CS 361S

Network Security and Privacy

Vitaly Shmatikov

http://www.cs.utexas.edu/~shmat/courses/cs361s/

Course Personnel

Instructor: Vitaly Shmatikov

- Office: GDC 6.812
- Office hours: Tuesday, 1-2pm
- Open door policy don't hesitate to stop by!
- TA: Oliver Jensen
 - Office: GDC 6.818A
 - Office hours: Wednesday, 11am-12n
- Watch the course website
 - Assignments, reading materials, lecture notes

Prerequisites

Required: working knowledge of C and JavaScript

- The first project is about Web security
- The second involves writing buffer overflow attacks in C
 - You must have detailed understanding of x86 architecture, stack layout, calling conventions, etc.
- Recommended: Introduction to Computer Security; Cryptography; Computer Networks; Compilers and/or Operating Systems
 - Not much overlap with this course, but will help gain deeper understanding of security mechanisms and where they fit in the big picture

Course Logistics

Lectures

- Tuesday, Thursday 11a-12:30p
- Three homeworks (30% of the grade)
- Two projects (10 + 15% of the grade)
 - A fair bit of C coding and PHP/JavaScript hacking
 - Can be done in teams of 2 students
 - Security is a contact sport!

Midterm (20% of the grade)

Final (25% of the grade)

No make-up or substitute exams! If you are not sure you will be able to take the exams in class on the assigned dates, **do not take this course**!

UTCS <u>Code of Conduct</u> will be strictly enforced

Late Submission Policy

- Each take-home assignment is due in class at 11am on the due date
 - 5 take-home assignments (3 homeworks, 2 projects)
- You have 3 late days to use any way you want
 - You can submit one assignment 3 days late, 3 assignments 1 day late, etc.
 - After you use up your days, you get 0 points for each late assignment
 - Partial days are rounded up to the next full day

Course Materials

Textbook:

Kaufman, Perlman, Speciner. "Network Security"

- Lectures will <u>not</u> follow the textbook
- Lectures will focus on "big-picture" principles and ideas of network attack and defense
- Attend lectures! Lectures will cover some material that is <u>not</u> in the textbook and you will be tested on it!
- Occasional assigned readings
 - Start reading "Smashing the Stack For Fun and Profit" by Aleph One (from Phrack hacker magazine)
 - Understanding it will be essential for your project

Other Helpful Books

Ross Anderson's "Security Engineering"

- Focuses on design principles for secure systems
- Wide range of entertaining examples: banking, nuclear command and control, burglar alarms
- "The Shellcoder's Handbook"
 - Practical how-to manual for hacking attacks
 - Not a required text, but you may find it useful for the buffer overflow project
- Kevin Mitnick's "The Art of Intrusion"
 - Real-world hacking stories
 - Good illustration for many concepts in this course

Main Themes of the Course

Vulnerabilities of networked software

• Worms and botnets, denial of service, attacks on Web applications, attacks on infrastructure

Defensive technologies

- Protection of information in transit: cryptography, application- and transport-layer security protocols
- Protection of networked software: memory integrity, firewalls, antivirus tools, intrusion detection
- Study a few deployed protocols in detail: from design principles to implementation details
 - Kerberos, SSL/TLS, IPsec (if time permits)


What This Course is Not About

Not a comprehensive course on computer security

◆<u>Not</u> a course on ethical, legal, or economic issues

- No file sharing, DMCA, piracy, free speech issues
- No surveillance
- Only a cursory overview of cryptography
 - Take CS 346 for deeper understanding
- Only some issues in systems security
 - Very little about OS security, secure hardware, physical security, security of embedded devices...

Motivation https://




Excerpt From "General Terms of Use"

