CS 380S

0x1A Great Papers in Computer Security

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http://www.cs.utexas.edu/~shmat/courses/cs380s/

Attacking Cryptographic Schemes

Cryptanalysis

- Find mathematical weaknesses in constructions
- Statistical analysis of plaintext / ciphertext pairs
- Side-channel attacks
 - Exploit characteristics of implementations
 - Power analysis
 - Electromagnetic radiation analysis
 - Acoustic analysis
 - Timing analysis

Timing Attack

 Basic idea: learn the system's secret by observing how long it takes to perform various computations
 Typical goal: extract private key

Extremely powerful because isolation doesn't help

- Victim could be remote
- Victim could be inside its own virtual machine
- Keys could be in tamper-proof storage or smartcard

Attacker wins simply by measuring response times

RSA Cryptosystem

Key generation:

- Generate large (say, 512-bit) primes p, q
- Compute n=pq and φ(n)=(p-1)(q-1)
- Choose small e, relatively prime to $\varphi(n)$
 - Typically, e=3 (may be vulnerable) or $e=2^{16}+1=65537$ (why?)
- Compute unique d such that $ed = 1 \mod \varphi(n)$
- Public key = (e,n); private key = d
 - Security relies on the assumption that it is difficult to compute roots modulo n without knowing p and q

◆Encryption of m (simplified!): c = m^e mod n

• Decryption of c: $c^d \mod n = (m^e)^d \mod n = m$

How RSA Decryption Works

RSA decryption: compute y^x mod n

• This is a modular exponentiation operation

Naïve algorithm: square and multiply

Let $s_0 = 1$. For k = 0 upto w - 1: If (bit k of x) is 1 then Let $R_k = (s_k \cdot y) \mod n$. Else Let $R_k = s_k$. Let $s_{k+1} = R_k^2 \mod n$. EndFor. Return (R_{w-1}) .

Kocher's Observation

Whether iteration takes a long time Let $s_0 = 1$. depends on the kth bit of secret exponent For k=0 upto w-1: This takes a while If (bit k of x) is 1) then to compute Let $R_k \neq (s_k \cdot y) \mod n$. Else Let $R_k = (s_k)$. This is instantaneous Let $s_{k+1} = R_k^2 \mod n$. EndFor. Return (R_{w-1}) .

Exploiting Timing Information

Different timing given operands

- Assumption / heuristic: timings of subsequent multiplications are independent
 - Given that we know the first k-1 bits of x ... < timing
 Given a guess for the kth bit of x ... < Exact
 ... Time for remaining bits independent
- Given measurement of total time can see whether there is correlation between "time for kth bit is long" and "total time is long"

Outline of Kocher's Attack

Idea: guess some bits of the exponent and predict how long decryption will take

- If guess is correct, will observe correlation; if incorrect, then prediction will look random
 - This is a signal detection problem, where signal is timing variation due to guessed exponent bits
 - The more bits you already know, the stronger the signal, thus easier to detect (error-correction property)
- Start by guessing a few top bits, look at correlations for each guess, pick the most promising candidate and continue

D. Brumley and D. Boneh

Remote Timing Attacks are Practical

(USENIX Security 2003)



RSA in OpenSSL

OpenSSL is a popular open-source toolkit

- mod_SSL (in Apache = 28% of HTTPS market)
- stunnel (secure TCP/IP servers)
- sNFS (secure NFS)
- Many more applications

Kocher's attack doesn't work against OpenSSL

- Instead of square-and-multiply, OpenSSL uses CRT, sliding windows and two different multiplication algorithms for modular exponentiation
 - CRT = Chinese Remainder Theorem
 - Secret exponent is processed in chunks, not bit-by-bit

Chinese Remainder Theorem

$\blacklozenge n = n_1 n_2 ... n_k$

where $gcd(n_i, n_j) = 1$ when $i \neq j$

The system of congruences

 $x = x_1 \text{ mod } n_1 = \ldots = x_k \text{ mod } n_k$

- Has a simultaneous solution x to all congruences
- There exists exactly one solution x between 0 and n-1
- For RSA modulus n=pq, to compute x mod n it's enough to know x mod p and x mod q

RSA Decryption With CRT

 \bullet To decrypt c, need to compute $m = c^d \mod n$

Use Chinese Remainder Theorem (why?)

