# Specifying an Implementation to Satisfy Interface Specifications: A State Transition Approach\*

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#### **Abstract**

We present a solution to the problem posed by Leslie Lamport to participants of the Specification Logics session in the 1987 Lake Arrowhead workshop. Formal specifications are given for a database interface offering serializable access to concurrent client programs, a two-phase locking implementation of the client interface, and the physical-database interface accessed by the implementation. We sketch a proof that the implementation satisfies the client interface specification, assuming that the physical-database interface specification holds.

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## 1. INTRODUCTION

Consider the database system illustrated in Figure 1. Each client program performs a sequence of transactions. Client programs can execute concurrently. We refer to the interface between the client programs and the two-phase locking system as the upper interface. We refer to the interface between the two-phase locking system and the physical database as the lower interface.




Figure 1. A database system.

## Interface specification

The informal specification of each interface consists of a set of procedures that can be executed concurrently. We will specify each interface by an event-driven system together with some safety and progress requirements. An event-driven system consists of a set of state variables and a set of events. Each event is specified by an enabling condition and an atomic action. The enabling condition is a predicate in the state variables. The action specifies updates to the state variables when the event occurs.

An interface procedure P is modeled as two events: Call(P) and Return(P). Since several invocations to P can be concurrently active, it is necessary to tag each call of P with a unique identifier, which will be used in the corresponding return of P. Therefore each interface procedure P is modeled by the two events: Call(i,P) and Return(i,P), where the identifier i must be unique for all possible concurrent invocations of P.

In summary, an interface specification includes the following:

- (a) a set of state variables (including history variables) and state functions;
- (b) a Call(i,P) event and a Return(i,P) event for each interface procedure P;
- (c) a set of safety requirements;
- (d) a set of progress requirements.

We note that state functions can always be transformed into state variables. Also, the event-driven system in the specification can be very small. In the extreme case, a single state variable is enough, i.e., a history variable recording the sequence of all procedure calls and returns; each event is always enabled and its action consists of only updating the history variable. For the interfaces to be specified in this paper, we found that some safety requirements can be more easily expressed by state variables and the updating of state variables than by formulating assertions on a history variable.

# Implementation specification

An implementation of the two-phase locking system is specified by an event-driven system. It is a "refinement" of the upper interface specification, obtained as follows [5]:

(a) Additional state variables are introduced, augmenting those in the upper interface specification. Thus, there is a projection mapping from each state of the implementation to a state of the upper interface, referred to as its image at the interface [2,3]. Some of the

variables of the upper interface specification can be declared to be auxiliary (e.g., a history variable).

(b) The upper interface events are refined and additional events are defined. The events can include in their enabling conditions and actions, the state variables introduced in part (a), as well as call and return events of the lower interface.

Each implementation event  $e_I$  must be a refinement of some upper interface events, which means that if  $e_I$  can take the implementation from state  $s_1$  to  $s_2$ , then there is an upper interface event  $e_U$  that can take the upper interface from state  $t_1$  to  $t_2$ , where  $t_i$  is the image of  $s_i$ . This condition can be relaxed by introducing a safety requirement S, in which case the condition has to be satisfied only for each  $(s_1,s_2)$  pair such that  $s_1$  and  $s_2$  satisfy S. We will have to prove that such safety requirements introduced are in fact safety properties of the implementation. A special case of event refinement is that  $e_I$  has a null image (i.e.,  $t_1$  equals  $t_2$ ).

The implementation is a refinement of the upper interface if all implementation events are refinements of upper interface events. In this case, safety properties of the event-driven system of the upper interface are also safety properties of the implementation [2,5].

## Specifying events by predicates

Consider a system with state variables  $\{v_i\}$ . The enabling condition of an event is specified by a predicate in  $\{v_i\}$ . Instead of specifying the event's action by algorithmic code, we use a predicate in  $\{v_i\} \cup \{v_i'\}$ , where  $v_i$  denotes the value of a state variable immediately before the event occurrence, and  $v_i'$  denotes its value immediately after the event occurrence [4]. For brevity, if  $v_i'$  does not appear in an event's definition, then  $v_i' = v_i$  is implicitly assumed. For example, an event  $e_1$  that is enabled whenever the state variable  $v_2$  is less than 5 and whose action increments the state variable  $v_1$  by 1 is defined by  $e_1 \equiv (v_2 < 5 \land v_1' = v_1 + 1)$ .

## Checking implementation events

Specifying events by predicates makes it easy to check if implementation events are refinements of upper interface events [5]. Event  $e_I$  is a refinement of the upper interface events,  $e_1, e_2, \cdots, e_n$ , if  $e_I \Longrightarrow e_1 \vee e_2 \vee \cdots \vee e_n$ . Given the safety requirement S,  $e_I$  is a refinement if  $S \wedge e_I \Longrightarrow e_1 \vee e_2 \vee \cdots \vee e_n$ .

For most implementation events,  $e_I$  is a refinement of a single upper interface event  $e_U$ . In this case, we need only check either  $e_I \implies e_U$  or  $S \land e_I \implies e_U$ .

# Verification of an implementation

Having an implementation that is a refinement of the upper interface, it remains to show that the implementation satisfies the following:

- (i) Safety requirements that are not safety properties of the event-driven system of the upper interface, e.g., serializability.
- (ii) Progress requirements in the upper interface specification.

For the two-phase locking implementation, we found that it is actually easier to give a direct proof that the implementation satisfies the progress requirements in the upper interface specification than to give a proof via the projection mapping. Our progress proof employs a novel metric based upon lexicographic ordering.

## 2. UPPER INTERFACE SPECIFICATION

Define the following constants. Let OBJECTS denote the set of objects in the database, VALUES the set of values each object can have, KEYS the set of keys, and IDS the set of transaction identifiers. The entries of IDS are needed to specify correct usage of keys. They are also adequate as identifiers in interface procedure calls, since each transaction has at most one procedure call outstanding. For each  $obj \in OBJECTS$ , let its initial value be given by INITVALUE(obj). We will use key, obj, val, id as variables that range over the corresponding sets.

We say that a transaction has a procedure invocation outstanding if it has called the procedure and not yet returned. We say that the transaction is active if it has returned from a BeginTr call with a key, and it has not yet ended.

