
Privacy-Preserving Shortest Path Computation


<u>David J. Wu</u>, Joe Zimmerman, Jérémy Planul, and John C. Mitchell

Stanford University

Navigation




Navigation: A Solved Problem?




Issue: cloud learns where you are and where you are going!

"Trivial" Solution





"Trivial" Solution




Pros: lots of privacy (for the client)

Cons:

- routing information constantly changing
- map provider doesn't want to just give away map for "free"

Private Shortest Paths



Client Privacy: server does not learn source or destination

Server Privacy: client only learns route from source to destination

Private Shortest Paths

Model: assume client knows topology of the network (e.g., road network from OpenStreetMap)

Weights on edges (e.g., travel times) are hidden

Client Privacy: Server does not learn client's source s or destination t

Server Privacy: Client only learns $s \to t$ shortest path and nothing about weights of other edges not in shortest path


Straw Man Solution

Suppose road network has *n* nodes

Construct $n \times n$ database:


from node *s* to node *t*

(e.g., $s \rightarrow v_1 \rightarrow v_2 \rightarrow t$)



Shortest Path Protocol: privately retrieve record r_{st} from database


Symmetric Private Information Retrieval (SPIR)



Client Privacy: server does not learn *i*

Server Privacy: client only learns record *i*


Symmetric Private Information Retrieval (SPIR)



- single-server PIR: solutions exist from additive homomorphism [KO97]
- SPIR: construction from PIR
 + OT on short secrets [NP05]
- computation lower bound:
 linear in size of database


query on 10^6 records = 10^6 public key operations = several minutes of (single-threaded) computation

Straw man solution requires SPIR on databases with n^2 records – quadratic in number of nodes in the graph – rather impractical!




Observation 1: Nodes in road networks tend to have low (constant) degree

Typically, an intersection has up to four neighbors (for the four cardinal directions)




For each node in the network, associate each neighbor with a direction (unique index)

Next-hop routing matrix for graph with n nodes:



 r_{st} : index of neighbor to take on first hop on shortest path from node s to node t


shortest path protocol: iteratively retrieve the next hop in shortest path



Routing from 0 to 4:

- 1. Query r_{04} : North
- 2. Query r_{14} : North
- 3. Query r_{24} : East
- 4. Query r_{34} : East


But same problem as before: SPIR on database with n^2 elements



Observation 2: Road networks have geometric structure

Nodes above hyperplane: first hop is north or east

Nodes below hyperplane: first hop is south or west



If each node has four neighbors, can specify neighbors with **two** bits:

- 1st bit: encode direction along NW/SE axis
- 2nd bit: encode direction along NE/SW axis

Examples:

• North: 00

• East: 10

• South: 11

West: 01


A Compressible Structure

Let $M^{(\rm NE)}$ and $M^{(\rm NW)}$ be next-hop matrices along NE and NW axis (entries in $M^{(\rm NE)}$ and $M^{(\rm NW)}$ are bits)

Objective: for $i \in \{NE, NW\}$, find matrices $A^{(i)}$, $B^{(i)}$ such that $M^{(i)} = \text{sign}(A^{(i)} \cdot B^{(i)})$

A Compressible Structure


Objective: for $i \in \{NE, NW\}$, find matrices $A^{(i)}, B^{(i)}$ such that $M^{(i)} = \text{sign}(A^{(i)} \cdot B^{(i)})$




Computing next-hop reduces to computing inner products

Index of row in A only depend on source, index of row in B only depend on destination

A Compressible Structure



Compression Benchmarks



An Iterative Shortest-Path Protocol

To learn next-hop on $s \rightarrow t$ shortest path:

- 1. Use SPIR to obtain s^{th} row of $A^{(NE)}$ and $A^{(NW)}$
- 2. Use SPIR to obtain t^{th} row of $B^{(\text{NE})}$ and $B^{(\text{NW})}$
- 3. Compute

$$M_{st}^{(\mathrm{NE})} = \mathrm{sign}\left\langle A_s^{(\mathrm{NE})}, B_t^{(\mathrm{NE})} \right\rangle$$
 and $M_{st}^{(\mathrm{NW})} = \mathrm{sign}\left\langle A_s^{(\mathrm{NW})}, B_t^{(\mathrm{NW})} \right\rangle$

SPIR queries on databases with n records

Problem: rows and columns of A, B reveal more information than desired

Affine Encodings and Arithmetic Circuits

Goal: Reveal inner product without revealing vectors

Idea: Use a "garbled" arithmetic circuit (affine encodings) [AIK14]

