Foundations of Computer Security
Lecture 7: MLS Example: Part II

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MLS Thought Experiment

Setting: General Eisenhower's office in 1943 Europe. Assume an environment in which we have:

- information at different "sensitivity" levels;
- individuals permitted access to selected pieces of information.

The goal: Understand what "security" (confidentiality) could mean in this context and define a policy (rules) to implement it.

Folder Sensitivity Labels

Information is parcelled out into separate containers (documents/folders) labeled according to sensitivity level.

Examples:

$$\textbf{(Secret: \{Nuclear, Crypto\})},$$
$$\textbf{(Top Secret: \{Crypto\})}.$$

A question we suggested for confidentiality policies is: *How do I characterize who is authorized to see what?*

Authorization Levels

Let's assign individuals *clearances* or *authorization levels*, of the same form as document sensitivity levels.

That is, each individual has:

- a hierarchical security level indicating the degree of trustworthiness to which he or she has been vetted;
- a *set* of "need-to-know categories" indicating domains of interest in which he or she is authorized to operate.

Notice that labels on documents indicate the sensitivity of the contained information; "labels" on humans indicate classes of information that person is authorized to access.

Least Privilege: An Aside

The need-to-know categories are a reflection that even within a given security level (such as **Top Secret**) not everyone needs to know everything. This is an instance of:

Principle of Least Privilege: Any subject should have access to the *minimum* amount of information needed to do its job.

This is as close to an axiom as anything in security. *Why does it make sense?*

Now What?

Question: Given that we have labels for documents and clearances for individuals, how do we decide which humans are permitted access to which documents?

Answer: Surely it's some relationship between the subject level and the object level. But what?

Should a human with the given clearance be able to read a document at the given sensitivity?

Clearance	Sensitivity	Access?
(Secret: {Crypto})	(Confidential: {Crypto})	Yes?
(Secret: {Crypto, Nuclear})	(Top Secret: {Crypto})	No?
(Secret: {Nuclear})	(Unclassified: {})	Yes?

Lessons

- To control access by individuals to documents/folders, we need "labels" for both.
- For documents the labels indicate the sensitivity of the information contained.
- For individuals, the labels indicate the authorization (clearance) to view certain classes of information.
- An individual should be given the minimal authorization to perform the job assigned. (Least Privilege)
- Whether an individual should be able to view a specific document depends on a relationship between the label of the document and the clearance of the individual.

Next lecture: MLS Example: Part III