#### 2.1. State variables

 $H_U$ : sequence of  $\{(id, BeginTr, key), (id, ReadTr, key, obj, val), (id, WriteTr, key, obj, val, OK), (id, EndTr, key, OK), (id, AbortTr, key)\}$ .

Initially,  $H_U$  is the null sequence.

History of the returns of procedure invocations. The (id,AbortTr,key) entry is used to record all returns aborting transactions. The other entries indicate successful returns. An unsuccessful BeginTr return is not recorded in  $H_U$ .  $H_U$  is adequate for stating serializability.

 $status_U(id)$ : {NOTBEGUN, READY, COMMITTED, ABORTED}  $\cup$  {(Begin Tr), (Read Tr, key, obj), (Write Tr, key, obj, val), (End Tr, key), (Abort Tr, key)}. Initially,  $status_U(id) = \text{NOTBEGUN}$ .

Indicates the status of transaction id. NOTBEGUN means that the transaction has not yet issued a BeginTr call, or such a call returned with FAILED. READY means that the transaction is active and has no interface procedure invocation outstanding. A procedure call, such as (ReadTr, key, obj), means that the transaction is active and has that procedure invocation outstanding. COMMITTED means that the transaction has ended successfully. ABORTED means that the transaction has ended by aborting.

allocated (key): boolean. Initially false.

True iff key is allocated to a transaction.

When we refer to a tuple in the domain of  $status_U(id)$ , such as (ReadTr, key, obj), where a component in the tuple can have any of its allowed values, we shall omit that component in our reference. For example,  $status_U(id) = (ReadTr, obj)$  means  $status_U(id) = (ReadTr, key, obj)$  for some value of key. More than one component in a tuple may be omitted. For example, (obj) refers to (ReadTr, key, obj) for some key or (WriteTr, key, obj, val) for some key and some val. The same notational abbreviation will be used in referring to elements of  $H_U$ . For example,  $(id, obj) \in H_U$  means that  $H_U$  has a (id, ReadTr, obj, key, val) or a (id, WriteTr, obj, key, val, OK) entry for some key and some val.

## 2.2. State functions

active (id): boolean True iff (id, Begin Tr)  $\in H_U$ , and neither (id, End Tr) nor (id, Abort Tr) is in  $H_U$ .

accessed (id): powerset of OBJECTS

The set of objects that have been accessed by an active transaction id. = empty, if  $\neg active$  (id).

```
= \{obj : status_U(id) = (obj) \lor (id, obj) \in H_U \}, \text{ if } active (id).
concurrentaccess (id): boolean
        True iff there is an i \in IDS -{id} such that accessed(i) \cap accessed(id) is not empty.
committedvalue (obj ): VALUES
        = INITVALUE(obj), if there is no (id, WriteTr, obj) \in H_U such that status_U(id) =
        COMMITTED.
        =\!val , if there is an id such that status_U(id)\!\!=\!\!	ext{COMMITTED} and H_U contains a
        (id, WriteTr, obj) entry, and (id, WriteTr, obj, val) is the last such entry.
currentvalue\ (obj\ ,id\ ): VALUES \cup\ \{NULL\}
        = NULL, if \neg active(id).
        = committed value (obj), if active (id) and (id, Write Tr, obj) \notin H_U.
        =val, if active(id), there is a (id, WriteTr, obj) entry in H_U, and (id, WriteTr, obj, val)
        is the last such entry.
2.3. Events
     For readability, we model each procedure return by two return events, one for success and
one for abort. Also, the enabling condition of an event is placed on the first line of the definition.
```

```
Call(id, BeginTr) \equiv
        status_U (id)=NOTBEGUN
         \land status_{II}(id)' = (BeginTr)
Return(id, BeginTr, key) \equiv
        status_U(id) = (BeginTr) \land \neg allocated(key)
         \wedge status_U(id)' = READY
         \land allocated (key)'
         \wedge H_U' = H_U @ (id, BeginTr, key)
Return (id, Begin Tr, FAILED) \equiv
        status_U(id) = (BeginTr) \land (\forall key : allocated(key))
         \land status_{II}(id)' = NOTBEGUN
Call(id,ReadTr,key,obj) \equiv
         status_{II}(id) = READY \land allocated(key)
         \land status_{U}(id)' = (ReadTr, key, obj)
Return(id, ReadTr, key, obj, val) \equiv
         status_{II}(id) = (ReadTr, key, obj)
```

 $\land H_{U}' = H_{U} @ (id, ReadTr, key, obj, val)$ 

 $\land status_U(id)' = READY$  $\land val = currentvalue(obj, id)$ 

```
Return(id, ReadTr, key, obj, ABORT) \equiv
        status_{U}(id) = (ReadTr, key, obj) \land concurrentaccess(id)
         \wedge status_{II}(id)' = ABORTED
         \land \neg allocated (key)'
         \wedge H_{U}' = H_{U} @ (id, AbortTr, key)
Call(id, WriteTr, key, obj, val) \equiv
         status_U(id) = READY \land allocated(key)
          \land status_U (id)' = (WriteTr, key, obj, val)
Return(id, WriteTr, key, obj, val, OK) \equiv
         status_U(id) = (WriteTr, key, obj, val)
          \wedge status_{II}(id)' = READY
          \wedge H_{II}' = H_{II} @ (id, Write Tr, key, obj, val, OK)
Return (id, WriteTr, key, obj, val, ABORT) =
          status_U(id) = (WriteTr, key, obj, val) \land concurrentaccess(id)
          \wedge status_{II}(id)' = ABORTED
          \land \neg allocated (key)'
          \wedge H_{U}' = H_{U} @ (id, Abort Tr, key)
 Call(id,EndTr,key) \equiv
          status_{U}(id) = READY \land allocated(key)
           \land status_U(id)' = (EndTr, key)
 Return(id, EndTr, key, OK) \equiv
          status_U(id) = (EndTr, key)
           \wedge status_U(id)' = COMMITTED
           \land \neg allocated (key)'
           \wedge H_{U}' = H_{U} @ (id, EndTr, key, OK)
 Return (id, EndTr, key, ABORT) \equiv
          status_U(id) = (EndTr, key) \land concurrentaccess(id)
           \land status_{II}(id)' = ABORTED
           \land \neg allocated (key)'
           \wedge H_{U}' = H_{U} @ (id, AbortTr, key)
  Call(id,AbortTr,key) \equiv
          status_{U}(\mathit{id}\,) \!\!=\!\! \mathsf{READY} \wedge \mathit{allocated}\,(\mathit{key}\,)
           \land status_U(id)' = (AbortTr, key)
  Return(id,AbortTr,key) \equiv
           status_{U}(id) = (AbortTr, key)
            \land status_U(id)' = ABORTED
            \land \neg allocated (key)'
            \wedge H_{U}' = H_{U} @ (id, AbortTr, key)
```

## 2.4. Safety requirements

The interface system events ensure that each transaction issues a correct sequence of procedure calls. Formally, define the following state function:

legal (id): boolean

True iff the subsequence of (id) entries in  $H_U$  is a prefix of (id, BeginTr)@<successes>@<final>, where <successes> is a sequence of zero or more (id, obj) entries, and <final> is either (id, AbortTr) or (id, EndTr).

