Formal Co-Validation of Low-Level Hardware/Software Interfaces

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Motivation



Consider this scenario:

- The product won't function unless there is firmware! So ideally ...
- But the hardware won't be available until shortly before release.

Our focus: how can we formalize hardware/software interfaces?

Current techniques

Well-known firmware development techniques in industry include:

- Using an older version of the hardware (if any!)
 - $\circ\,$ hard to debug, can hide latent firmware bugs, no guarantee
- Virtual platforms
 - $\circ\;$ faster turnaround times, easier to debug and test
 - $\circ\;$ but generally too big to formally analyze

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Idea: Verifiable Virtual Platform

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Idea: Verifiable Virtual Platform

How to model hardware/software interfaces so existing software engineering principles apply but also formal methods

(See also question posed by Per Bjesse (Synopsys) during FMCAD 2010)

VVP: Verifiable Virtual Platform

realistic • open source • concurrent



Outline

An Ethernet MAC concurrency bug

A real bug firmware developers care about

Problem statement and contribution

Technical details

Few glimpses at a verifiable virtual platform

Experiments and conclusion Download Me!

GNU/Linux + Open Cores Ethernet MAC

Explain known kernel bug due to concurrency (i.e. asynchronous operations) in the hardware/software interface.



Interrupt source:



Interrupt mode?



Buffer descriptors:



Initially, assume the firmware is in polling mode (i.e. 0_x) and "there are no new RX frames" (yet).

Interrupt source:



Interrupt mode?



Buffer descriptors:



A new RX frame arrives changing the interrupt source from 0_a to 1_b . The arrival of an RX frame gives us a "nonempty" buffer descriptor.

Interrupt source:



Interrupt mode?



Buffer descriptors:



Repeat but notice that the Open Cores Ethernet MAC always sets the interrupt source register as new RX frames arrive $(1_b$ has become $1_c)$.

Interrupt source:



Interrupt mode?



Buffer descriptors:



The firmware reads one "nonempty" buffer descriptor changing it to be "empty" again.

Interrupt source:



Interrupt mode?



Buffer descriptors:



But simultaneously new RX frames can arrive.

Interrupt source:



Interrupt mode?



Buffer descriptors:



As before, the firmware continues to consume these ...

Interrupt source:



Interrupt mode?



Buffer descriptors:



... until it detects that there aren't any more RX frames to consume. So assume it initiates a procedure now to switch to interrupt mode.

Interrupt source:



Interrupt mode?



Buffer descriptors:



Asynchronous operation: a fraction of a second later a new RX frame arrives and changes 1_d to 1_e as well as the buffer descriptor.

Interrupt source:



Interrupt mode?



Buffer descriptors:



Since firmware is not in interrupt mode yet, it fails to detect the intermittent RX frame; it continues by clearing interrupt sources (0_f) .

Interrupt source:



Interrupt mode?



Buffer descriptors:



The firmware continues by enabling interrupts (1_y) . But an interrupt is only raised once another RX frame arrives, *problem*.

Polling to interrupt mode switch (bug)



Polling to interrupt mode switch (fix)



Problem statement and contribution

Problem:

• Many firmware bugs can go undetected when hardware and software are verified in isolation.

Contribution:

- Three realistic and open-source benchmarks to scientifically study firmware verification.
- Practical evidence that a verifiable virtual platform is a **feasible concept** to verify hardware/software interfaces.

Benchmarks to study firmware verification



EMU ppen source processor emulator

Experimental setup

Overview of work flow:

- 1. Extract QEMU hardware model and Linux driver
- 2. Manually add runtime assertions in C
- 3. If necessary, introduce concurrency in $\mathsf{QEMU}+\mathsf{Linux}$ code
 - $\circ~$ Use new CBMC concurrency source code annotations
 - $\circ~$ Encode any concurrency as symbolic partial orders (CAV'13)
- 4. SAT solver finds satisfying assignment (i.e. bug) or not.

Real-time clock (RTC)



Special-purpose registers that require an ancillary manipulation of bits to read and write time, date and alarm data.

RTC benchmark code



Project	Files		LOC
Linux Kernel 3.6	$\sim 14,000$	(.h)	$\sim 10^7$
	$\sim 17,000$	(.c)	~ 10
QEMU 1.2	~ 600	(.h)	\sim 700,000
	\sim 1,500	(.c)	
QEMU hardware model of RTC	5	(.h)	$\sim 1,000$
	5	(.c)	
Linux x86 RTC driver and model ~ 300	(.h)	$\sim 20,000$	
	8	(.c)	/~ 20,000
Combined RTC benchmark	0	(.h)	$\sim 6,000$
	1	(.c)	

Example Assertion



```
1 void cmos_ioport_write (void *opaque,
                         uint32_t addr, uint32_t data)
2
3 {
     RTCState *s = opaque;
4
      if ((addr \& 1) == 0) {
5
       s->io_info = OUTB_0x70; // for temporal property
6
       s \rightarrow cmos_index = data \& 0x7f;
7
     } else {
8
         switch(s->cmos_index) {
9
         case RTC SECONDS ALARM:
10
12 #ifdef RTC_BENCHMARK_PROP_9
           assert((s->cmos_data[RTC_REG_B] & REG_B_SET)
13
                    == REG_B_SET);
14
15 #endif
```

