Biometric Authentication

Vitaly Shmatikov

Biometric Authentication

- ◆Nothing to remember
- Passive
 - Nothing to type, no devices to carry around
- Can't share (usually)
- Can be fairly unique
 - ... if measurements are sufficiently accurate

Identification vs. Authentication

- Goal: associate an identity with an event
 - Example: a fingerprint at a crime scene
 - Key question: given a particular biometric reading, does there exist another person who has the same value of this biometric?
- Goal: verify a claimed identity
 - Example: fingerprint scanner to enter a building
 - Key question: do there exist any two persons who have the same value of this biometric?
 - Birthday paradox!

Problems with Biometrics

- Private, but not secret
 - Biometric passports, fingerprints and DNA on objects...
- Even random-looking biometrics may not be sufficiently unique for authentication
 - Birthday paradox!
- Potentially forgeable
- Revocation is difficult or impossible

Forging Handwriting

[Ballard, Monrose, Lopresti]

graphic language
target

graphic language
human forgery
graphic language
generative forgery

chisis management

human forgery

Chists management

chists management

generative torgery

solv concert
target

solv concert
human forgery

solv concert
generative forgery

Generated by computer algorithm trained on handwriting samples

Biometric Error Rates (Benign)

- "Fraud rate" vs. "insult rate"
 - Fraud = system accepts a forgery (false accept)
 - Insult = system rejects valid user (false reject)
- Increasing acceptance threshold increases fraud rate, decreases insult rate
- ◆ For biometrics, U.K. banks set target fraud rate of 1%, insult rate of 0.01% [Ross Anderson]
 - Common signature recognition systems achieve equal error rates around 1% - not good enough!

Biometrics (1)

- Face recognition (by a computer algorithm)
 - Error rates up to 20%, given reasonable variations in lighting, viewpoint and expression
- Fingerprints
 - Traditional method for identification
 - 1911: first US conviction on fingerprint evidence
 - U.K. traditionally requires 16-point match
 - Probability of a false match is 1 in 10 billion
 - No successful challenges until 2000
 - Fingerprint damage impairs recognition
 - Ross Anderson's scar crashes FBI scanner

Biometrics (2)


◆Iris scanning

- Irises are very random, but stable through life
 - Different between the two eyes of the same individual
- 256-byte iris code based on concentric rings between the pupil and the outside of the iris
- Equal error rate better than 1 in a million


Hand geometry

- Used in nuclear premises entry control, INSPASS (discontinued in 2002)
- Voice, ear shape, vein pattern, face temperature

Biometrics (3)




Identifies wearer by his/her unique heartbeat pattern



Biometrics (4)

"All you need to do is sit"

[Advanced Institute of Industrial Technology, Japan]




"Forget Fingerprints: Car Seat IDs Driver's Rear End"

360 disc-shaped sensors identify a unique "buttprint" with 98% accuracy

¥70,000

Biometrics (5)



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Risks of Biometrics

- Criminal gives an inexperienced policeman fingerprints in the wrong order
 - Record not found; gets off as a first-time offender
- Can be cloned or separated from the person
 - Ross Anderson: in countries where fingerprints are used to pay pensions, there are persistent tales of "Granny's finger in the pickle jar" being the most valuable property she bequeathed to her family
- Birthday paradox
 - With the false accept rate of 1 in a million, probability of a false match is above 50% with only 1609 samples

Surgical Change

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re-grafted on to the matching digits of the opposite hand.

在这个最大的自己的公司,但是这个一个的人们还是有的自己的的,但是这个一个的人们的,我们就是这个的人们就是一个的人们也是不够的自己的的。这一个人们的人们也是不够的

About these results

Stealing Biometrics




Involuntary Cloning


Clone a biometric without victim's knowledge or assistance



"my voice is my password"



cloned retina



Fingerprints from beer bottles
Eye laser scan

Bad news: it works!

Cloning a Finger

[Matsumoto]

Making an Artificial Finger from a Residual Fingerprint

Materials

A photosensitive coated Printed Circuit Board (PCB)

"10K" by Sanhayato Co., Ltd.




Solid gelatin sheet "GELATINE LEAF" by MARUHA CORP



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Cloning Process


[Matsumoto]



slide 17

Fingerprint Image

[Matsumoto]




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Molding

[Matsumoto]





Put this mold into a refrigerator to cool, and then peel carefully.




The Mold and the Gummy Finger

[Matsumoto]



Mold: 70JPY/piece (Ten molds can be obtained in the PCB.)



Gummy Finger: 50JPY/piece

Side By Side

[Matsumoto]

Pores can be observed.



Enhanced Fingerprint



Captured Fingerprint Image of the Gummy Finger with the device H (a capacitive sensor)

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Play-Doh Fingers

[Schuckers]

- Alternative to gelatin
- Play-Doh fingers fool 90% of fingerprint scanners
 - Clarkson University study
- Suggested perspiration measurement to test "liveness" of the finger