It can be proved that legal(id) is a safety property of the event-driven system in the interface specification. (Proof omitted.)

An invocation of ReadTr, WriteTr, or EndTr by transaction id aborts only if it accesses an object that is also accessed by another concurrently executing transaction. This has been captured formally by including concurrentaccess (id) in the enabling conditions of the corresponding return events.

The definition of committed value ensures that writes of aborted transactions do not influence the committed values. The definition of currentvalue ensures that the values read by a transaction are not affected by writes of other concurrently executing transactions. Observe that currentvalue  $(obj, id_1)$  can differ from currentvalue  $(obj, id_2)$ , for two concurrently executing transactions  $id_1$  and  $id_2$ .

Let us review some basic definitions from serializability theory [1]. The committed history  $C(H_U)$  is the subsequence of  $H_U$  obtained by including all (id) entries such that  $status_U(id)$ =COMMITTED.

For any two transactions  $id_1$  and  $id_2$ , define the boolean function dependency  $(id_1, id_2)$  to be true iff for some obj,  $(id_1, Write Tr, obj) @ (id_2, obj)$  or  $(id_1, obj) @ (id_2, Write Tr, obj)$  is a subsequence of  $C(H_U)$ .

We say that dependency is acyclic if for every  $n \ge 2$ , there does not exist distinct  $id_1$ ,  $id_2$ ,  $\cdots$ ,  $id_n$ , such that dependency  $(id_k, id_{k+1})$ , for  $k = 1, \cdots, n-1$ , and dependency  $(id_n, id_1)$ . A fundamental theorem of serializability is that  $H_U$  is serializable iff dependency is acyclic [1].

Define the following state functions:

correctkeyuse: boolean.

True iff every transaction has used the correct key in all its procedure calls, i.e., every  $(id, key) \in H_U$  satisfies key = keyof(id).

The upper interface specification includes the following:

Safety requirement: correctkeyuse  $\implies$  dependency is acyclic.

# 2.5. Progress requirements

The progress guarantee that every procedure call eventually returns is formally specified by:

```
L_1 \equiv status_U(id) \in \{(BeginTr), (ReadTr), (WriteTr), (EndTr), (AbortTr)\} \\ leads-to\ status_U(id) \in \{\text{READY}, \text{ABORTED}, \text{COMMITTED}, \text{NOTBEGUN}\}
```

The assumption that every active transaction that does not abort eventually issues an EndTr call can be stated as follows: If every ReadTr and WriteTr call made by the transaction

returns successfully, then the transaction will eventually issue an EndTr call. Formally:

$$\begin{array}{ll} L_2 \equiv & (status_U(id) \in \{(ReadTr), (WriteTr)\} \ leads-to \ status_U(id) = \text{READY}) \\ \implies & (status_U(id) = \text{READY} \ leads-to \ status_U(id) = (EndTr) \end{array}$$

The upper interface specification includes the following:

Progress requirement: correctkeyuse  $\wedge L_2 \Rightarrow L_1$ .

## 3. LOWER INTERFACE SPECIFICATION

Note that outstanding procedure calls at the lower interface can be uniquely identified by the entries of KEYS.

## 3.1. State variables

 $status_L$  (key ): {READY, (AcqLock, obj), (RelLock, obj), (Read, obj), (Write, obj, val)}. Initially READY.

Indicates the status of any procedure invocation identified by key. READY means that key has no lower interface procedure invocation outstanding. Otherwise, indicates the outstanding procedure invocation.

owned (key, obj): boolean. Initially false.

True iff key has locked obj.

 $storedvalue\ (obj\ )$ : VALUES. Initially,  $storedvalue\ (obj\ )$ =INITVALUE $(obj\ )$ .

The value of the object in the physical database.

#### 3.2. State functions

waiting (key, obj): boolean.

True iff  $status_L(key) = (AcqLock, obj)$ . Defined for notational convenience.

deadlock (key, obj): boolean.

True iff there is a cycle including the edge (key,obj) in the directed graph of nodes KEYS  $\cup$  OBJECTS, and edges  $\{(x,k): owned(k,x)\} \cup \{(k,x): waiting(k,x)\}$ .

#### 3.3. Events

The events of the interface are the calls and returns of the interface procedures AcqLock, Rel-Lock, Read, and Write.

```
Call (key ,AcqLock ,obj) \equiv status_L (key ) = READY 
 \land status_L (key )' = (AcqLock ,obj)
Return (key ,AcqLock ,obj ,GRANTED) \equiv status_L (key ) = (AcqLock ,obj ) \land (\forall k : \neg owned (k ,obj )) 
 \land status_L (key )' = READY 
 \land owned (key ,obj )'
```

```
Return (key ,AcqLock ,obj ,REJECTED) ≡
        status_L(key) = (AcqLock, obj) \land deadlock(key, obj)
         \wedge status_L(key)' = READY
Call(key,RelLock,obj) \equiv
        status, (key)=READY
         \land status_L(key)' = (RelLock, obj)
Return(key, RelLock, obj) \equiv
        status_{L}(key) = (RelLock, obj) \land owned(key, obj)
         \wedge status_L(key)' = READY
         \land \neg owned (key, obj)'
Call(key,Read,obj) \equiv
        status_L (key) = READY
         \land status_L(key)' = (Read, obj)
Return(key, Read, obj, val) \equiv
         status_{L}(key) = (Read, obj)
         \wedge status_L (key)' = READY
         \land val = storedvalue(obj)
 Call(key, Write, obj, val) \equiv
         status_L(key) = READY
         \land status_L (key)' = (Write, obj, val)
 Return(key, Write, obj, val) \equiv
         status_L(key) = (Write, obj, val)
         \wedge status_L (key)' = READY
          \land storedvalue (obj)' =val
```

## 3.4. Safety requirements

The enabling condition of Return(key,AcqLock,obj,GRANTED) ensures that obj is not owned by any other key. Its action updates owned(key,obj) to true. The enabling condition of Return(key,RelLock,obj) ensures that obj is owned by key. Its action updates owned(key,obj) to false. No other event updates owned(key,obj).