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Found bug in RTC hardware model

rtc: Only call rtc_set_cmos when Register B SET flag is disabled. author Alex Horn <alex.horn@cs.ox.ac.uk> Mon, 26 Nov 2012 16:32:54 +0000 (17:32 +0100) committer Anthony Liguori <aliguori@us.ibm.com> Tue, 27 Nov 2012 17:04:33 +0000 (11:04 -0600) commit 02c6ccc6dde90dcbf5975blcfe2ab199e525ec11 tree 0a4266587fa357224cdaebe6c14ff2255b9084ef tree!anapthol parent 03a36f1747788e4ale07b334lb18028aa02060845 commi! diff

rtc: Only call rtc_set_cmos when Register B SET flag is disabled.

This bug occurs when the SET flag of Register B is enabled. When an RTC data register (i.e. any of the ten time/calender CMOS bytes) is set, the data is (as expected) correctly stored in the cmos data array. However, since the SET flag is enabled, the function rtc_set_time is not invoked. As a result, the field base_rtc in RTCState remains uninitialized. This causes a problem on subsequent writes which can end up overwriting data. To see this, consider writing data to Register A after having written data to any of the RTC data registers; the following figure illustrates the call stack for the Register A write operation:

```
+- cmos_io_port_write
+-- check_update_timer
+---- get_next_alarm
+----- rtc update time
```

In rtc_update_time, get_guest_rtc calculates the wrong time and overwrites the previously written RTC data register values.

```
Signed-off-by: Alex Horn <alex.horn@cs.ox.ac.uk>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Anthony Liguori <aliguori@us.ibm.com>
```

Also found bug in TMP105 hardware model

tmp105: Fix	I2C protocol bug			
author	Andreas Färber <andreas.faerber@web.de> Wed, 16 Jan 2013 00:57:56 +0000 (01:57 +0100)</andreas.faerber@web.de>			
committer	Anthony Liguori <aliguori@us.ibm.com></aliguori@us.ibm.com>			
commit	Wed, 16 Jan 2013 18:14:20 +0000 (12:14 -0600) cb5ef3fa1871522a0886627033459e94bd537fb7			
tree	ec94c5b0f0514297227eb6de0a0e432f2affe5a2	tree I snapshot		
parent	6d0b430176e3571af0e1596276078f05bfe1c5a5	commit I diff		
An early length postincrement in the TMP105's I2C TX path led to transfers of more than one byte to place the second byte in the third byte's place within the buffer and the third byte to get discarded. Fix this by explicitly incrementing the length after the checks but before the callback is called, which again checks the length.				
Adjust the Coding Style while at it.				
Signed-off-by: Alex Horn <alex.horn@cs.ox.ac.uk> Signed-off-by: Andreas Färber <andreas.farber@web.de> Reviewed-by: Anthony Liguori <aliguori@us.ibm.com></aliguori@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Anthony Liguori <aliguori@us.ibm.com></aliguori@us.ibm.com></andreas.farber@web.de></alex.horn@cs.ox.ac.uk>				

Experiments

Hardware/software interface properties formally checked on an individual basis:

- 11 RTC properties within a few minutes
- 17 TMP105 properties in less than 15 minutes
- 3 Ethernet MAC properties in sequential code within a few minutes
- 7 Ethernet MAC properties in concurrent code within a few hours¹

¹After publication, we found a bug in CBMC's implementation of the partial order concurrency encoding but continue to improve the code. At the present time, we cannot reproduce the results with CBMC for the concurrent model of the Ethernet MAC.

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Conclusion:

- Formal verification of hardware/software interface properties written in C code
 - $\circ~$ Executable code leverages well-established testing principles in industry
 - Apply multi-path (i.e. CBMC-style) symbolic execution and symbolic partial order encodings to handle concurrency in hardware/software
- Open-source prototype of a verifiable virtual platform (VVP)
 - Provides an object of study for software engineers

All code and documentation is openly available now.

Source code, data sheets and experiments can be downloaded at http://www.cprover.org/firmware/.

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Thank you.

Symbolic partial order encoding with CBMC

(Not to be confused with partial order reduction.)



RTC/QEMU: QDev and QOM Simplifications

Domain knowledge required:



Related work by Kai Cong et al.

Recent Kai Cong, Fei Xie, and Li Lei publications:

- Symbolic Execution of Virtual Devices (QSIC, 2013).
 - Single-path (KLEE-style) symbolic execution
 - $\circ~$ Doesn't symbolically co-execute virtual device and driver
 - $\circ~$ Suggests a way to automatically extract QEMU hardware models
- Automatic Concolic Test Generation with Virtual Prototypes for Post-silicon Validation (ICCAD, 2013).
 - $\circ~$ Uses QEMU and KLEE
 - Records concrete hardware/software interactions