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    • Message-set

    Message-set-fix

    (message-set-fix x) is a usual ACL2::fty set fixing function.

    Signature
    (message-set-fix x) → *
    Arguments
    x — Guard (message-setp x).

    In the logic, we apply message-fix to each member of the x. In the execution, none of that is actually necessary and this is just an inlined identity function.

    Definitions and Theorems

    Function: message-set-fix

    (defun message-set-fix (x)
      (declare (xargs :guard (message-setp x)))
      (mbe :logic (if (message-setp x) x nil)
           :exec x))

    Theorem: message-setp-of-message-set-fix

    (defthm message-setp-of-message-set-fix
      (message-setp (message-set-fix x)))

    Theorem: message-set-fix-when-message-setp

    (defthm message-set-fix-when-message-setp
      (implies (message-setp x)
               (equal (message-set-fix x) x)))

    Theorem: emptyp-message-set-fix

    (defthm emptyp-message-set-fix
      (implies (or (emptyp x) (not (message-setp x)))
               (emptyp (message-set-fix x))))

    Theorem: emptyp-of-message-set-fix

    (defthm emptyp-of-message-set-fix
      (equal (emptyp (message-set-fix x))
             (or (not (message-setp x)) (emptyp x))))

    Function: message-set-equiv$inline

    (defun message-set-equiv$inline (acl2::x acl2::y)
      (declare (xargs :guard (and (message-setp acl2::x)
                                  (message-setp acl2::y))))
      (equal (message-set-fix acl2::x)
             (message-set-fix acl2::y)))

    Theorem: message-set-equiv-is-an-equivalence

    (defthm message-set-equiv-is-an-equivalence
      (and (booleanp (message-set-equiv x y))
           (message-set-equiv x x)
           (implies (message-set-equiv x y)
                    (message-set-equiv y x))
           (implies (and (message-set-equiv x y)
                         (message-set-equiv y z))
                    (message-set-equiv x z)))
      :rule-classes (:equivalence))

    Theorem: message-set-equiv-implies-equal-message-set-fix-1

    (defthm message-set-equiv-implies-equal-message-set-fix-1
      (implies (message-set-equiv acl2::x x-equiv)
               (equal (message-set-fix acl2::x)
                      (message-set-fix x-equiv)))
      :rule-classes (:congruence))

    Theorem: message-set-fix-under-message-set-equiv

    (defthm message-set-fix-under-message-set-equiv
      (message-set-equiv (message-set-fix acl2::x)
                         acl2::x)
      :rule-classes (:rewrite :rewrite-quoted-constant))

    Theorem: equal-of-message-set-fix-1-forward-to-message-set-equiv

    (defthm equal-of-message-set-fix-1-forward-to-message-set-equiv
      (implies (equal (message-set-fix acl2::x)
                      acl2::y)
               (message-set-equiv acl2::x acl2::y))
      :rule-classes :forward-chaining)

    Theorem: equal-of-message-set-fix-2-forward-to-message-set-equiv

    (defthm equal-of-message-set-fix-2-forward-to-message-set-equiv
      (implies (equal acl2::x (message-set-fix acl2::y))
               (message-set-equiv acl2::x acl2::y))
      :rule-classes :forward-chaining)

    Theorem: message-set-equiv-of-message-set-fix-1-forward

    (defthm message-set-equiv-of-message-set-fix-1-forward
      (implies (message-set-equiv (message-set-fix acl2::x)
                                  acl2::y)
               (message-set-equiv acl2::x acl2::y))
      :rule-classes :forward-chaining)

    Theorem: message-set-equiv-of-message-set-fix-2-forward

    (defthm message-set-equiv-of-message-set-fix-2-forward
      (implies (message-set-equiv acl2::x (message-set-fix acl2::y))
               (message-set-equiv acl2::x acl2::y))
      :rule-classes :forward-chaining)