The enabling condition of Return(key,AcqLock,obj,REJECTED) ensures that (key,obj) is involved in a deadlock.

## 3.5. Progress requirements

The lower layer guarantees the progress properties  $Q_1$  through  $Q_4$ :

$$Q_1 \equiv status_L(key) = (Read) leads - to status_L(key) = READY$$
 $Q_2 \equiv status_L(key) = (Write) leads - to status_L(key) = READY$ 
 $Q_3 \equiv status_L(key) = (RelLock, obj) \land owned(key, obj)$ 
 $leads - to status_L(key) = READY \land \neg owned(key, obj)$ 

```
\begin{array}{ll} Q_{\,4} \; \Longrightarrow \; G_{\,4} \; \text{where} \\ & R_{\,\,4} \; \Longrightarrow \; waiting \left( k_{\,\,1}, obj \, \right) \wedge \, owned \left( k_{\,\,2}, obj \, \right) \, leads - to \; \, \neg owned \left( k_{\,\,2}, obj \, \right) \\ & G_{\,\,4} \; \Longrightarrow \; waiting \left( k_{\,\,1}, obj \, \right) \, leads - to \; \, \neg waiting \left( k_{\,\,1}, obj \, \right) \end{array}
```

 $Q_4$  specifies the property that every call to AcqLock will eventually return provided that every granted lock is eventually returned.

# 4. TWO-PHASE LOCKING IMPLEMENTATION

The two-phase locking implementation is obtained from the upper interface system by adding state variables, refining the upper interface events, and adding new events. The events can include events of the lower interface.

## 4.1. State variables

In addition to the upper interface state variables  $H_U$ ,  $status_U$ , and allocated, we add the following:

 $locked\ (key\ ,obj\ )$ : boolean. Initially false. Indicates whether  $key\$ has locked  $obj\ .$ 

 $localvalue\ (obj\ , key\ )$ : VALUES  $\cup\ \{\text{NULL}\}$ . Initially NULL.

The current value of obj as seen by transaction using key.

The upper interface variable  $H_U$  becomes auxiliary. This also makes auxiliary all state functions defined in terms of  $H_U$ , such as concurrentaccess, currentvalue, committedvalue, etc. An event cannot use an auxiliary variable or function in its enabling condition or in its update of a nonauxiliary variable.

## 4.2. State functions

holdinglocks (key): boolean.

True iff locked(key, obj) is true for some obj.

#### 4.3. Events

Implementation events that are refinements of the upper interface events are listed first. In an event predicate, the notation previous definition refers to the event's predicate definition given in Section 2.3. This notation is used whenever the refinement consists of adding conjuncts only. When the refinement is not of this simple form, we add a safety requirement which will have to be proved later.

```
Call (id ,BeginTr ) \equiv < previous definition >
Return (id ,BeginTr ,result ) \equiv status_U (id ) = (BeginTr )
\land ((\exists key : \neg allocated (key ) \land \neg holdinglocks (key ))
\land allocated (key )' \land status_U (id )' = READY \land result = key
\land H_U' = H_U @ (id ,BeginTr ,key ))
\lor ((\forall key : allocated (key ))
\land status_U (id )' = NOTBEGUN \land result = FAILED \land H_U' = H_U ))
```

The above event is a refinement of the upper interface events, Return(id, BeginTr, key) and Return(id, BeginTr, FAILED). We have combined the two returns in the implementation because

```
\label{eq:control_proof} \text{the progress proof; specifically, } \textit{status}_{U}\left(id\right.)\!\!=\!\!\left(BeginTr\right.)
                                                                                                that
                                                                                     ensures
    facilitates
Return (id , BeginTr) is continuously enabled, and therefore will eventually occur.
Call(id,ReadTr,key,obj) \equiv previous definition>
Return(id, ReadTr, key, obj, val) \equiv
       status_U(id) = (ReadTr, key, obj) \land localvalue(obj, key) \neq NULL
        \land status_U(id)' = READY
        \wedge H_U' = H_U @ (id, ReadTr, key, obj, val)
        \land val = local value (obj, key)
In order for the above to be a refinement, we specify the following safety requirement:
A_1 \equiv keyof(id) = key \land local value(obj, key) \neq NULL
          ⇒ localvalue (obj,key)=currentvalue (obj,id)
Return(id, ReadTr, key, obj, ABORT) \equiv
        status_{U}(id) = (ReadTr, key, obj) \land Return(key, AcqLock, obj, REJECTED)
        \wedge status_{II}(id)' = ABORTED
        \wedge H_U' = H_U @ (id, AbortTr, key)
         \land \neg allocated (key)'
         \land (\forall x : local value (x, key)' = NULL)
 For the above to be a refinement, it is sufficient if concurrentaccess(id) is true whenever
 Return (key ,AcqLock, obj ,REJECTED) occurs. Because the latter event is enabled only when
 deadlock (key, obj ) is true, the following safety requirement is adequate:
 A_2 \equiv keyof(id) = key \land deadlock(key,obj) \Rightarrow concurrentaccess(id)
 \land localvalue (obj,key)' =val
 Return(id, WriteTr, key, obj, val, ABORT) \equiv
         status_{U}(id) = (WriteTr, key, obj, val) \land Return(key, AcqLock, obj, REJECTED)
         \land status_U(id)' = ABORTED
         \land H_{U}' = H_{U} @ (id, AbortTr, key)
         \land \neg allocated (key)'
         \land (\forall x : local value (x, key)' = NULL)
 A_2 ensures that the above is a refinement.
  Call (id ,EndTr ,key) =  cprevious definition>
 Return (id, EndTr, key, OK) \equiv < previous definition > \land (\forall x : localvalue (x, key) = NULL)
 Return (id, EndTr, key, ABORT) is never enabled, and is absent in the implementation.
```

```
Call(id,AbortTr,key) \equiv <previous definition>Return(id,AbortTr,key) \equiv <previous definition>\land (\forall x: local value(x,key)' =NULL)
```