网络古马科学科教育的 化合金 化等等的 法证明的 计数字形式 医子宫丛 网络白色花 化二氯化化物 化化物的 化化物的 化化物的 化化物的 化化物的

wells Fargo - General To	er × 🕂	
← → C 🔒 https://	/www.wellsfargo.com/privacy_security/terms	☆ 🔘 🔧
	U.S. copyright laws and international treaties. The copyrighte images, graphics, source code, and the content on the Site. purposes only. You may download copyrighted materials for	trolled by Wells Fargo, except as otherwise expressly stated, and are protected by ed materials on the Site include, but are not limited to, the text, design, software, You are authorized to view the information available on the Site for your informational your personal or internal business purposes only. You acknowledge that you do not
	acquire any ownership rights by downloading copyrighted or frame, alter, create derivative works of or republish all or any written consent. WELLS FARGO [®] the stagecoach design an Wells Fargo. Other featured words used on the Site Joidentit	YOU ACKNOWLEDGE THAT NEITHER WELLS
	Wells Fargo or owned by third parties. You may no use, cop except as authorized in this paragraph. You may not use any trademark license agreement.	FARGO, ITS AFFILIATES NOR ANY OF THEIR
	The Site may contain links to Web sites controlled or offered	
	for any other company's Web site control, products, privacy p site, you agree to read and adhere to the policies and terms provided by the linked site provides are those of the provide and the delivery of goods or searces, is based solely on the	PARTY CONTENT PROVIDERS OR LICENSORS
	Registration Information	WARRANT THAT THE SERVICES OR THE SITE
	You may be invited to represent at the Site to help us tailor the products and services for you and/or your business. In regis information about you and/or your business as requested by business may be reated based on the registration informat	WILL DE UNINTERRUPTED OR ERROR FREE;
	protected as described in our Privacy Policy.	NOR DO THEY MAKE ANY WARRANTY AS TO
	Disclaimer THE SERVICES ARE OFFERED ON AN "AS IS," "WHERE IS" EXPRESS, IMPLIED OR STATUTORY-INCLUDING, BUT NO" MEECHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PUR	
	EXCLUSION, RESTRICTION OR MODIFICATION UNDER TH	
	YOU ACKNOWLEDGE THAT NEITHER WELLS FARGO, ITS. PARTY CONTENT PROVIDERS OR LICENSORS WARRANT FREE; NOR DO THEY MAKE ANY WARRANTY AS TO THE R OR AS TO THE TIMELINESS, SEQUENCE, ACCURACY, REI	
	MERCHANDISE PROVIDED THROUGH THE SERVICES AN APPEARING ON LINKED SITES OR PURCHASED VIA LINKE	RELIABILITY, COMPLETENESS OR CONTENT OF
	THE PROVIDERS OF THE LINKED SITES OTHERWISE OFF	ΔΝΙΥ ΙΝΕΩΡΜΑΤΙΩΝΙ SERVICE ΩΡ
	WELLS FARGORS NOT RESPONSIBLE FOR ANY LOSS, PR USE OF THE SERVICES OR THE SITE. TO THE MAXIMUM E RESPONSIBLE TO YOU OR ANY THIRD PARTY CLAIMING T	MERCHANDISE PROVIDED THROUGH THE
	ECONOMIC OR OTHER DAMAGES RUSING IN ANY WAY OU SERVICES OR INTERNET BROWSER SOF PUARE, INCLUE	

"Privacy, Security and Legal"



"As a Wells Fargo customer, your privacy and security always come first."

- Privacy policies
 - Privacy policy for individuals
 - Online privacy policy
 - Social Security Number protection policy
 - International privacy policies
- Your online security
 - How we protect you
 - Online security guarantee
- Fraud information center
 - How fraudsters operate
 - How to protect yourself
- USA PATRIOT ACT information

What Do You Think?

What do you think should be included in "privacy and security" for an e-commerce website?



Desirable Security Properties

- Authenticity
- Confidentiality
- Integrity

. . .

- Availability
- Accountability and non-repudiation
- Access control
- Privacy of collected information

Syllabus (1): Security Mechanisms

Basics of cryptography

• Symmetric and public-key encryption, certificates, cryptographic hash functions, pseudo-random generators

Authentication and key establishment

- Case study: Kerberos
- Web security
 - Case study: SSL/TLS
- IP security (if time permits)
 - Case study: IPsec protocol suite

Syllabus (2): Attacks and Defenses

Web attacks

• Cross-site scripting and request forgery, SQL injection

Network attacks

- Worms, viruses, botnets
- Spam, phishing, denial of service
- Attacks on routing and DNS infrastructure
- Buffer overflow / memory corruption attacks

Defense tools

- Firewalls, antivirus, intrusion detection systems
- Wireless security

Peek at the Dark Side



The <u>only</u> reason we will be learning about attack techniques is to build better defenses

Don't even think about using this knowledge to attack anyone








A Security Engineer's Mindset

[Bruce Schneier]



Ken Thompson



ACM Turing Award, 1983

http://www.acm.org/classics/sep95

- What code can we trust?
- Consider "login" or "su" in Unix
 - Is Ubuntu binary reliable? RedHat?
 - Does it send your password to someone?
 - Does it have backdoor for a "special" remote user?
- Can't trust the binary, so check source code or write your own, recompile

Does this solve problem?



http://www.acm.org/classics/sep95

Who wrote the compiler?



