

A COMPUTATIONAL LOGIC

ACL2 

APPLICATIVE COMMON LISP

for the Verification of Fault-Tolerance Properties: First Results

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
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Introduction

- Designing dependable circuits → evaluation of robustness against faults
- Faults:
 - Natural phenomena
 - Attacks


Introduction

- Designing dependable circuits → evaluation of robustness against faults
- Faults:
 - Natural phenomena
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Introduction

- Designing dependable circuits → evaluation of robustness against faults
- Faults:
 - Natural phenomena
 - Attacks



Introduction (cont'd)

- **Consequences of faults = errors**
 - Signals stuck at 1 or at 0
 - Bit flips in memories
- **Goal: to ensure a given level of robustness → analysis of the potential consequences of errors**
 - Usually based on fault-injection techniques

Using formal methods

- **Most results based on enumerative techniques**
 - **Krautz et al. DATE'06:** symbolic simulation to characterize correction capabilities
 - **Seshia et al. DATE'07:** SMV to identify latches that must be protected
 - **Fey et al. ISQED'08:** SAT-solving to compute a measure of the robustness

Using formal methods


- Goal: to avoid enumeration → meta-model for faults in ACL2
- Transition and output functions

$$\delta : I \times S \rightarrow S$$


$$\lambda : I \times S \rightarrow O$$

+ fault-injection function **f**


Overall framework



Overall framework




Overall framework



Overall framework

VHDL RTL description 



$\delta : I \times S \rightarrow S$
 $\lambda : I \times S \rightarrow O$

ACL2 code: transition and output functions
+ fault injection + properties

f



Single fault model

- **Fault model: presence of an error in a single register**

- $f : S \rightarrow S$
- $f(s) \neq s$
- only one register differs from s to $f(s)$

$$\forall_k f(s) = \text{inject}_k(s)$$

Single fault model

- Example: TMR counter


$$s_n = (X, X, X) \Rightarrow$$

$$\delta(i, f(s_n)) \Leftrightarrow \delta(i, s_n)$$

$$s_0 = (X, X, X) \Rightarrow$$

$$\delta(i, f(\delta^n(l, s_0)))$$

$$\Leftrightarrow \delta(i, \delta^n(l, s_0))$$



Hierarchical model

- **TMR example:**
 - CPU time for property 1: 0.01 s
 - CPU time for property 2: 6.35 s
- **Unacceptable times for larger circuits → hierarchical model that takes advantage of the compositional circuit structure**

Hierarchical model

- Exporting characteristic properties

Component C_2

$$\delta_2: I_2 \times S_2 \rightarrow S_2$$

$$\lambda_2: I_2 \times S_2 \rightarrow O_2$$

$$Sp_2: S_2 \rightarrow B$$

$$Sreach_2: S_2 \rightarrow B$$

Error function f_2

Component C_1


$$\delta_1: I_1 \times S_1 \rightarrow S_1$$

$$\lambda_1: I_1 \times S_1 \rightarrow O_1$$

$$Sp_1: S_1 \rightarrow B$$

$$Sreach_1: S_1 \rightarrow B$$

Error function f_1



P_1

Hierarchical model

- Exporting characteristic properties

Component C_2

$$\delta_2: I_2 \times S_2 \rightarrow S_2$$

$$\lambda_2: I_2 \times S_2 \rightarrow O_2$$

$$Sp_2: S_2 \rightarrow B$$

$$Sreach_2: S_2 \rightarrow B$$

Error function f_2

Component C_1

$$\delta_1: I_1 \times S_1 \rightarrow S_1$$

$$\lambda_1: I_1 \times S_1 \rightarrow O_1$$

$$Sp_1: S_1 \rightarrow B$$

$$Sreach_1: S_1 \rightarrow B$$

Error function f_1

P_1



P_2

Hierarchical model

- Exporting characteristic properties

Component C_2


$$\delta_2: I_2 \times S_2 \rightarrow S_2$$

$$\lambda_2: I_2 \times S_2 \rightarrow O_2$$

$$Sp_2: S_2 \rightarrow B$$

$$Sreach_2: S_2 \rightarrow B$$

Error function f_2



P_2

Hierarchical model

■ Example: component TMR register

```
(defspec TMR
; - Signatures
  ((TMR-Sp          *) => *) ; state recognizer
  ((TMR-next       * *) => *) ;  $\delta$ 
  ((TMR-out_value  * *) => *) ;  $\lambda$ 
  ((TMR-e_detect   * *) => *)
  ((TMR-reach_state *) => *) ; fault-free states
  ((TMR-error      *) => *) ; error
  (local (defun TMR-Sp (x)
            ...))
  (local (defun TMR-next (i s)
            ...))
  ...)
```