In addition to the above refinements of the upper interface events, we define the following events. These events have null images at the upper interface because they do not update any upper interface variables.

```
RequestLock(id, key, obj) \equiv
         status_{U}(id) \in \{(ReadTr, key, obj), (WriteTr, key, obj)\} \land \neg locked(key, obj)
         \land Call (key,AcqLock,obj)
LockAcquired(key,obj) \equiv
         Return (key ,AcqLock ,obj ,GRANTED)
          \land locked (key,obj)'
RequestRead(id, key, obj) \equiv
         status_{U}(id) \!\!=\!\!\! (ReadTr\ ,\!key\ ,\!obj\ ) \land \ locked\ (key\ ,\!obj\ ) \land \ localvalue\ (obj\ ,\!key\ ) \!\!=\!\! \text{NULL}
          \land Call(key,Read,obj)
ReadCompleted(key,obj,val) \equiv
          Return (key ,Read ,obj ,val )
          \land localvalue (obj,key)' =val
 RequestWrite(id,key,obj) \equiv
          status_U(id) = (EndTr, key) \land localvalue(obj, key) \neq NULL
          \(\lambda \) Call (key, Write, obj, localvalue (obj, key))
 WriteCompleted(key,obj) \equiv
          Return (key, Write, obj, val)
           ∧ localvalue (obj ,key )' =NULL
 RegRelLock(key,obj) \equiv
          \neg allocated \, (key \, ) \wedge \, locked \, (key \, , obj \, )
           \land Call(key,RelLock,obj)
  LockReleased(key,obj) \equiv
          Return (key ,RelLock ,obj )
           \land \neg locked (key, obj)'
```

#### 5. VERIFICATION

We first prove that  $A_1$  and  $A_2$  are invariant, thereby establishing the implementation events to be refinements of the upper interface events. We then prove the safety requirement (that

dependency is acyclic) and the progress requirement (that every call eventually returns) in the upper interface specification.

Given a predicate A in the state variables  $\{v_i\}$ , we use A' to denote A with every free occurrence of  $v_i$  replaced by  $v_i'$ . We say that A is invariant given B if the following are logically valid: (i) Initial  $\Rightarrow A$ ; and (ii)  $A \land B \land e \Rightarrow A'$  for every event e [4]. Initial is a predicate specifying initial conditions on the state variables. B is a safety property that is either assumed, as in the case of correctkeyuse, or has been proved to be invariant separately, as in the case of legal (id).

## 5.1. Proof of refinement

In order to establish  $A_1$  and  $A_2$ , we need additional safety requirements. The following requirements specify that every allocated key is associated with a unique active transaction:

```
B_1 \equiv \neg allocated(key) \Rightarrow (\forall id : keyof(id) \neq key)

B_2 \equiv allocated(key) \Rightarrow (\exists exactly one id : keyof(id) = key)
```

**Lemma 1.**  $B_1 \wedge B_2$  is invariant, given *correctkeyuse*. (Proof omitted.)

The following assertions specify relationships between state variables during the growing phase of a transaction, during which it acquires a key and then locks:

```
C_1 \equiv status_U(id) \in \{\text{NOTBEGUN}, (BeginTr)\} \Rightarrow (id) \notin H_U
```

$$C_2 \equiv keyof(id) = key \land status_U(id) = READY \Rightarrow status_L(key) = READY$$

$$C_3 \equiv keyof(id) = key \land \neg locked(key, obj) \Rightarrow (id, obj) \notin H_U$$
  
The consequent of  $C_3$  implies currentvalue(obj, key) = committed value(obj).

```
C_4 \equiv keyof(id) = key \land status_L(key) = (AcqLock, obj)

\Rightarrow \neg locked(key, obj) \land status_U(id) = (key, obj)
```

$$C_5 \equiv keyof(id) = key \land locked(key, obj) \land status_U(id) \neq (EndTr)$$
  
 $\implies storedvalue(obj) = committedvalue(obj)$ 

$$\begin{array}{ll} C_6 \equiv & keyof \ (id \ ) = key \ \land \ status_U \ (id \ ) = (key \ ,obj \ ) \ \land \ locked \ (key \ ,obj \ ) \\ \land \ local value \ (obj \ ,key \ ) = \text{NULL} \implies (id \ ,obj \ ) \notin H_U \end{array}$$

$$C_7 \equiv keyof(id) = key \land status_L(key) = (Read, obj) \Rightarrow locked(key, obj) \\ \land localvalue(obj, key) = NULL \land (id, obj) \notin H_U \land status_U(id) = (ReadTr, key, obj)$$

$$C_8 \equiv keyof(id) = key \land locked(key, obj) \implies obj \in accessed(id)$$

$$A_1 \equiv keyof (id) = key \land localvalue (obj, key) \neq NULL$$
  
 $\Rightarrow localvalue (obj, key) = currentvalue (obj, id)$ 

where we have repeated  $A_1$  for convenience of reference.

The following assertions specify relationships when a transaction is committing its writes:

$$D_1 \equiv keyof(id) = key \land locked(key,obj) \land status_U(id) = (EndTr) \land localvalue(obj,key) \neq NULL$$

$$\Rightarrow storedvalue(obj) = committedvalue(obj)$$

$$D_2 \equiv keyof (id) = key \land status_L(key) = (Write , obj , val)$$

$$\Rightarrow status_U(id) = (EndTr , key) \land val = currentvalue (obj , id) \land locked (key , obj)$$

$$D_3 \equiv keyof(id) = key \land locked(key,obj) \land status_U(id) = (EndTr) \land localvalue(obj,key) = NULL$$

$$\Rightarrow storedvalue(obj) = currentvalue(obj,id)$$

The following assertions specify relationships during the lock releasing phase of a transaction:

```
E_1 \equiv \neg allocated (key) \Rightarrow local value (obj, key) = NULL
```

$$E_2 \equiv status_L(key) = (RelLock, obj) \Rightarrow \neg allocated(key) \land locked(key, obj)$$

$$E_3 \equiv \neg locked(key, obj) \Rightarrow local value(obj, key) = NULL$$

Two additional assertions are needed:

$$F_1 \equiv (\forall key : \neg locked(key, obj)) \Rightarrow storedvalue(obj) = committed value(obj)$$

$$F_2 \equiv owned(key, obj) \iff locked(key, obj)$$

We use the notation  $C_{1-8}$  to denote the conjunction  $C_1 \wedge C_2 \cdot \cdot \cdot \wedge C_8$ .

