infinite number of times. There is no bound on message delivery time.

Our variant is a straightforward extension of Malkhi and Reiter's original protocols. It uses the same quorum constructions and therefore require the same number of servers: $3f + 1$ for self-verifying data and $4f + 1$ otherwise.

4.1. Protocols

For the case of self-verifying data, we use a dissemination quorum system and the protocol described in Figure 5. The protocol differs from the original only in two aspects. First, it introduces an arbitrary time-out value to deal with the unreliable channels. All messages will be repeated if no acknowledgment is received within this time-out period, until a quorum of servers acknowledged the message.

The second difference between the two protocols is that MR-U uses nounces to identify duplicate messages. This is necessary because messages are sent multiple times and therefore more than one copy of a message may reach its destination.

In the case of non-self-verifying data, the protocol of Figure 6 is used along with masking quorums systems. This variant differs from Malkhi and Reiter's original protocol in the same way as the protocol previously described: it introduces resends and nounces.

4.2. Correctness

The proof of correctness for the MR-U protocol can be derived from that of the MR protocols. The necessary insights are the following.

Lemma 13 *The only communication primitive used by the MR protocols is the reliable send to a quorum (called "Q-RPC" in their Phalanx paper [25]).*

This can be determined by examining the proof they provide and noting that it does not make use of the messages sent outside of a quorum. □

Lemma 14 *MR-U implements reliable send to a quorum.*

All the communication in the protocol follows the same pattern: a client repeatedly sends a message to all servers and waits for a quorums of answers. The network guarantees we require are sufficient to ensure that both the client's message and the server's reply will get through (since servers answer every message, including duplicate messages). This communication pattern therefore succeeds in reaching a quorum of servers. □

Write(Δ)

1. **wait until** n buffers can be allocated. Allocate them.
2. let u be a nounce.
3. send (GET-TS,u) to all servers. When a link times out (i.e. when no ack was received within the time-out interval), resend.
4. **wait until** received an answer (ACK-GET-TS, u, ts_i) from each server s_i in a dissemination quorum.
5. choose a new timestamp new_ts that is larger than any ts_i and that any timestamp previously chosen by this server.
6. send (STORE,$u+1, \{new\_ts, \Delta\}_{client}$) to all servers. If a link times out before we get an ACK, resend.
7. **wait until** received an answer (ACK-STORE, $u+1, ts$) from each server s_i in a dissemination quorum.
8. release the n buffers.

$\langle ts, \Delta \rangle$=**Read()**

1. **wait until** n buffers can be allocated. Allocate them.
2. Let u be a nounce.
3. Send (GET,u) to all servers. When a link times out (i.e. when no ack was received within the time-out interval), resend.
4. **wait until** received an answer (ACK-GET,$u, \{ts_i, \Delta_i\}_{client_i}$) from each server s_i in a dissemination quorum.
5. Discard all pairs that are not verifiable.
6. Select among the remaining pairs the pair $\langle ts, \Delta \rangle$ with the highest timestamp and return it.
7. release the n buffers.

Figure 5: *MR-U protocol for self-verifying data*

Write(Δ)

1. wait until n buffers can be allocated.
2. Let u be a nounce.
3. Send (GET-TS, u) to all servers. When a link times out, resend.
4. Wait for a quorum of answers (using the buffers allocated in the initial step).
   Let A be the set of servers that replied with (ACK-GET-TS, u, ts_i)
   Let A grow until $\exists Q_1 \in Q : Q_1 \subseteq A$.
5. Let the timestamp ts be larger than the largest timestamp in the answers.
6. Send (STORE,$u+1, \{ts, \Delta\}_{client}$) to all servers. If a link times out before we get an ACK, resend.
7. Wait for a quorum of acks (using the buffers allocated in the initial step).
   Let A be the set of servers that replied with (ACK-STORE, $u+1, ts$)
   Let A grow until $\exists Q_1 \in Q : Q_1 \subseteq A$.
8. release the n buffers.

(ts, Δ)=**Read()**

1. wait until n buffers can be allocated.
2. Let u be a nounce.
3. Send (GET, u) to all servers. When a link times out, resend.
4. Wait for a quorum of answers of the form (ACK-GET,u, ts, Δ) (using the buffers allocated in the initial step).
   Let A be the set of servers that replied with (ACK-GET,u, ts, Δ).
   Let A grow until $\exists Q_1 \in Q : Q_1 \subseteq A$.
5. Compute the set of answers that we know are vouched for by at least one correct server.
   $A' = \{(ts, \Delta) : \exists B^+ \subseteq Q[\forall B \in S[B^+ \not\subseteq S] \wedge \forall i \in B^+[ts_i = ts \wedge \Delta_i = \Delta]]\}$.
6. Return (ts', Δ'), the value of A' with the largest timestamp. If A' is empty then return $\perp$.
7. release the n buffers.

Figure 6: *MR-U protocol for non-self-verifying data*

Lemma 15 *MR-U deals succesfully with duplicate messages.*

The only remaining difference between the communication with the MR-U and the MR protocols is the fact that the former may duplicate messages. Duplicate requests to servers will not harm the server state: read requests do not modify it and write requests are ordered according to their timestamp instead of the order of their arrival.

The danger lies in clients accepting an answer which belonged to a previous request. Fortunately, the protocol uses nounces to be able to match answers to the corresponding request and therefore duplicate messages are not a problem. □

Lemma 16 *MR-U is safe and live even when only finite memory is available.*

The first and last operations in every request ensure that the protocol only uses finite memory. These steps do not affect safety, and we showed in Section 4.3. that they do not affect liveness either. The argument was that once memory is allocated, it will eventually be freed. Therefore, threads will eventually be able to allocate memory and the MR-U protocol is therefore live. □