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    • Signed-certificates

    Signed-certs-of-next

    How the certificates signed by a validator change (or not) for each transition.

    The only kind of event that may change the certificates signed by a validator is create, because all the others do not change the set of system certificates, as proved in system-certs-of-next, which are a superset of the signed certificates. Whether the set of signed certificates actually changes depends on whether the validator is a signer of the certificate or not; so our theorem for create has a conditional. The theorems for the other kinds of events assert that there is no change in the set of signed certificates.

    Definitions and Theorems

    Theorem: signed-certs-of-create-next

    (defthm signed-certs-of-create-next
      (implies (in val (correct-addresses systate))
               (equal (signed-certs val (create-next cert systate))
                      (if (in (address-fix val)
                              (certificate->signers cert))
                          (insert (certificate-fix cert)
                                  (signed-certs val systate))
                        (signed-certs val systate)))))

    Theorem: signed-certs-of-accept-next

    (defthm signed-certs-of-accept-next
      (implies (and (in val (correct-addresses systate))
                    (accept-possiblep msg systate))
               (equal (signed-certs val (accept-next msg systate))
                      (signed-certs val systate))))

    Theorem: signed-certs-of-advance-next

    (defthm signed-certs-of-advance-next
      (implies (and (in val (correct-addresses systate))
                    (advance-possiblep val1 systate))
               (equal (signed-certs val (advance-next val1 systate))
                      (signed-certs val systate))))

    Theorem: signed-certs-of-commit-next

    (defthm signed-certs-of-commit-next
      (implies (and (in val (correct-addresses systate))
                    (commit-possiblep val1 systate))
               (equal (signed-certs val (commit-next val1 systate))
                      (signed-certs val systate))))