**Lemma 2.** 
$$A_1 \wedge C_{1-8} \wedge D_{1-3} \wedge E_{1-3} \wedge F_{1-2}$$
 is invariant, given  $B_1 \wedge B_2$ . (Proof omitted.)

Lemma 2 establishes  $A_1$ . We next show that it also establishes  $A_2$ . Assume  $deadlock\ (key\ obj)$  to be true. From the definition of  $deadlock\$ , we have  $waiting\ (key\ obj)$  and  $owned\ (k\ obj)$  for some  $k\neq key$ . From the definition of  $waiting\$  and  $C_4$ ,  $waiting\ (key\ obj)$  implies  $status_U\ (id\ )=(obj)$  for some  $id\$ , which implies  $obj\ \in accessed\ (id\ )$ . From  $F_2\$ and  $C_8$ ,  $owned\ (k\ obj\ )$  implies  $obj\ \in accessed\ (id\ )$  for some  $id\$ 1. From  $B_1\ \land B_2$ , we have  $id\ _1\neq id$ . Consequently,  $concurrentaccess\ (id\ )$  is true.

## 5.2. Proof of serializability

The following assertions are to be proved:

$$G_{1} \equiv (id_{1}, obj) \in H_{U} \wedge (id_{1}, EndTr) \notin H_{U} \wedge (id_{1}, AbortTr) \notin H_{U}$$

$$\Rightarrow keyof (id_{1}) \neq \text{NULL} \wedge locked (keyof (id_{1}), obj)$$

$$\begin{array}{ll} G_2 \; \equiv \; & (id_1,obj_.) @ \; (id_2,obj_.) \; \text{is a subsequence of} \; H_U \\ \; \Longrightarrow (id_1,obj_.) @ \; (id_1,EndTr_.) @ \; (id_2,obj_.) \; \text{is a subsequence of} \; H_U \\ \; \lor (id_1,obj_.) @ \; (id_1,AbortTr_.) @ \; (id_2,obj_.) \; \text{is a subsequence of} \; H_U \end{array}$$

**Lemma 3.**  $G_1 \wedge G_2$  is invariant, given  $B_1 \wedge B_2 \wedge legal$  (id 1). (Proof omitted.)

Lemma 3 implies that the following is invariant:

$$G_3 \equiv dependency (id_1, id_2) \implies (id_1, EndTr) @ (id_2, EndTr)$$
 is a subsequence of  $C(H_U)$ 

This can be proved as follows. Given dependency  $(id_1, id_2)$ . From the definitions of  $C(H_U)$  and  $legal(id_2)$ ,  $(id_2, obj) \in C(H_U)$  implies that  $(id_2, obj) @ (id_2, EndTr)$  is a subsequence of  $C(H_U)$ . Combining this with  $G_2$ , we see that  $(id_1, obj) @ (id_2, obj)$  is a subsequence of  $C(H_U)$  implies  $(id_1, obj) @ (id_1, EndTr) @ (id_2, obj) @ (id_2, EndTr)$  is a subsequence of  $C(H_U)$ .

 $G_3$  implies that dependency is acyclic. Assume the contrary: For some  $n \geq 2$ , there exist distinct  $id_1, id_2, \cdots, id_n$ , such that dependency  $(id_k, id_{k+1})$  for  $k = 1, \cdots, n-1$ , and dependency  $(id_n, id_1)$ . From  $G_3$ ,  $C(H_U)$  contains the subsequences  $(id_k, EndTr) \otimes (id_{k+1}, EndTr)$ , for  $k = 1, \cdots, n-1$ , and  $(id_n, EndTr) \otimes (id_1, EndTr)$ . But this implies that there are at least two occurrences of  $(id_1, EndTr)$  in  $C(H_U)$ , which violates  $legal(id_1)$ .

# 5.3. Proof of progress

Given predicates A and B and an event  $e_1$ , we say that A leads -to B via  $e_1$  if the following are logically valid: (i)  $A \Rightarrow enabled(e_1)$ , (ii)  $A \wedge e_1 \Rightarrow B'$ , and (iii)  $A \wedge e \Rightarrow A' \vee B'$  for every event e [4]. Whenever A holds, parts (i) and (ii) ensure that  $e_1$  is enabled and its occurrence makes B hold. Part (iii) ensures that no event can violate A without establishing B. Thus, in any fair implementation B will hold at some point. We use leads-to to denote the

closure of the leads-to-via relation; e.g., A leads-to B if A leads-to  $B \lor C$  and C leads-to B.

We first show that the progress properties  $Q_1$ ,  $Q_2$ ,  $\dot{Q}_3$ , and  $Q_4$  offered by the lower interface can be assumed in the verification. Each such property has the form A leads—to B and is achieved by the execution of a lower interface event  $e_L$ . Let  $e_L$  be imbedded together with enabling condition b in event  $e_I$  of the implementation. In order to assume the property A leads—to B, we need to establish that  $A \implies b$  is invariant.

Consider  $Q_1$ , which is achieved by executing the Return(key, Read, obj, val) event. This event is imbedded in the implementation event ReadCompleted(key, obj, val). The latter event is enabled whenever the former is enabled, because it has no other requirement in its enabling condition. Consequently,  $Q_1$  can be assumed.

Similarly, we can assume  $Q_2$  because WriteCompleted(key,obj) is enabled whenever Return(key, Write,obj,val) is enabled.

We can assume  $Q_3$  because LockReleased (key,obj) is enabled whenever Return (key, RelLock,obj) is enabled.

We can assume  $Q_4$  because (i) LockAcquired is enabled whenever Return (AcqLock, GRANTED) is enabled; and (ii) either Return (ReadTr, ABORT) or Return (WriteTr, ABORT) is continuously enabled whenever Return (AcqLock, REJECTED) is enabled. Part (ii) holds because of  $C_4$ .