- $d_1 = d \mod (p-1)$ $d_2 = d \mod (q-1)$ $qinv = q^{-1} \mod p$ these are precomputed
- Compute $m_1 = c^{d_1} \mod p$; $m_2 = c^{d_2} \mod q$
- Compute $m = m_2 + (qinv^*(m_1 m_2) \mod p)^*q$

Attack this computation in order to learn q. This is enough to learn private key (why?)

Montgomery Reduction

• Decryption requires computing $m_2 = c^{d_2} \mod q$

This is done by repeated multiplication

- Simple: square and multiply (process d₂ 1 bit at a time)
- More clever: sliding windows (process d₂ in 5-bit blocks)

In either case, many multiplications modulo q

Multiplications use Montgomery reduction


- Pick some $R = 2^k$
- To compute x*y mod q, convert x and y into their Montgomery form xR mod q and yR mod q
- Compute (xR * yR) * R⁻¹ = zR mod q
 - Multiplication by R⁻¹ can be done very efficiently

Schindler's Observation

At the end of Montgomery reduction, if zR > q, then need to subtract q

- Probability of this extra step is proportional to c mod q
- ◆ If c is close to q, a lot of subtractions will be done
- If c mod q = 0, very few subtractions
 - Decryption will take longer as c gets closer to q, then become fast as c passes a multiple of q
- By playing with different values of c and observing how long decryption takes, attacker can guess q!
 - Doesn't work directly against OpenSSL because of sliding windows and two multiplication algorithms

Reduction Timing Dependency



Integer Multiplication Routines

 30-40% of OpenSSL running time is spent on integer multiplication


- If integers have the same number of words n, OpenSSL uses Karatsuba multiplication
 - Takes O(n^{log₂3})

 If integers have unequal number of words n and m, OpenSSL uses normal multiplication


• Takes O(nm)

Summary of Time Dependencies


g<q q>q Montgomery Shorter Longer effect Shorter Multiplication Longer effect g is the decryption value (same as c) Different effects... but one will always dominate!




Discontinuity in Decryption Time



Normal SSL Handshake



Attacking SSL Handshake




Attack Overview


Initial guess g for q between 2⁵¹¹ and 2⁵¹² (why?)
Try all possible guesses for the top few bits
Suppose we know i-1 top bits of q. Goal: ith bit.

- Set g = <known i-1 bits of q>000000
- Set $g_{hi} = < known i-1$ bits of q > 100000 note: $g < g_{hi}$
 - If $q < q < g_{hi}$ then the ith bit of q is 0
 - If $g < g_{hi} < q$ then the ith bit of q is 1

Goal: decide whether g<q<g_{hi} or g<g_{hi}<q</p>



Two Possibilities for g_{hi}




Timing Attack Details


What is "large" and "small"?

- Know from attacking previous bits
- Decrypting just g does not work because of sliding windows
 - Decrypt a neighborhood of values near g
 - Will increase difference between large and small values, resulting in larger 0-1 gap
- Attack requires only 2 hours, about 1.4 million queries to recover the private key
 - Only need to recover most significant half bits of q


Impact of Neighborhood Size



Extracting RSA Private Key



Works On The Internet



Defenses

 Bad: require statically that all decryptions take the same time

- For example, always do the extra "dummy" reduction
- ... but what if compiler optimizes it away?
- Bad: dynamically make all decryptions the same or multiples of the same time "quantum"
 - Now all decryptions have to be as slow as the slowest decryption
- Good: Use RSA blinding

RSA Blinding

 Instead of decrypting ciphertext c, decrypt a random ciphertext related to c

- Compute x' = c*r^e mod n, r is random
- Decrypt x' to obtain m'
- Calculate original plaintext m = m'/r mod n

Since r is random, decryption time is random
2-10% performance penalty

slide 28

Blinding Works