C₁

Hierarchical model

■ Example: component TMR register

```
(local (encapsulate
  (((TMR-error *) => *))
  (local (defun TMR-error (x) (TMR-inject1 x)))
  (defthm TMR-error-type1
    (equal (TMR-Sp (TMR-error x)) (TMR-Sp x)))
  (defthm TMR-error-def1
    (implies (TMR-Sp x)
      (not (equal (TMR-error x) x))))
  (defthm TMR-error-def2
    (or (equal (TMR-error x) (TMR-inject1 x))
        (equal (TMR-error x) (TMR-inject2 x))
        (equal (TMR-error x) (TMR-inject3 x)))
    :hints (("Goal" :in-theory (disable TMR-Sp)))
    :rule-classes nil)))
```

...

C₁

Hierarchical model

■ Example: component TMR register

`; Robustness-related properties:`

```
(defthm TMR-thm-hardened-1
  (implies (and (TMR-Sp S)
                (TMR-reach_state S)
                (true-listp I)
                (natp (nth *TMR/in_value* I))
                (booleanp (nth *TMR/ld_flag* I))
                (equal (len I) 2))
            (equal (TMR-next I (TMR-error S))
                  (TMR-next I S)))
  :hints (("Goal" :use
           (:instance TMR-error-def2 (x S))))
  :rule-classes :rewrite)
...

```

P_1

Hierarchical model

■ Example: ATM

```
(defspec ATM-TMR
; - Signatures
  ((ATM-Sp          *) => *) ; state recognizer
  ((ATM-next       * *) => *) ;  $\delta$ 
  ((ATM-start_op   * *) => *) ;  $\lambda$ 
  ((ATM-keep       * *) => *)
  ((ATM-outc       * *) => *)
  ((ATM-e_detect   * *) => *)
  ((ATM-reach_state *) => *) ; fault-free states
  ((ATM-error      * *) => *) ; error
  ...)
```

C₂

Hierarchical model

■ Example: ATM

```
(local (encapsulate          ; for register n
  (((ATM-n_reg-error *) => *))
  (defun ATM-n_reg-Sp (S) (TMR-Sp S))
  (defun ATM-n_reg-next (I S) (TMR-next I S))
  (defun ATM-n_reg-out_value (I S)
    (TMR-out_value I S))
  (defun ATM-n_reg-e_detect (I S)
    (TMR-e_detect I S))
  (defun ATM-n_reg-reach_state (S)
    (TMR-reach_state S))
  (local (defun ATM-n_reg-error (S) (TMR-error S)))
  (definstance TMR n_register
    :functional-substitution
      ((TMR-error ATM-n_reg-error))
    :rule-classes :rewrite)))
```

C₂

Hierarchical model

■ Example: ATM

```
(defthm ATM-thm-hardened-1
  (implies (and (ATM-Sp S) (ATM-reach_state S)
    (true-listp I) (equal (len I) 7)
    (booleanp (nth *ATM/reset* I))
    (booleanp (nth *ATM/inc* I))
    (natp (nth *ATM/cc* I))
    (natp (nth *ATM/codin* I))
    (booleanp (nth *ATM/val* I))
    (booleanp (nth *ATM/done_op* I))
    (booleanp (nth *ATM/take* I)))
    (equal (ATM-next I (ATM-error S))
      (ATM-next I S)))
  :hints (("Goal" :use (:instance ATM-error-def2 (x S))
    :in-theory (disable booleanp)))
  :rule-classes :rewrite)
```

P_2

CPU times*

Proof (book)	CPU time
Register with error-detection	0.24 s
TMR register	0.88 s
ATM with error-detecting registers	2.34 s
ATM with TMR registers	10.58 s
ATM with TMR registers (flat)	2559.14 s

* Intel Core 2 Duo

Conclusion

- First results → ACL2 can be useful for some kinds of faults/properties
- Improvements

- Single fault:

$$f(s_i) \neq s_i \Rightarrow \forall k \neq i, f(s_k) = s_k$$

instead of

$$\forall_k f(s) = \text{inject}_k(s)$$

Conclusion

■ Improvements (cont'd)

- Instantiation of components:

- **defcomp**

```
(defcomp TMR ...)
```

- **instcomp**

```
(defspec ATM-TMR
```

```
...)
```

```
(local (instcomp TMR n))
```

```
(local (instcomp TMR ok))
```

```
(local (instcomp TMR code))
```

```
... )
```