From  $Q_3$ , ReqRelLock, and LockReleased, we can establish:

 $holdinglocks(key) \land \neg allocated(key) leads-to \neg holdinglocks(key)$ 

From this and Return(BeginTr), we can establish:

 $W_1 \equiv status_U(id) = (BeginTr) leads - to status_U(id) \in \{READY, NOTBEGUN\}$ 

From  $Q_2$ , ReqWrite, and WriteCompleted, we have:

 $status_U(id) = (EndTr, key) \land local value(obj, key) \neq NULL$  $leads-to\ status_U(id) = (EndTr, key) \land local value(obj, key) = NULL$ 

From Return (EndTr, key), we have:

 $status_U(id)$ = $(EndTr, key) \land local value(obj, key)$ =NULL  $leads-to\ status_U(id)$ =COMMITTED

Combining the above two, we have:

 $W_2 \equiv status_U(id) = (EndTr, key) leads-to status_U(id) = COMMITTED$ 

From Return(AbortTr), we have:

 $W_3 \equiv status_U(id) = (AbortTr) leads-to status_U(id) = ABORTED$ 

From  $Q_1$ , ReqRead and ReadCompleted, we have:

 $status_U(id) = (ReadTr, key, obj) \land locked(key, obj)$  $leads-to \ status_U(id) = (ReadTr, key, obj) \land localvalue(obj, key) \neq NULL$ 

From above and Return (ReadTr, val), we have:

 $W_4 \equiv status_U(id) = (ReadTr, key, obj) \land locked(key, obj) leads - to status_U(id) = READY$ From Return(WriteTr, OK), we have:

 $W_{5} \equiv status_{U}(id) = (WriteTr, key, obj) \land locked(key, obj) \ leads-to \ status_{U}(id) = READY$ 

From RequestLock, we have:

 $W_6 \equiv status_U(id) = (key, obj) \land \neg locked(key, obj) leads - to waiting(key, obj)$ 

From  $W_1$ ,  $W_2$ ,  $W_3$ ,  $W_4$ ,  $W_5$ , and  $W_6$ , all that is left to establish the desired progress property is:

 $status_U(id) = (key, obj) \land waiting(key, obj) leads - to \neg waiting(key, obj).$ 

Observe that this is the same as  $G_4$ , the consequent of  $Q_4$ . We now provide a proof of this.

## Lexicographic induction

Consider the directed graph of nodes KEYS  $\cup$  OBJECTS, and edges  $\{(x,k): owned(k,x)\}$   $\cup$   $\{(k,x): waiting(k,x)\}$ . Consider any key  $k_1$  waiting on object  $x_1$ . We need to show that eventually  $\neg waiting(k_1,x_1)$  holds. Let M=| KEYS|

Each node in this graph can have several incoming edges, but at most one outgoing edge. We say  $k_1, x_1, k_2, x_2, \cdots, k_j$  is a path if waiting  $(k_i, x_i)$  and owned  $(k_{i+1}, x_i)$  for  $1 \le i < j$ , and all the  $k_i$ 's and  $x_i$ 's are distinct. We say that  $x_i$  is not locked if  $\forall key : \neg locked (key, x_i)$ . We say that  $k_i$  is not waiting if  $\forall obj : \neg waiting (k_i, obj)$ .

Define the following state functions on the directed graph, where  $1 \le j \le M$ :

waitstate  $_1(j)$ : boolean

True iff there are  $k_2, x_2, \cdots, k_j$  such that  $k_1, x_1, \cdots, k_j$  is a path and  $k_j$  is not waiting.

waitstate 2(j): boolean

True iff there are  $k_2, x_2, \cdots, k_j, x_j$  such that  $k_1, x_2, \cdots, k_j$  is a path, and waiting  $(k_j, x_j)$  and  $x_j$  is not locked.

waitstate 3(j): boolean

True iff there are  $k_2, x_2, \cdots, k_j$  such that  $k_1, x_2, \cdots, k_j$  is a path, and waiting  $(k_j, x_i)$  for some  $x_i$  such that  $1 \le i < j$  or owned  $(k_1, x_i)$ ; i.e.,  $k_j$  is deadlocked.

Observe that for any state of the directed graph, exactly one of the 3M functions  $\{waitstate_1(j), waitstate_2(j), waitstate_3(j): 1 \le j \le M \}$  is true. At any time, let the function depth denote that value of j.

Define the following functions, where  $1 \le i \le M$ :

 $\beta(i)$ : integer

If i < depth, or if i = depth and  $k_i$  is waiting:  $\beta(i)$  equals the number of times  $x_i$  has been unlocked since the last time that  $k_i$  started to wait.

If i = depth and  $k_i$  is not waiting:  $\beta(i) = 0$ .

If  $i > depth : \beta(i) = -1$ .

 $\alpha(i)$ : integer

If i < depth, or if i = depth and  $k_i$  is not releasing locks (i.e., allocated  $(k_i)$  is true):  $\alpha(i)$  equals the number of objects held by  $k_i$ .

If i = depth and  $k_i$  is releasing locks:  $\alpha(i)$  equals the number of objects locked by  $k_i$  just before it started releasing locks.

If  $i > depth : \alpha(i) = 0$ .

Define the function  $\alpha = (\beta(1), \alpha(2), \beta(2), \alpha(3), \cdots, \alpha(M), \beta(M))$ . The values of  $\alpha$  can be well-ordered using the lexicographic ordering. We will show that  $\alpha$  increases without bound unless  $\neg waiting(k_1, x_1)$  becomes true. This establishes the desired progress property as follows:  $\alpha$ 

increasing without bound implies that either  $\beta(i)$  or  $\alpha(i)$  increases without bound for some i. The former is not allowed by the fairness assumption of the lock manager (i.e.,  $Q_4$ ). The latter is not allowed by the assumption that every transaction needs at most a finite set of locks (i.e.,  $L_2$ ).

Let  $\alpha$  have the value  $\mathbf{a} = (b_1, a_2, b_2, a_3, \cdots, a_M, b_M)$ . The notation  $\alpha = \mathbf{a}[\beta(i) = x]$  means that every function in  $\alpha$  has the same value as in  $\mathbf{a}$  except for  $\beta(i)$  which has the value x. Other relations can be used in place of equality; e.g.,  $\alpha = \mathbf{a}[\beta(i) \ge 0]$ . This notation is extended in the usual fashion: e.g.,  $\alpha = \mathbf{a}[\alpha(i) = x; \beta(j) = y]$ ;  $\alpha = \mathbf{a}[\alpha(i) = x_i : j \le i \le k]$ .