- Compiler looks for source code that looks the login process, inserts backdoor into it
- Ok, inspect the source code of the compiler... Looks good? Recompile the compiler!
- Does this solve the problem?

http://www.acm.org/classics/sep95

```
The compiler is written in C ...
```

```
compiler(S) {
```

if (match(S, "login-pattern")) {
 compile (login-backdoor)
 return

if (match(S, "compiler-pattern")) {
 compile (compiler-backdoor)
 return


```
.... /* compile as usual */
```



http://www.acm.org/classics/sep95



"The moral is obvious. You can't trust code that you did not totally create yourself. (Especially code from companies that employ people like me.)"




Network Stack

people		←	Phishing attacks, usability
		email, Web, NFS	Sendmail, FTP, NFS bugs, chosen-
application		•	protocol and version-rollback attacks
session		▲ RPC	RPC worms, portmapper exploits
transport		ТСР	SYN flooding, RIP attacks, sequence number prediction
cianopore		` D	sequence number prediction
network		↓ IP	IP smurfing and other
data link		€ 802.11	address spoofing attacks
			WEP attacks
physical		← RF	RF fingerprinting, DoS

Only as secure as the <u>single</u> weakest layer... ... or interconnection between the layers

Network Defenses



<u>All</u> defense mechanisms must work correctly and securely

Correctness versus Security

- System correctness: system satisfies specification
 - For reasonable input, get reasonable output
- System security:
 - system properties preserved in face of attack
 - For <u>un</u>reasonable input, output not completely disastrous

Main difference: active interference from adversary

Modular design may increase vulnerability ...

- Abstraction is difficult to achieve in security: what if the adversary operates below your level of abstraction?
- but also increase security (small TCB)

What Drives the Attackers?

Put up a fake financial website, collect users' logins and passwords, empty out their accounts

- Insert a hidden program into unsuspecting users' computers, use it to spread spam or for espionage
- Subvert copy protection for music, video, games
- Stage denial of service attacks on websites, extort money
- Wreak havoc, achieve fame and glory in the blackhat community

Marketplace for Vulnerabilities

Option 1: bug bounty programs

- Google: up to \$3133.7 in 2010, now up to \$20K per bug
- Facebook: up to \$20K per bug
- Microsoft: up to \$150K per bug
- Pwn2Own competition: \$10-15K
- Option 2: vulnerability brokers
 - ZDI, iDefense: \$2-25K
- Option 3: gray and black markets
 - Up to \$100-250K reported (hard to verify)
 - A zero-day against iOS sold for \$500K (allegedly)

It's a Business

Several companies specialize in finding and selling exploits

- ReVuln, Vupen, Netragard, Exodus Intelligence
- The average flaw sells for \$35-160K
- \$100K+ annual subscription fees

Nation-state buyers

 "Israel, Britain, Russia, India and Brazil are some of the biggest spenders. North Korea is in the market, as are some Middle Eastern intelligence services. Countries in the Asian Pacific, including Malaysia and Singapore, are buying, too" -- NY Times (Jul 2013)

Marketplace for Stolen Data

[Dell SecureWorks, 2013]

- Single credit card number: \$4-15
- Single card with magnetic track data: \$12-30
 "Fullz": \$25-40
 - Full name, address, phone, email addresses (with passwords), date of birth, SSN, bank account and routing numbers, online banking credentials, credit cards with magnetic track data and PINs
- Online credentials for a bank account with \$70-150K balance: under \$300

Prices dropped since 2011, indicating supply glut

Marketplace for Victims

[Trend Micro, "Russian Underground 101", 2012]

Pay-per-install on compromised machines

- US: \$100-150 / 1000 downloads, "global mix": \$12-15
- Can be used to send spam, stage denial of service attacks, perform click fraud, host scam websites

Botnets for rent

- DDoS: \$10/hour or \$150/week
- Spam: from \$10/1,000,000 emails

Tools and services



 Basic Trojans (\$3-10), Windows rootkits (\$300), email, SMS, ICQ spamming tools (\$30-50), botnet setup and support (\$200/month, etc.)

Bad News

Security often not a primary consideration

- Performance and usability take precedence
- Feature-rich systems may be poorly understood
- Implementations are buggy
 - Buffer overflows are the "vulnerability of the decade"
 - Cross-site scripting and other Web attacks

Networks are more open and accessible than ever

• Increased exposure, easier to cover tracks

Many attacks are not even technical in nature

• Phishing, social engineering, etc.

Better News

There are a lot of defense mechanisms

- We'll study some, but by no means all, in this course
- It's important to understand their limitations
 - "If you think cryptography will solve your problem, then you don't understand cryptography... and you don't understand your problem"
 - Many security holes are based on misunderstanding
- Security awareness and user "buy-in" help
- Other important factors: usability and economics

Reading Assignment

Review Kaufman, section 1.5

- Primer on networking
- Start reading buffer overflow materials on the course website
 - "Smashing the Stack for Fun and Profit"
 - You will definitely need to understand it for the buffer overflow project