## CS344M

# Autonomous Multiagent Systems Spring 2008 

Prof: Peter Stone

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The University of Texas at Austin

## Good Afternoon, Colleagues

Are there any questions?

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- Mixed Nash equilibria?
- What can'† game theory simulate?
- What if one player isn't rational?
- Doran's research


## Logistics

- Faculty candidate on Thursday at 1lam:
"When Game Theory Isn'† Enough: Engineering Agents for an Open and Imperfectly Rational World" Sevan Ficici, Harvard


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- Faculty candidate on Thursday at 11 am:
"When Game Theory Isn'† Enough: Engineering Agents for an Open and Imperfectly Rational World" Sevan Ficici, Harvard
- Another one April 8th:
"Computing Equilibria in Games" Konstantinos Daskalakis, UC Berkeley


## Class Discussion

Mike Jordan on statistical tests

## T-test vs. Paired T-test

- Is the right half of the class or the left half taller?


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- Who's better at tetris? Adam or Brandon?


## T-test vs. Paired T-test

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- Did you weigh less after the class than before?
- Who's better at tetris? Adam or Brandon?
- Who's better at video games in general?


## T-test vs. Paired T-test

- Test: Your team better than UvA vs. Brainstormers


## T-test vs. Paired T-test

- Test: Your team better than UvA vs. Brainstormers
- Test: Your team better than UvA vs. a set of 20 opponents


## T-test vs. Paired T-test

- Test: Your team better than UvA vs. Brainstormers
- Test: Your team better than UvA vs. a set of 20 opponents
- What if neither is significant?


## Matching Pennies

- We each put a penny down covered
- If they match, I win, if they don't, you win


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$$
\text { Player } 2
$$

$$
\begin{array}{lll}
\mathrm{H} & 1,-1 & -1,1
\end{array}
$$

Player 1

$$
\begin{array}{ll}
\mathrm{T} & -1,1
\end{array}
$$

$$
1,-1
$$

## Matching Pennies

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Player 1

$$
\begin{aligned}
& \text { T } \quad-1,1 \\
& \text { Nash equilibrium? }
\end{aligned}
$$

## Rock/Paper/Scissors

- Nash equilibrium?
-Why is anything else not an equilibrium?


## Mixed strategy equilibrium

## Player 2 <br> Action 1 Action 2

$$
\begin{array}{llll} 
& \text { Action 1 } & 4,8 & 2,0 \\
\text { Player 1 } & & \\
& \text { Action 2 } & 6,2 & 0,8
\end{array}
$$

## Mixed strategy equilibrium

$$
\begin{array}{cc}
\hline \text { Player } & 2 \\
\text { Action } 1 & \text { Action } 2 \\
4,8 & 2,0 \\
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\text { Action } 1 \quad 4,8 \quad 2,0
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- What if player 2 picks action $13 / 4$ of the time?


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Do actual numbers matter?