The following leads -to properties can be established.

 $\begin{array}{lll} W_7 & \equiv & waitstate \ _1(j) \land \alpha = \mathbf{a} \ leads - to \ W_{7a} \lor W_{7b} \lor W_{7c} \lor W_{7d} \ , \ \text{where} \\ W_{7a} & \equiv & waitstate \ _2(j-1) \land \alpha = \mathbf{a}[\beta(j-1) = b_{j-1} + 1; \ \alpha(j) = 0; \ \beta(j) = -1] > \mathbf{a} \\ W_{7b} & \equiv & waitstate \ _1(k) \land j < k \ \land \alpha = \mathbf{a}[\beta(i) = 0; \ \alpha(i) \geq 0: \ j < i \leq k] > \mathbf{a} \\ W_{7c} & \equiv & waitstate \ _2(k) \land j \leq k \ \land \alpha = \mathbf{a}[\beta(i) = 0; \ \alpha(i) \geq 0: \ j < i \leq k] \geq \mathbf{a} \\ W_{7d} & \equiv & waitstate \ _3(k) \land j \leq k \ \land \alpha = \mathbf{a}[\beta(i) = 0; \ \alpha(i) \geq 0: \ j < i \leq k] \geq \mathbf{a} \end{array}$ 

 $W_{7a}$  results if  $k_j$  returns the lock on  $x_{j-1}$ , in the process of releasing its locks. The value of  $\alpha$  increases because  $\beta(j-1)$  increases and it is lexicographically the most significant of the functions whose values are changed.  $W_{7c}$  with j=k results if  $k_j$  requests an object that is not locked.  $W_{7b} \vee W_{7c} \wedge j < k$  results if the object is already locked but not by any  $k_i$ , i < j.  $W_{7d}$  results if the object is already locked by some  $k_i$  where i < j. In  $W_{7b} \vee W_{7c} \vee W_{7d}$ , if k > j, the value of  $\alpha$  increases because  $\beta(j+1)$  increases from -1 to 0,  $\alpha(j+1)$  stays at 0 or increases, and the other functions whose values are changed are less significant. If k = j,  $\alpha$  stays constant. One of the above transitions will eventually occur because  $k_j$  is ready in waitstate  $\alpha(j)$ , i.e.,  $\alpha(j) = \beta(j)$ .

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\begin{array}{lll} W_8 &\equiv & \textit{waitstate}\ \underline{2}(j) \land \alpha = \mathbf{a}\ \textit{leads-to}\ \neg \textit{waiting}\ (k_1,\!x_1) \lor W_{8a} \lor W_{8b}\ , \ \text{where} \\ W_{8a} &\equiv & \textit{waitstate}\ \underline{1}(j) \land \alpha = \mathbf{a}[\alpha(j) = a_j + 1;\ \beta(j) = 0] > \mathbf{a} \\ W_{8b} &\equiv & \textit{waitstate}\ \underline{1}(j+1) \land \alpha = \mathbf{a}[\beta(j+1) = 0;\ \alpha(j+1) \geq 0] > \mathbf{a} \end{array}
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The  $LockAcquired(k_j,x_j)$  event is continuously enabled in  $waitstate_2(j)$ . Its occurrence results in  $\neg waiting(k_1,x_1)$  if j=1, and in  $W_{8a}$  if j>1. This will eventually occur unless  $x_j$  is locked by a key other that  $k_j$ . In this case, that key becomes  $k_{j+1}$  and  $W_{8b}$  holds. In the case of  $W_{8a}$ , the value of  $\alpha$  increases because  $\alpha(j)$  increases and it is the most significant function changed. In the case of  $W_{8b}$ , the value of  $\alpha$  increases because  $\beta(j+1)$  increases from -1 to 0,  $\alpha(j+1)$  stays at 0 or increases, and no other functions change values.

$$W_9 \equiv waitstate_3(j) \land \alpha = \mathbf{a} \ leads - to \ \neg waiting (k_1, x_1) \lor W_{9a}$$
, where  $W_{9a} \equiv waitstate_2(k) \land j > k \land \alpha = \mathbf{a}[\beta(k) = b_k + 1; \beta(i) = 0; \alpha(i) = -1: k < i \leq j] > \mathbf{a}$ 

waitstate  $_3(j)$  implies a cycle involving  $k_j$ . This cycle only involves keys from  $k_1, k_2, \cdots, k_j$ . LockRejected  $(k_i, x_i)$  for every  $k_i$  involved in the cycle is enabled, and the lock manager will execute one of them eventually.  $\neg waiting(k_1, x_1)$  results if  $k_1$  is involved in the deadlock and LockRejected  $(k_1, x_1)$  occurs. If LockRejected  $(k_{k+1}, x_{k+1})$  occurs, then  $k_{k+1}$  is aborted, and it gives up its locks.  $W_{9a}$  results when it gives up its lock on  $x_k$ . At this point, the value of  $\alpha$  increases because  $\beta(k)$  increases, and all other function changes are less significant.

Substituting  $W_8$  and  $W_9$  for  $W_{7c}$  and  $W_{7d}$ , we have waitstate  $_1(j) \land \alpha = \mathbf{a}$  leads -to  $\alpha > \mathbf{a} \lor \neg waiting\ (k_1,x_1)$ . From  $W_8$ , we have waitstate  $_2(j) \land \alpha = \mathbf{a}$  leads -to  $\alpha > \mathbf{a}$   $\lor \neg waiting\ (k_1,x_1)$ . From  $W_9$ , we have waitstate  $_3(j) \land \alpha = \mathbf{a}$  leads -to  $\alpha > \mathbf{a}$ 

 $\vee \neg waiting(k_1,x_1)$ . Combining these three leads -to statements, we have  $\alpha = \mathbf{a}$  leads -to  $\alpha > \mathbf{a} \vee \neg waiting(k_1,x_1)$ , which establishes that  $\alpha$  increases without bound unless  $k_1$  stops waiting.

## 5.4. Conclusion

We have provided the sketch of a proof that the two-phase locking implementation satisfies the upper interface specification, assuming that the lower interface specification holds, as follows:

- (i) Implementation events are refinements of the upper interface events; thus, safety properties of the event-driven system in the upper interface specification are also safety properties of the implementation.
- (ii) The implementation satisfies the safety and progress requirements in the upper interface specification.

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