Example: Encoding of addition circuit $f(a, b) = a + b \in \mathbb{F}_p$:

- Encoding of a, b given by (a + r, b r) for random $r \in \mathbb{F}_p$
- Encodings (a + r, b r) reveal a + b and nothing more

Solution: SPIR on arithmetic circuit *encodings*

An Iterative Shortest-Path Protocol

To learn next-hop on $s \rightarrow t$ shortest path:

- 1. Use SPIR to obtain encodings of s^{th} row of $A^{(NE)}$ and $A^{(NW)}$
- 2. Use SPIR to obtain encodings of t^{th} row of $B^{(\text{NE})}$ and $B^{(\text{NW})}$
- 3. Evaluate inner products $\langle A_s^{(\mathrm{NE})}, B_t^{(\mathrm{NE})} \rangle$ and $\langle A_s^{(\mathrm{NW})}, B_t^{(\mathrm{NW})} \rangle$
- 4. Compute $M_{st}^{(NE)}$ and $M_{st}^{(NW)}$ (signs of inner products)

Affine encodings hide source and destination matrices, but inner products reveal too much information

Thresholding via Garbled Circuits

Goal: Reveal only the sign of the inner product

Solution: Blind inner product and evaluate the sign function using a garbled circuit [Yao86, BHR12]

- Instead of $\langle x, y \rangle$, compute $\alpha \langle x, y \rangle + \beta$ for random $\alpha, \beta \in \mathbb{F}_p$
- Use garbled circuit to evaluate function

$$g(z, \alpha, \beta) = \operatorname{sign}(\alpha^{-1}(z - \beta) \bmod p)$$

Client input: *z*

Server input: α , β

Input privacy of garbled circuits hide α , β

An Iterative Shortest-Path Protocol

To learn next-hop on $s \rightarrow t$ shortest path:

- 1. Use SPIR to obtain encodings of s^{th} row of $A^{(NE)}$ and $A^{(NW)}$
- 2. Use SPIR to obtain encodings of t^{th} row of $B^{(NE)}$ and $B^{(NW)}$
- 3. Evaluate to obtain blinded inner products $z^{(\mathrm{NE})}$ and $z^{(\mathrm{NW})}$
- 4. Use garbled circuits to compute $M_{st}^{\rm (NE)}$ and $M_{st}^{\rm (NW)}$

Semi-honest secure!

But malicious client can make inconsistent queries...

The Malicious Client



Round 1



client learns arbitrary edges of its choosing...

Ensuring Consistency


Consistency for the <u>destinations</u>: encrypt rows of destination database with a secret key for the destination, OT for destination key at start of protocol

Consistency for the <u>sources</u>: encrypt rows of source database with a secret key for the source, each round reveals source key for next hop

Consistency within <u>rounds</u> (between output of arithmetic circuit and input to garbled circuit): appeal to pairwise independence of hash family

Privacy-performance tradeoff: allow malicious client small probability to learn different, but contiguous, path towards destination

Benchmarks



Preprocessed city maps from OpenStreetMap

Online Benchmarks

City	Number of Nodes	Time per Round (s)	Bandwidth (KB)
San Francisco	1830	1.44 ± 0.16	88.24
Washington D.C.	2490	1.64 ± 0.13	90.00
Dallas	4993	2.91 ± 0.19	95.02
Los Angeles	7010	4.75 ± 0.22	100.54

Timing and bandwidth for each round of the **online** protocol (with protection against malicious clients)

Online Benchmarks

Most expensive component of protocol is sending garbled circuits (≈ 520 KB per circuit), but this can be done prior to the online (navigation) phase

Each round of the protocol completes in a few seconds (bottleneck is PIR protocol); fast enough for real-time navigation if it takes more than a few seconds between intersections (generally true)

Modest amount of bandwidth (around 100 KB) per round

End-to-End Benchmarks

City	Number of Rounds	Offline Bandwidth (MB)	Total Online Time (s)	Online Bandwidth (MB)
San Francisco	97	49.08	140.39	8.38
Washington D.C.	120	60.72	197.48	10.57
Dallas	126	63.76	371.44	11.72
Los Angeles	165	83.49	784.34	16.23

End-to-end performance of private shortest paths protocol (after padding number of rounds to maximum length of shortest path for each network)

Conclusions

Problem: privacy-preserving navigation

Routing information for road networks are compressible!

 Optimization-based compression technique achieves over 10x compression of next-hop matrices

Compressed routing matrix lends itself to iterative shortest-path protocol

- Computing the shortest path reduces to computing sign of inner product
- Leverage combination of arithmetic circuits + Boolean circuits

Questions?